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ABSTRACT 
States under threat may choose to initiate war not only because their interests are 
hurt, but also because they want to establish or defend their credibility, so that they do not 
have to fight later wars. This dissertation looks at deterrence situations where the 
defender of the status quo responds to challenges with force and links its concern with 
credibility to the decision. When states are expressly worried about the repercussions of 
backing down, they are more likely to fight. By shining a spotlight on the defender rather 
than the challenger, this study enriches the discussion on why and how deterrence fails. 
By linking the decision to fight to a concern about reputation, this study also provides a 
new framework for analyzing deterrence and foreign policy. 
In addition, the dissertation joins the debate on Chinese use of force. All three 
case studies cast China as the defender that ultimately decided to fight the challenger 
decisively. In each case, aside from the real and perceived security interests at stake, 
 vii 
China’s concern with its reputation for resolve contributed to the decision. The reputation 
for resolve became a security interest in and of itself, serving to dispel future 
infringements and well worth fighting for. China was particularly worried about its 
reputation when it feared a collusion of foreign and domestic enemies and sought to 
internalize the lesson that fighting now means enjoying peace later.  
This study uses in-depth, qualitative case studies with a heavy reliance on textural 
analysis of first and secondary sources. The three case studies are China’s intervention in 
the Korean War in 1950, China’s border war with India in 1962, and Sino-Soviet clashes 
in 1969. While only three case studies are selected, they are structured along the same 
questions on deterrence and credibility to focus the reader’s attention on the hypothesis. 
The case studies are selected because they were robust tests; they were all drawn-out 
deterrence situations in which Chinese leaders pondered explicitly on the role of 
credibility. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 States under threat may choose to initiate war not only because their interests are 
hurt, but also because they want to establish or defend their credibility, so that they do not 
have to fight later wars. This study looks at deterrence situations where the defender 
responds to challenges to the status quo with force and links its concern with credibility 
to the decision. When states are expressly concerned about the repercussions of backing 
down, they are more likely to fight. The study looks at three case studies in depth, all 
with China as the defender. As such, it contributes both to the literature on deterrence and 
that on Chinese foreign and military policy. 
Literature overview 
Deterrence: the theory 
 Deterrence theory originated as an attempt to use rational choice to simplify and 
explain a particular type of interstate conflict. Simply put, deterrence is the attempt to 
dissuade an enemy from undertaking an undesirable action by threatening to retaliate 
with force. The underlying principle, that force can be used to deter or dissuade, is 
certainly nothing new, but as many scholars have argued, deterrence as a concept 
flourished with the burgeoning Cold War and accompanied the invention and use of 
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nuclear weapons.
1
 The reorganization of the world order into a bipolar system led by the 
United States and the Soviet Union pitted their allies broadly against each other, locked in 
an active competition for dominance in both core and peripheral regions of the world. 
Nuclear weapons, on the other hand, made total war unthinkable yet posed new 
complications for limited wars. Capable of annihilating entire cities in seconds, these 
weapons enabled states for the first time in the history of warfare to punish enemy states 
before defeating their troops in the battlefield.
2
 Threats, therefore, acquire much graver 
weight and have to be taken seriously. On the other hand, the awesome power of the 
weapons made threats less credible as the risk of escalation and retaliation carried 
unbearable consequences. Together the new pattern of state interaction and the 
transformative power of the new weapons focused people’s minds on how to make 
deterrence successful so that total wars did not break out.  
Deterrence, hardly a novel concept in international politics, took on newfound 
prominence. In a bipolar world in which main adversaries were seen as bent on 
challenging each other but also wary of the destruction of nuclear weapons, deterrence 
was thought to capture the majority of interstate conflicts. Conflicting strategic interests 
between the two superpowers and their allies meant that challenges were inevitable, 
                                                        
1
 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 18-34. For an 
overview of deterrence theory and various schools, see Christopher H. Achen and Duncan Snidal, “Rational 
Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies,” World Politics, Vol. 41, No. 2 (January 1989): 143-169. 
2
 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 21. 
3 
 
 
likely by taking territory from or casting influence over a country in the opposite camp. 
But such moves were seen as potentially destabilizing to the whole system and had to be 
stopped through deterrence. Understanding the dynamics of deterrence was particularly 
important not only for academic reasons but also for diplomacy, for successful deterrence 
would entail a de-escalation of conflicts and the avoidance of catastrophic war. Statesmen 
in major countries during the Cold War were consciously and unconsciously framing 
their policy decisions in terms of deterrence, and the outcomes of their policies became 
the fodder for deterrence scholars. 
The concept has both a strategic and tactical component, with different 
implications. On a strategic level, the United States and the Soviet Union were 
entrenched in general deterrence to prevent each other from upsetting the existing balance 
of power in a material fashion. As direct war between the two superpowers became 
unthinkable with the invention of nuclear weapons and the acquisition of second-strike 
capabilities, general deterrence was seen as largely stable but also of lesser interest. More 
interesting are incidents of immediate deterrence, in which a state faces a specific 
challenge from an adversary and needs to deter it. This immediate deterrence makes up 
the bulk of actual deterrence cases and is the subject of this dissertation. In the Cold War 
context, immediate deterrence usually takes place within a context of porous general 
deterrence, and by definition it means that general deterrence can be eroded to the point 
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of breaking down in isolated places. If general deterrence were completely fail-safe, and 
the two camps refrained from any challenge to the status quo, immediate deterrence could 
not have happened. 
Within immediate deterrence, extended deterrence also captured particular 
attention, especially for students of American foreign policy. In extended deterrence, the 
state defending the status quo had to fend off challenges targeting its protectorate or ally. 
Because the intent of the two superpowers defending their respective home territories was 
regarded as beyond doubt, the majority of early deterrence scholars focused on 
understanding and explaining extended deterrence. In the context of foreign policy issues 
at the time, this attention was understandable, as the US was keen to prevent the Soviet 
Union from gaining advantage first in Europe, then in Asia. Most scholars and diplomats 
assumed that this would be the area where most of the challenges would come from, 
where defense would be open to question. The task of defending its allies in far-flung 
areas of the world also posed unique challenges for deterrence scholars. 
 Unlike other types of war initiation, deterrence seems logical and sequential, and 
success is seen at least in part as a result of careful design. The defender takes stock of a 
challenger’s actions, threatens to respond by a variety of tools and communication 
mechanisms, and the challenger either attacks or backs down after weighing the benefits 
of attacking versus the risks of escalation and punishment. The crucial question quickly 
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turns to, how could one achieve deterrence success? Given the construction of the 
deterrence process, it appeared that a clever act of deterring could dissuade enemies 
effectively, whereas a blunder could lead to deterrence failure. 
Early scholars boiled down deterrence policy to three factors: commitment, 
capabilities, and the communication of commitment.
3
 Commitment, or the intent to 
protect certain interests, was treated as a given. The defender was presumed to be 
committed to its interests. It is a prerequisite for deterrence to work – without 
commitment deterrence is unnecessary – but it is also often left in an abstract, 
unexplained form, especially in extended deterrence. As Thomas C. Schelling points out, 
it is difficult to put commitment in concrete terms and articulate what an ally is 
committed to doing for another, and threats are very difficult to establish: “saying so, 
unfortunately, does not make it true; and if it is true, saying so does not always make it 
believed.”4 Capabilities are what is used to coerce the challenger. Because of the 
terrifying destruction of nuclear power, capabilities were also most often regarded as 
universal and unequivocal, especially for nuclear powers.  
Since both commitment and capabilities were assumed to be self-evident, and 
states were assumed to be rational actors capable of cost-benefit analysis, failures of 
                                                        
3
 For an excellent review and critique of early deterrence theory, see Alexander L. George and Richard 
Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1974), 58-83. 
4
 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 35. 
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actual deterrence incidents therefore could only be blamed on insufficient communication 
or misunderstanding of that commitment. It is not that commitment was weak; it was 
simply misunderstood. By implication, if the defender had communicated more 
effectively, the challenger might have backed down. The emphasis on communication 
therefore led to a fascination with signaling and efforts to predict the challenger’s 
reaction to certain signals with the aid of game theory. But the use of game theory further 
simplified deterrence into a highly stylized interaction where both parties base their 
decisions on the material pay-off of feasible policies, and outcomes are predictable. 
 However, this “normative-prescriptive” branch of the theory seriously limited its 
applicability to real-world deterrence situations.
5
 The theory was based on either 
misleading or simplistic assumptions about the nature of the Cold War and the process of 
decision-making. Actors were portrayed as unitary and rational, capable of weighing 
difficult options with perfect information and freedom from normative concerns. The 
actual content of commitment policy was often ignored, substituted with a binary 
understanding that commitment is either there or not. Although these assumptions may 
have helped in understanding the intrinsic logic of deterrence, they provided very little 
guidance to actual applications of deterrence. Strategic and foreign policy goals, the most 
important context for conflicts, were cast aside.  
                                                        
5
 George and Smoke, 59-60. 
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 Having realized the shortcomings of deductive reasoning based on abstract 
models, scholars such as Alexander George and Richard Smoke began to conduct large-
scale, comparative case studies of immediate deterrence in order to build an inductive and 
historical theory that takes into account the complexity of conflicts. From these case 
studies, George and Smoke conclude that the key to deterrence outcomes is the 
challenger’s assessment of the defender’s commitment and the calculability of the risks 
of its policy.
6
 Both are necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for deterrence success, but 
the latter has more predictive power over deterrence outcomes.
7
 They argue that the 
outcome of any deterrence situation depends fundamentally upon the grand strategy and 
foreign policy of the defender – in this case the US – and cannot replace foreign policy 
where there is none. Later, Paul K. Huth and Bruce Russett analyze the outcome of more 
than fifty deterrence cases and argue similarly that it is the defender’s level of actual 
commitment to its ally, demonstrated through foreign aid and alliance relationships, that 
determines the challenger’s decision of whether to launch its offensive. Politics is 
reintroduced into deterrence theory to provide a richer context for outcomes. However, 
these scholars still clearly predicate their framework on expected utility or rational choice, 
the idea that challengers decide on the course of action that incurs lesser costs.
8
 They 
                                                        
6
 Ibid., 519-532. 
7
 Ibid., ch. 17. 
8
 Paul K. Huth and Bruce Russett. “What Makes Deterrence Work?” World Politics 36, no. 04 (1984): 496-
526. 
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fine-tune the variables with the aid of comparative case studies but do not overturn the 
underlying assumptions of the earlier scholars. 
 In contrast, other scholars question the validity of the rational model itself. Robert 
Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janis Gross Stein argue that the mainstream approach to 
understanding deterrence outcomes, which focuses on the impact of the defender’s 
commitment and actions on the decisions of the challenger, is misconstrued. Instead, 
leaders in challenger states are often internally motivated, forced by domestic weaknesses 
to provoke international crises in order to distract the public. These challenger leaders are 
particularly prone to misperceptions that blind them to even clearly demonstrated 
commitment and strength of the defender. Deterrence, in this case, is difficult to succeed, 
and assurance may work better than aggressive tactics in forestalling conflicts.
9
 They also 
disagree with Ruth and Russett on what causes deterrence successes. Rather than credit 
the deterring nation’s efforts in demonstrating and communicating its resolve and 
strength, one should find out the internally driven reasons for the challenger to withdraw 
from the confrontation. In many cases, the challenger does not in fact wish to change the 
status quo to begin with, so the question of whether a state has been successfully deterred 
is moot. Deterrence success could be created if scholars believed that the Soviet Union 
and China were actively seeking to upset the balance of power, and their failure to mount 
                                                        
9
 Robert Jervis , Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein. Psychology and Deterrence. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1985, 203-232. 
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material attacks would then be codified as success.
10
 This wholesale challenge on the 
assumptions of rational deterrence model and Cold War history earned them the name of 
revisionist scholars. 
 While Jervis, Lebow and Stein’s effort to shift some attention to the domestic 
dynamics within the challenger state casts a new light on the theory, Huth and Russett 
vigorously reject the accusation that the rational deterrence theory is based on Cold-War 
assumptions. They point out that Lebow and Stein’s critique of rational deterrence theory 
is influenced by “a tendency on their part to accept too readily the conclusions of the 
revisionist literature.”11 Too much emphasis on – and empathy with – the challenger’s 
intentions would result in discounting the threat posed by the challenger and hence the 
number of deterrence cases.
12
 While Huth and Russett are willing to allow for a role by 
psychological variables, they insist that the rational-choice framework remains robust and 
rigorous, as long as the case studies are treated consistently and studied systematically. 
 Elli Lieberman also points out that Lebow and Stein’s internal-weakness thesis 
suffers from a theoretical paradox: even if leaders facing domestic challenges are tempted 
to initiate conflicts in order to distract or mobilize the domestic audience, they should 
realize their own vulnerability were their challenges to fail. Only stronger leaders can 
                                                        
10
 See Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, “Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable,” World 
Politics 42, issue 03 (1990): 345-347. 
11
 Huth and Russett, “Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference,” World Politics 42, issue 04 
(1990): 487. 
12
 Ibid., 498-499. 
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accept the risks inherent in any military adventure; others should logically have valid 
reasons to seek compromises with the opponent.
13
 Lebow and Stein suggest that 
beleaguered leaders may engage in self-deception through motivated biases to exaggerate 
the possibility of controlling the risks or, if war were to break out, that of winning the 
conflict.
14
 Lieberman contends that such misperceptions, which Lebow and Stein seek to 
explain on cognitive and psychological terms, in fact represent the challenger’s 
uncertainty towards either the defender’s capabilities or its resolve. Improved rational 
deterrence theory can successfully account for the so-called gap between deterrence 
theory and deterrence as a practice of policy identified by Lebow and Stein.  
 The shift from abstract modeling to comparative case studies has led to a 
tremendous increase of historical richness, but as Christopher Cohen and Duncan Snidal 
point out in their critique of case studies, the richness has not resulted in much theory-
building. A large number of cross-country, cross-time case studies often introduce a long 
list of factors or typology that do not lend themselves to parsimonious theories.
15
 On the 
other hand, country specialists also often have doubts on the interpretation of individual 
case studies, demanding even more historical nuance. The tension between the original 
stylized theory and the attempt to test it through case studies is not easily resolved.  
                                                        
13
 Elli Lieberman, “The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate: Is the Dependent Variable Elusive?” Security 
Studies 3, no.3 (1994): 387. 
14
 Richard Ned Lebow, “The Deterrence Deadlock: Is There a Way Out?” in Jervis, Lebow and Stein, 
Psychology and Deterrence, 180. 
15 Christopher H. Achen and Duncan Snidal, “Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies,” 
World Politics 41, No. 2 (1989):154-158. 
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Credibility: the underdeveloped variable 
 Since both commitment and capabilities of the defender need to be perceived and 
weighed by the challenger in order to have an impact on its decisions, the perceptive lens 
becomes the most significant but also the most difficult variable. This is where the 
credibility of the defender, especially when it is making threats, comes in. However, 
despite the obvious theoretical and substantive development of the field in the last half-
century, Paul Huth argues that “as an explanatory variable, reputation is the least 
developed component of deterrence theory.”16 In the early stages, Schelling argues that it 
helps to not act completely rational in order to be credible.
17
 Though the issue of 
perception focuses on the challenger’s decision-making, credibility is key to perception. 
Patrick Morgan describes efforts to understand the process of cognition and decision-
making on either the individual level, the group or organizational level, or the national 
actor level.
18
 Their explanatory power varies, since certain variables – such as the 
idiosyncrasies of individual leaders – cannot be simplified into parsimonious variables, 
but the reputation of the defender logically affects calculations on all three levels. As such 
the question of reputation, or credibility, becomes the key factor that unifies varied 
                                                        
16
 Paul K. Huth, “Reputations and Deterrence: A Theoretical and Empirical Assessment”, Security Studies 7, 
no.1 (1997): 97. 
17
 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 36-43. 
18
 Patrick Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1977), ch.3. 
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channels of cognition. 
Is commitment interdependent? In other words, does the challenger infer future 
behavior of the defender from its past record? What makes a country credible, and where 
does reputation come from? Some insist that commitment is cumulative, interdependent 
and that reputation is “one of the few things worth fighting over.”19 Stephen Maxwell, on 
the other end, asserts that reputation is case-specific and rarely accounts for deterrence 
outcomes, as commitment is interest-specific and hardly transferable.
20
 It is also difficult 
to determine how reputation plays its role. Scholastic opinion suggests that reputation 
influences the challenger’s assessment of the defender’s commitment, yet how and what 
exactly the challenger observes in crises is hard to pinpoint. For example, even the 
debacle in the Vietnam War did not seem to have diminished American reputation in the 
long run, and US success in forcing the Soviet Union to withdraw its missiles from Cuba 
did not stop the latter from challenging American commitment later on. The simple 
assumption that a single victory can breed credibility needs to be questioned. 
In very specific incidents, credibility may refer to the immediate credit-worthiness 
of a particular threat, and can be enhanced by clear, trusted communication channels or 
transparent display of force. Deterrence may be strengthened by careful planning and 
common sense. But the credibility as the subject of this dissertation and of deterrence 
                                                        
19
 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 124. 
20
 Stephen Maxwell, Rationality in Deterrence, Adelphi Papers, No. 50, August 1968: 19. 
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theory also covers something bigger, the overall reputation of the state and the likelihood 
that it would carry out its threats.  
 The apparent lack of agreement on the nature and role of reputation and 
credibility stems partly from the rational deterrence model that pictures deterrence as a 
clearly demarcated, objective and logical sequence in which actions convey an 
unequivocal message and bring about an anticipated impact on the other side. Instead, as 
Patrick Morgan argues persuasively, deterrence is necessarily a psychological relationship, 
the secret to its success not in possessing the wherewithal to defeat the opponent but in 
convincing the opponent of such.
21
 If we accept that deterrence relies on the act of 
convincing, then the way the challenger interprets the signals sent by the defender 
becomes critical. A reputation for resolve can color a challenger’s perception, giving 
more validity to threats. However, the variable is difficult to quantify and observe, and 
scholars often work backward from the outcome of deterrence: if a threat fails to deter, it 
must not have been sufficiently credible. This way of theorizing diminishes the role of 
credibility and leads attention elsewhere. 
 
Defender: the undervalued actor 
 A bigger flaw in deterrence theory that impedes a fuller understanding of 
                                                        
21
 Morgan, 32. 
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reputation, however, is the setup of the sequence that stresses the initiatives of the 
challenger and downplays those of the defender. The theory posits that deterrence works 
against a challenge to the status quo and that the defender will defend the status quo 
through the threat of force. Thus, the defender needs only to lay bare its interests and 
ability to defend, and in turn the challenger needs to make the crucial decision of whether 
to pursue its initiative and call the defender’s bluff. In this view, deterrence breaks down 
only in one fashion, when the challenger decides to test the defender’s threat of retaliation. 
Of course, the defender’s threat plays a significant role, but it is up to the challenger 
whether deterrence succeeds or fails. 
Even though deterrence theory has benefited significantly in recent years from 
large-scale case studies, the focus remains on the actions of the challenger. George and 
Smoke argue that the challenger’s perception of the defender’s commitment, as well as its 
assessment of the controllability of risks, determine deterrence outcomes. Likewise, Huth 
and Russett’s study emphasizes the defender’s actual political ties to the protected ally as 
a decisive factor in influencing the challenger’s perceptions. Morgan also stresses the 
effect of the challenger’s fragmented decision-making on its perceptions.22 The 
defender’s decision-making structure, in contrast, receives not much treatment.  
                                                        
22
 George and Smoke, 519-532. Huth and Russett. “What Makes Deterrence Work?”: 496-526. Morgan, 
Deterrence, 32. 
15 
 
 
 Nothing in the logic of deterrence, however, dictates that only one party can be 
responsible for escalating pre-conflict confrontations to open conflicts. Deterrence, in the 
purest sense, is simply the threat of using force to dissuade a challenge. It says nothing 
about the sequence of events that follow. Some challenges may alter the status quo or 
change the defender’s perception of the acceptability of the status quo to such a degree 
that the defender changes its assessment of how desirable it is to maintain the status quo. 
It may decide, in the course of the usually quite lengthy period of trying to interpret the 
opponent’s intentions and influence its actions, to escalate the conflict initiated by the 
other side, to launch a preemptive attack, or to threaten the other side with such 
asymmetric force that the latter is forced to respond violently.  
In short, the defender could play a much greater role than commonly believed in 
deciding the outcome of deterrence, especially failures. The theory so far treats the 
defender’s actions as a variable that feeds into the thinking of the challenger. Yet the 
defender is also in the position to decide outcomes by going to war before the challenger 
has a chance to. Moreover, the crucial variable of credibility is all the more interesting in 
the defender’s own perception. This dissertation attempts to contribute to the literature on 
deterrence theory by pointing out this much-overlooked variable and exploring its effect. 
 Current theorizing on deterrence also suffers from overconcentration on cases 
within the context of a single episode of general deterrence, namely the nuclear standoff 
16 
 
 
between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Although this 
conflict deserves attention, it has led to a preference for highly stylized models because 
direct conflicts are unthinkable and have to be mapped conceptually. Lessons drawn from 
studying two superpowers equipped with vast nuclear arsenals are not necessarily 
applicable to other areas of the world or other bilateral relations, either. This focus on the 
United States also reinforces the other misperception mentioned above – the tendency to 
equate the defender in a deterrence situation with the defender of the broader status quo 
world order. It was largely assumed that the United States had no intention of challenging 
the Soviet Union’s influence or possessions in the absence of provocations, and that its 
primary goal was to prevent conflicts; the same, however, is not often said about the 
Soviet Union.  
 The literature on US deterrence policy, however, is the one exception to the 
general lack of interest in the defender’s concern with credibility. Scholars describe the 
US as troubled by its reputation, often choosing to fight even when vital interests were 
not involved for the sake of credibility. However, this literature makes only a limited 
contribution to deterrence theory because the US was regarded as an exception, and no 
comparable study was done on the Soviet Union or China. US was deemed different 
because it had to lead a large alliance from a remote offshore location, and its democratic 
form of government meant that public support for military conflicts or expensive foreign 
17 
 
 
policy initiatives cannot always be guaranteed.
23
 Add to that the conviction that the 
Soviet camp harbored deeply hostile and aggressive policies, this strategic disadvantage 
as a democratic, offshore leader bred fear for being perceived as irresolute by enemies 
and friends alike.  
Skeptics could argue that the US experience may not apply to other powers. The 
US had the unique advantage of overwhelming strength and an all-encompassing grand 
strategy, which means that it has more security options than middle-range states and can 
“afford” to fight for prestige. Smaller and burgeoning powers may not have the luxury of 
using force against challenges that do not immediately undermine national security. 
However, the same fear of being seen as irresolute applies to smaller and nondemocratic 
states as well. Even the US did not always consider itself secure in relative power 
comparisons with the Soviet Union, so small states with limited resources could also 
choose to use force to defend their reputation. The exceptionalism of the US may not be 
as great as it appears.  
 
Deterrence vs. Compellence 
 Scholars of security policy also draw a distinction between deterrence and 
compellence, both coercive acts short of war. On the analytical level, the definition for 
                                                        
23
 See Patrick Morgan, “Saving Face for the Sake of Deterrence,” in Jervis, Lebow and Stein, Psychology 
and Deterrence, 125-152. 
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each act seems clean-cut and self-contained. Deterrence presents a definite beginning (an 
opponent considers an undesirable move), a coercive instrument (the defender threatens 
to use force or other forms of punishment), and an intention to persuade the challenger to 
give up its designs. It seems purely defensive, though the threat of violence is evoked for 
this purpose. In the other type of coercion – compellence, the challenger has already 
carried out the challenge to the defender and moved the dial. The status quo has become 
status quo ante. Schelling and other scholars therefore see a clear difference between the 
two security challenges; the defender seeks to defend the status quo in deterrence, but 
restore the status quo ante in compellence by coercing its enemy to reverse the 
unfavorable action.
24
 The two are viewed as similar yet distinctive types of conflicts, and 
it is often argued that deterrence is easier to achieve than compellence because it does not 
require the very public reversal of one’s actions, which carries prohibitive political costs. 
In the debate between Huth and Russett on one side and Jervis and Lebow on the other, 
much effort is spent on classifying cases correctly. If a deterrence case is in fact 
compellence, which relies on a different set of factors in order to succeed and is more 
difficult to begin with, its outcome should not be used to test the validity of deterrence 
theories. 
Just as deterrence is assumed to be purely defensive, compellence is portrayed as 
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 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 69-71. 
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clearly offensive. Alexander George derives the concepts of coercive diplomacy and 
blackmail from compellence and argues that compellence implies heavy reliance on 
coercion.
25
 However, insisting that deterrence and compellence are mutually exclusive 
would ignore the complexity of deterrence situations. It is often very difficult to 
determine whether a move is a mere challenge to deterrence or a material encroachment 
of the status quo that needs to be repelled. Also, a threat of retaliation, if challenges do 
not stop, may be interpreted by the adversary as an attempt to coerce it to do as it wishes. 
In the cases in which both sides have an incentive to portray themselves as the defender 
(which would include most cases), the interpretation of the event rests on what the status 
quo is and what a challenge is. These questions concern the judgment of state behavior in 
the Cold War and remain the subjects of important contention among country specialists 
and Cold War historians.  
Empirically, deterrence scenarios, especially those involving two neighbors, are 
usually not as clear cut as extended deterrence. Challenges to borders, which make up a 
substantial portion of inter-state conflicts, tend to consist of limited border clashes or 
advances rather than plans for a large-scale invasion. Such skirmishes may be interpreted 
as the kind of solid changes to the status quo that call for compellence; yet in the broader 
context of military conflicts, they may be considered harbingers of the greater challenge 
                                                        
25
 Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, eds., The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 2
nd
 edition 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1994): ch.1. 
20 
 
 
that needs to be deterred. Territorial disputes are almost always predicated on competing 
historical and legal claims. Legal merit, even if it could be established, does not equal the 
status quo before a conflict. Territorial disputes therefore highlight the often fluid 
definition of the status quo on which deterrence theory is based.  
 
Hypothesis of this dissertation 
 This study examines the defender’s concern with its reputation for resolve in 
deterrence situations and demonstrates that this concern contributes to the decision to 
fight. It also searches for the causes for such a concern, thus establishing a pattern of 
behavior that may have implications for similar situations in the future. All the case 
studies posit China as the defender in immediate deterrence situations.
26
 
This study argues that states concerned with their reputations for resolve are more 
likely to respond to challenges with force, turning a deterrence situation into a violent 
conflict. In short, states may choose to fight current wars so as not to fight later ones. 
Deterrence is rarely a one-shot interaction; it often takes place over a period of time, 
offering both sides time to weigh their options and evaluate the status quo dynamically. 
Likewise, the challenger rarely gives up its probing and advances immediately after the 
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initial threat of punishment by the defender, especially when it has doubts about whether 
the defender is willing to bear the costs of escalation. The defender, in this scenario, may 
become concerned about its own credibility and decide to initiate a conflict in order to 
establish or maintain a reputation for toughness. 
 Both the defender and the challenger look beyond the immediate interests 
involved when mulling their options. One shortcoming of traditional deterrence theory is 
its singular focus on the values both sides place on the immediate issue, such as the 
integrity of an ally or the value of a particular disputed area, which renders each 
deterrence case unique and isolated. Yet not only may both consider the shadow that their 
actions cast in the future, they are also influenced and restrained by the legacies of past 
deterrence situations. Although it is imprudent to assert that states infer weakness from 
defeat in a linear fashion and ignore the circumstances of the issue at hand, it is also 
unreasonable to assume that past lessons, no matter what they are, have no bearing on 
current perceptions and decisions. Statesmen, just like scholars, try to understand foreign 
policy challenges in a historical and comparative context, which shapes the perception 
and interpretation of challenges and the corresponding responses. 
 The role of the shadow of the future is particularly pronounced between enduring 
rivalry relationships, defined by Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl as enduring 
competitiveness between a pair of states over a certain good, involving at least five 
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militarized disputes in a period of at least ten years.
27
 Enduring rivalries are empirically 
important because twice as many conflicts occur in enduring rivalries as in isolated 
disputes, and these conflicts have a much higher propensity for flaring into wars. Goertz 
and Diehl conclude that conflicts are not independent of each other but rather shaped 
heavily by the context.
28
 Their empirical finding is especially relevant to deterrence, since 
a considerable number of immediate deterrence crises occur between enduring rivalries 
engaged in long-term general deterrence. In such a context, the defender might have an 
even stronger incentive to “overreact” to minor infringements from the rival because it 
sees the danger of irresoluteness as casting a cumulative and negative influence on long-
term deterrence. The challenger, on the other hand, is also more likely to presume 
reactions by the defender from past experiences. Since the good coveted by both sides is 
unlikely to change drastically, the historical pattern of interaction is more meaningful to 
decision-makers than it is in non-enduring rivalry relationships. The recognition of such a 
learning process in turn strengthens the defender’s belief that its generalized credibility is 
at stake even in minor challenges and that it must be defended in order to ward off 
excessive challenges from its opponent in the future. 
 Similarly, Elli Lieberman argues that deterrence must be studied longitudinally 
because deterrence is created through engagement in the long run. “A defender cannot 
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establish the requirements of deterrence, a credible threat based on a demonstrated 
capability and will, in any single deterrence episode.”29 Here deterrence success acquires 
a general meaning. It no longer refers simply to one particular case in which the opponent 
is dissuaded from attack, but represents the moment when general deterrence succeeds 
and the opponent accepts the balance of power between the two states. Immediate 
deterrence thus becomes an organic component of general deterrence and the overall 
foreign policy of states. In addition, deterrence successes and failures between rivals are 
intimately connected. Lieberman examines both deterrence successes and failures 
between the same pair of states, Israel and Egypt, and asserts that “requirements for 
deterrence stability can only be created through war.”30 Only by defeating the opponent 
repeatedly and unequivocally can a reputation for resolve be established and deterrence 
achieved. In other words, meeting challenges with violence may in fact contribute to 
future stability even though it might disturb peace temporarily. Clearly, if the defender 
realizes the shadow of the future, it has more reasons to favor the option of force. 
Moreover, because Lieberman considers deterrence as a longitudinal strategy rather than 
discrete incidents, he finds that defense and compellence “are elements of a larger 
strategy of deterrence whose aim is to influence the behavior of the challenger.”31 In 
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other words, the distinction between the two types of coercion is not as precise as 
generally thought. 
 Actions short of war, such as demonstrations of force, do not come close as 
effective deterrents, however. Lieberman argues that truly resolute leaders have one way 
to distinguish themselves from irresolute ones: committing to actions too costly to fake. 
Wars, which incur immediate costs but uncertain future benefits, are the ultimate 
barometer of resolve.
32
 The outcome of wars most indisputably determines the balance of 
capabilities each side can bring to bear in conflicts and establishes a reputation at the 
same time. 
 Thus, the defender’s own assessment of its credibility and reputation is crucial to 
the outcome of deterrence situations. However, whenever perception is the explanatory 
factor, there is the inevitable question of whether that perception is correct or mistaken 
and whether the distinction matters. Generally speaking, there is considerable 
methodological difficulty in establishing an objective or “correct” perception to be 
compared with the misperception.
33
 In this case, however, the explanatory power of the 
hypothesis does not rest on the disjuncture between subjective and objective perceptions 
but rather the subjective assessment of one’s credibility and the concern with the lack of 
it. The purpose of this dissertation is to study the effect of this concern with credibility on 
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the policy making of the defender. 
 Besides the question of how the concern with credibility shapes policies, this 
study also addresses the question of where this concern comes from. What are the factors 
that breed a strong concern about reputation? Can changes in these factors alleviate such 
fears? While security interests and the severity of threats still anchor a state’s 
consideration of policy options in any particular incident, the role of credibility may serve 
to either accelerate or slow escalation. Therefore, if credibility is brought on by either 
certain structural features or temporal factors, addressing these factors may alleviate an 
excessive concern about credibility. 
This study argues that states that define an enduring rivalry with the challenger in 
a deterrence situation are more concerned about credibility. States that foresee repeated 
conflicts with the same opponent might favor the use of force as a preventive measure 
against excessive challenges. As security threats will be forthcoming regardless of 
whether the issue at hand is resolved, using force becomes a less costly alternative in this 
larger context, when benefits will be felt long into the future. 
States that consider themselves strategically vulnerable also have a heightened 
sense of reputation. This sensitivity is the most acute when an external challenge is linked 
to domestic weaknesses that raise fears of revolt. Some scholars have argued that states 
experiencing domestic problems might be prone to military action because they are 
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concerned their opponents might infer vulnerability from domestic troubles. They are 
also afraid that regime survival is under threat if domestic opposition gains strength when 
the sovereignty of the state is at risk. Deterrence success rests on the strength of a state’s 
capabilities and resolve. Weak states in particular may be more concerned with its image, 
its reputation for action, than stronger states. Having learned through repeated deterrence 
cases that other states do not take their warnings seriously, these weak countries may 
decide to respond to challenges with force in order to establish such a reputation. What 
they lack in capabilities they may try to make up in resolve if the challenges are severe 
enough. 
The similarity of these two scenarios is that security threat to the state is 
compounded by the factors of time and image; credibility is not just an optional good, but 
a vital security good. In other words, it is not just a luxury for some, but a necessity for 
most. In these cases, defenders are motivated to fight to be seen as resolute. By extension, 
states with a revolutionary or ideologically-charged foreign policy are more likely 
affected by this concern, as they are both more prone to enduing rivalries and fears of 
domestic revolt. As a newly established regime, the leadership is wary that others may try 
to take advantage of it. A revolutionary regime that upsets the regional and sometimes 
international balance of power is also bound to encounter frequent challenges, which 
force the leadership to link even minor incursions to the fundamental question of what the 
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appropriate regional or international order is. 
In each deterrence interaction, we need to consider the broad foreign policy 
context facing the leadership, not just the immediate issue at hand. Conflicts do not grow 
out of nowhere, but stem from either significant disruptions to the international or 
regional system and bilateral interests that form a history of interactions. First, states are 
often forced to make sense of complicated and sometimes contradictory external 
pressures, threats, and assurances beyond the immediate issue of concern. Second, as the 
leadership presides over a domestic as well as an international audience, it can be 
motivated by internal concerns and values that nonetheless have a bearing on its foreign 
policy. Fundamental changes in a state’s perception of external threat are often 
accompanied by important adjustments on the domestic front. Third, as perception is by 
definition produced by the decision-making process, the factors that affect this process of 
interpretation can be influential as well. A highly centralized, stable bureaucratic 
decision-making structure, compared with a period of intensive factional struggle and 
internal strife, could yield very different decisions even on matters of national security. 
Finally, a state surprised by a challenger’s questioning of its resolve could develop a 
heightened sensitivity towards its reputation in the future. 
 These arguments are hardly new to international relations. However, they have 
often been studied as discrete, competing hypotheses that do not complement each other. 
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They are used to explain particular conflicts, but the findings do not form a basis for 
cumulative knowledge because no hypothesis links them together. Too often the 
distinction between domestic and international factors and the agent-structure debate 
divide the field of international relations unnecessarily. This study seeks to contribute to 
the literature by approaching these hypotheses from the singular perspective of 
deterrence. In particular, it points out that they are in fact complementary hypotheses, all 
exerting an influence on the concern with credibility. By intensifying or alleviating this 
concern, these domestic and international factors indirectly shape the outcome of 
deterrence situations.   
 
Chinese Use of Force: The Substantive Debate 
 The three case studies in this dissertation span the time period since the 
establishment of the People’s Republic of China to the height of the Cultural Revolution. 
The choice of China is deliberate, for as a deterrence player, China offers a broad range 
of explanatory factors, and the conclusions of this study are relevant to more countries’ 
experiences than a study of the nuclear confrontation between the US and the Soviet 
Union. A middle-range, vulnerable, revolutionary power likely perceives threat and 
builds its credibility differently than an enormously powerful, entrenched, relatively 
secure superpower. Given the common assumption that a less powerful country has fewer 
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options and gets punished more for making mistakes, China’s decisions to enter conflicts 
were all the more intriguing. In the field of Chinese security, this dissertation joins the 
debate on the pattern of Chinese use of force, a fertile field for scholars helped by a 
gradual opening of Cold War archives. However, the literature on Chinese use of force, 
and more broadly, Chinese foreign policy, is rife with both empirical disagreements and 
competing schools of thought. 
 
The empirical debate: how much force did China use? 
First, the field is divided on the starting point of theorizing, which is China’s 
empirical record of using force. Was China a minimally violent, defensive power that 
shunned conflicts, or a state that preferred force to settle disputes? Early in the Cold War, 
Western scholars and policy-makers tended to regard China as just another Soviet 
satellite, acting upon Moscow’s decrees or its own radical revolutionary vision and 
harboring a dangerous propensity to use force. Later events, especially the increasingly 
public Sino-Soviet split that ultimately erupted into armed clashes, undermined the earlier 
perception. Since then, many scholars have agreed with the conclusions first forwarded 
by Allen S. Whiting, who argues that China has used force judiciously and out of its own 
national security interests. Arthur Huck writes, in the middle of the frenzied Cultural 
Revolution no less, that beneath the turbulent and ever-more-fanatic ideological rhetoric 
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lies a realist and shrewd logic of security calculations. China “has maintained an 
essentially defensive military posture” that has been “obscured to some extent by an 
aggressive Maoist political stance.”34 Many contemporary Chinese scholars have agreed 
with that argument and maintain a mostly benign assessment of Mao’s foreign policy 
even though at the same time denouncing his domestic political and economic policies. 
When it comes to theories on military strategy, a significant portion of the Chinese 
literature categorizes all Beijing’s use of force as “active defense,” a term adopted by the 
People’s Liberation Army as the guiding principle of China’s post-independence military 
stance, and thus infers that China used force only to defend its own territory or interests 
and only as a last resort.
35
 
This assessment of Chinese use of force, however, is largely based on an 
evaluation of several salient cases studies, rather than quantitative evidence. The best 
known aggregate datasets of military conflicts belie this sanguine image of a China 
always using force minimally and only as a last resort. Alastair Iain Johnston analyzes the 
University of Michigan dataset on militarized interstate disputes in the Cold War and 
concludes that China is among the states with the most frequent and violent record of 
using force in the post-1945 period. Not only was China second only to the US among 
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major powers in the frequency of conflicts, but China was the most likely among major 
powers to escalate conflicts into full-blown wars and more likely to respond to challenges 
with force. In other words, China did not shy away from using force to resolve disputes 
and from escalating conflicts. Why? Johnston compares the validity of several theories 
and concludes that the most probable ones point to territorial security and the higher 
incidence of conflicts by newly revolutionary states to explain such a record.
36
 
 To a certain extent this empirical gap between a pattern of violent and frequent 
resort to force and the portrayal of Chinese military policies as defensive is not as wide as 
it seems. The change of government in 1949 and the dramatic transformation of the state 
and society disrupted the regional and international balance of power, and as a result, 
China had many direct and potential conflicts with its neighbors and with the US to settle. 
Undefined borders are an obvious source of conflict, but other interests, such as new 
alliance relations, could also be disruptive for the neighbors of a new regime. Unable and 
unwilling to reach a compromise on certain issues it deemed vital to its interests, China 
did not have many policy alternatives at its disposal. Force was simply the choice by 
default. 
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The theoretical debate: was China driven by revolution or realpolitik? 
 However, we cannot simply write off the disparity either. The disagreement over 
the empirical record reveals a much deeper and more important theoretical division 
among scholars in the explanation of Chinese history of using force, and much of the 
disagreements stems from a normative judgment of Chinese security policy. The critical 
questions are: first, was China a status quo power or revisionist power? In other words, 
did China have only minimal goals of territorial security or grand designs of altering the 
existing order either to its advantage or according to the ideal world order of its choice? 
Consequently, what drives Chinese security policy, Maoist ideology or realpolitik 
calculations? Third, did the leadership in Beijing approach security policies based on 
external factors or was it internally driven, manipulating conflicts to realize political 
goals or misperceiving outside signals because of powerful personal and cultural biases? 
These questions are interrelated but not completely interchangeable. They target different 
aspects of foreign policy-making—goals, motivations, and processes. A revisionist power, 
defined as one that seeks to change the status quo to its desired landscape, may still be 
sensitive to external threats and calculate its policy rationally. Likewise, a regime largely 
satisfied with the status quo may still make critical mistakes regarding military conflicts 
if the leaders became blinded by misperceptions of the enemy. 
 Those who argue that China’s security policy was defensive and status quo draw 
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on the fact that it used force only on its border, apparently to defend its territorial security. 
China did not seek to expand its territory even after resoundingly defeating Indian troops 
in 1962, nor did it station troops in its friendly allies permanently. Allen Whiting, in his 
monumental study of the Korean War, the Indochina conflict, and the war against India, 
notes that in each case China attempted to warn the opponent of its intent to intervene and 
carefully calibrated and paced its verbal signals to the severity of the situation in its eyes. 
He contends that China was chiefly motivated by a threat against its territorial security. 
This threat, heightened by a fear of encirclement and exploitation of domestic 
weaknesses by the enemy, persuaded China to use force even against much stronger 
opponents.
37
 
 In stark contrast to the view that China was judicious, status quo, and used force 
only as a controlled response to severe and objective security threats, other scholars paint 
a far more violent picture of the Beijing leadership. Mao, they point out, was deeply 
convinced of the superiority of a Leninist state and a centrally planned economy and 
sought to keep the revolution alive, even to the detriment of the Communist Party and the 
society at large.
38
 As Mao himself argued, foreign policy is the extension of a state’s 
domestic policy, and it is difficult to imagine that a government with turbulent and radical 
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policy priorities at home would not project the same aspirations abroad. Similarly, Chen 
Jian, a leading Chinese specialist on Cold War history, identifies three rationales that 
shaped Beijing’s decision-making before its intervention in the Korean War: the 
Communist Party’s revolutionary nationalism, its sense of responsibility towards world 
revolution, and the need to maintain a domestic revolutionary zeal.
39
 China intervened in 
the Korean War not just out of security concerns, but more importantly because of deep-
seated ideological affinity with North Korea and the need to purge the Chinese society of 
reactionary elements. As evidence, Chen points out that the leadership in Beijing made up 
its mind to intervene in the Korean War as early as in August of 1950, barely two months 
after the outbreak of the war and a full month before the Inchon landing that ended North 
Korea’s bid to unify the peninsula.40 The decision to intervene was a foregone conclusion, 
decided not by external security threats but more importantly by Mao’s Communist world 
view. 
Chen’s recent, expanded history of Mao’s foreign policy in the Cold War furthers 
this claim and traces a thread of ideological reasoning in all China’s major foreign policy 
decisions during the Cold War. He asserts that China pursued its foreign policy not as a 
result of cost-benefit analysis, but as a result of ideological and revolutionary doctrines 
and predictions. By ideology he does not mean orthodox Marxism, but rather Mao’s ever-
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changing ideological preferences, his thinking on the international system, Communist 
movements, and domestic socialism-building.
41
 This depiction of China clearly has 
practical implications. If Mao’s calculation of foreign policy was dominated by 
ideological doctrines he was deeply convinced of, scholars would have to largely 
acknowledge in retrospect the wisdom of the containment policy. Such a revolutionary 
power obviously could not have been peacefully acculturated by the established powers 
in the international system, and since other states cannot count on normal diplomacy to 
influence Mao’s revolutionary thinking, the only option left with any probability of 
success would be tough containment and encirclement. In other words, a state leader 
driven mostly by beliefs and insensitive to external pressures is difficult to deter.  
 On the other hand, although revolutionary ideals may have shaped foreign China’s 
policy goals, Mao may have also partaken in or even engineered international crises in 
order to advance his own political agenda. Chen Jian’s work on Chinese intervention in 
the Korean War also remarks on the larger domestic context of the Korean War in Mao’s 
eyes, which was to transform the entire Chinese society and revive its great power status. 
Once China declared that it has sided with North Korea against the US-led UN forces, the 
government initiated a massive mobilization and propaganda campaign in a bid to purge 
the society of all counterrevolutionary elements, eventually resulting in hundreds of 
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thousands of executions. The war abroad served to garner considerable support for the 
regime, and by the end of the three-year war China declared that it has finished the initial 
period of socialist transformation (gaizao).
42
 In other words, one of the most important 
reasons for China’s intervention and thus escalation of the war may be the fringe benefits 
the war can bring to China’s domestic reform. 
Thomas J. Christensen also points out the mobilizing use of international crises 
not just in China but also in the US, but his explanation is based on the need to fund 
unpopular and expensive grand strategies. When state leaders choose a grand strategy 
with a prohibitive price tag or a very high hurdle, they need to mobilize the masses and 
the political leadership to support their visions and as a result become the victims of their 
own success. In order to sell their unpopular strategies, in other words, they may have to 
exaggerate the crises their states are in, which can have the unintended consequence of 
getting entangled into crises not necessarily in their best interest. President Harry Truman 
found that in courting Congress for its support on his containment policy and Europe 
reconstruction plan, which was primarily aimed at saving Greece and Turkey, he had to 
portray the Communist threat as far more pervasive and urgent than he believed it really 
was. As a result, the China lobby gained much needed raison d’être, and when the Korean 
War broke out, Truman had no choice but to pledge American support for South Korea 
                                                        
42
 Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War, 220-223. 
37 
 
 
and neutralize the Taiwan Strait. Similarly, Mao faced immense obstacles as he prepared 
to embark the nation on the Great Leap Forward in 1958, a social and agricultural 
campaign designed to elevate China to a major economic power practically overnight. He 
decided to shell the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu not just to show the US the 
perils of supporting Taiwan, as Mao himself claimed; he decided to shell the islands to 
create the right political environment for launching the Great Leap Forward and mobilize 
the masses to make colossal personal sacrifices in the face of grave external challenges. 
In this view, security policies do not grow out of an ideology, but are rather dictated by a 
grand strategy that requires overextension in order to survive.
43
 
Finally, there is the question of whether China has correctly perceived and 
responded to external pressures and signals, or if it has been mired in misperceptions and 
cultural biases. This debate focuses not so much on the content and intention of the actual 
policies but the way the Chinese leadership processed information. On one end of the 
spectrum emphasizing the realist and universal nature of Chinese security policies we can 
find Avery Goldstein, who shows that China, Britain, and France all pursued similar 
nuclear policies because they were middle-range powers allied with a superpower.
44
 
Pressured by the same bipolar world order, which pushes them to seek protection from a 
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superpower, and by the fear of abandonment in such an asymmetrical alliance, which 
forces them to seek self-protection, these countries all chose at different times to develop 
their own nuclear programs, which means that the fear for abandonment overtook the 
comfort of alliance.
45
 China, among others, correctly perceived the challenges to its own 
security and made a rational decision that can be explained by realism. These policy 
choices largely comply with the broad predictions of neorealism and illustrate the power 
of the systemic structure to make divergent countries behave in a similar manner. 
But others contend that China’s conflict behavior displays distinct patterns and 
cannot be explained in such broad strokes. They argue that China’s policies reflect 
cognitive and cultural biases that do not conform to its external environment. Whiting’s 
classic study of Chinese deterrence behavior suggests that while China’s response is 
largely explained by deterrence theory, Chinese use of force was also unique. He 
observes a greater propensity for Beijing to link internal weaknesses with the severity of 
external threats and attributes this alarmism to both “classical as well as modern 
experience” and “a uniquely Chinese contextual framework for deterrence perceptions.”46 
At the same time, leaders in Beijing favored belligerent tactics as the best means of 
deterrence, which raises the risk of triggering a chain reaction that spirals out of control. 
Whiting does not elaborate on the causes of such distinctive assumptions of the dynamics 
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of deterrence; by calling this pattern “uniquely Chinese,” he seems to suggest that we 
need to resort to cultural interpretations rooted as much in the history of imperial China 
as in the Communist experiment. 
 Strategic culture is the focus of Johnston’s Cultural Realism, a look at Chinese 
military doctrines and beliefs formed in the combative history of the oft-divided Chinese 
state. The PRC’s reliance on belligerence is but a modern example of a long tradition that 
exalted violence. In the dominant paradigm of China’s strategic culture, conflicts are seen 
as constant and zero-sum. The use of violence is preferred and effective. This doctrine 
would be consistent with China’s empirical record of engaging in frequent conflicts at a 
higher hostility level. This paradigm calls to mind realpolitik traditions in the Western 
statecraft. Johnston argues that scholars have been mistaken in classifying China’s 
strategic culture as minimally violent and defensive by choice. They have relied too much 
on Sun Tze’s Art of War, which is only one sidelined school in Chinese strategic thinking. 
This school only gained prominence in the 1980s among Chinese scholars, who accepted 
the benign judgments at face value. But China’s proclivity toward violence, which 
resembles realpolitik and neorealism, is not a universal or automatic response, rather a 
result of certain cultural assumptions passed down through centuries of military doctrines 
and mental framework. By implication, if realism and the proclivity to use force to solve 
security problems are a learned behavior, then given certain conditions they may be un-
40 
 
 
learned. Some liberal democracies have already un-learned this paradigm.
47
 
A broader cultural argument is also used by some scholars to explain Chinese 
military policy. After evaluating both Chinese and American decision-making during 
several deterrence episodes, Shuguang Zhang evaluates Chinese and American decision-
making during several episodes of deterrence and concludes that “culture-bound 
perceptions of behavior by each country confused important aspects of their strategic 
thinking.”48 He argues that neither China nor the US actually harbored aggressive 
intentions towards the other, yet misperceptions, attributable to differences between two 
cultures and policy-making processes, clouded the vision of the adversaries.
49
 Zhang’s 
definition of culture is nevertheless broad. He includes factors such as different 
geopolitical status and security interests in the confines of culture and asserts that the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was obviously influenced by the middle-kingdom, 
imperial self image and Sun Tzu’s doctrine that all wars must be moral.50 While 
Americans regard crises as problems that call for solutions, Chinese leaders thrive in 
crises as they are also opportunities.
51
 Americans value human casualties, while the 
Chinese weigh human costs just as another kind of material costs and thus are much less 
                                                        
47
 Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 22-27, 249-266. 
48
 Shuguang Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949-1958 
(Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1992), 271. 
49
 Ibid., 268. 
50
 Ibid., 273, 278. 
51
 Ibid., 279-280. 
41 
 
 
sensitive to body count.
52
 These sweeping characterizations, though on balance favorable 
toward the Chinese, nevertheless call to mind generalized prejudices once exhibited by 
American officials. Eisenhower, for example, once said that Chinese leaders were 
completely indifferent to human losses.
53
 It is often difficult to distinguish between this 
broad cultural typology and untested generalizations. 
 The debate on Chinese use of force is unnecessarily polarized, partly due to the 
inevitable carryover of the broader debate in the international relations theory field 
between neorealism and its critics, especially area specialists. Those in the realist 
tradition often treat China as just another case study to test the validity of realist 
explanations; they are satisfied with linking policies to Chinese concern with security 
threats. They argue that since China feared for an encroachment of its territory and faced 
real challenges to its security, it would naturally respond with force to protect itself. As 
China is but a case study of realist theories, they tend to focus more on the generality of 
Chinese decision-making than the details or sometimes anomalies in its application of 
deterrence. China specialists, on the other hand, insist on first getting the facts right. 
Aided by newly declassified documents from the former Soviet Union, the US, China, 
and European and Asian sources, they are still in the process of vetting these documents 
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to verify or disprove past hypotheses about Chinese security policy. Before an 
authoritative empirical account is established, they tend to resist the attempt by 
international relations theorists to come up with a generalized theory.  
 In the end, what the neorealists gain in parsimony they have to sacrifice in 
explanatory power, and vice versa. Systemic pressures, such as security threats, narrow 
the range of state responses but do not dictate a particular outcome. No matter how 
predisposed to conflict the leaders are, the decision to use force does not come easily. It 
risks international reprimand in an already hostile system and incurs considerable 
material costs to a poor and at times turbulent society. Even though it may be argued that 
certain challenges are so severe that all leaders, regardless of their goals and intellectual 
baggage, would choose to respond with force, in real-life crises, challenges often need to 
be interpreted and framed by a context before any reaction can be decided. It is 
imperative that we understand the mindset that narrows down the desirable choices, and 
this study seeks to use the defender’s concern about its credibility as another factor that 
can lead to conflict. Realist explanations help contextualize and predict the general 
directions of Chinese military policy, but they could underestimate the range of choices 
available to statesmen.  
Area specialists should also try to join the theoretical debates with their rich 
findings. China scholars have made admirable inroads in understanding Maoist foreign 
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policy, filling in holes and debunking misunderstandings and myths, but have largely 
remained reluctant to place their specific findings into the extensive theoretical literature 
in political science.
54
 Much of their work is limited to a short period or a single policy, 
and more substantial studies tend to assume the character of a chronology or typology. 
This focus on events tends to lead to a lack of theoretical rigor. The most important 
concepts, such as ideology, nationalism, and realpolitik, do not have clear-cut definitions 
accepted by all or most scholars. The term ideology is especially fuzzy, which has 
expanded from references to Marxism to any non-realpolitik way of thinking. Without 
theoretical rigor, efforts to explain and predict events and policies may be ineffective. 
Furthermore, the debate over Chinese security policy is torn by a more specific 
disagreement over the role of Mao and his thinking. Mao, as the founder of the People’s 
Republic, led a powerfully ideological revolution that scholars unanimously agree 
transformed the society in ways never before imagined. However, as a state leader, he 
faced the same dilemma as other statesmen, that international anarchy both gave him 
freedom of action yet at the same time restricted this freedom by raising the stakes of 
survival. The question that naturally follows is the one that has dominated China Cold 
War studies: was Mao motivated more by realpolitik considerations or ideological creeds? 
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This question drives a host of other, more specific, research questions: was Mao 
interested in pursuing relations with the US in 1949, or was he set in his tracks to side 
with the Soviet Union? Did Mao decide to intervene in Korea out of affinity with North 
Korea or realpolitik security reasons? Was the Sino-Soviet split a result of power 
struggles or a clash of world views and personalities between Mao and Khrushchev? 
These questions provide us with a basic structure of policy analysis and carry practical 
implications for evaluating foreign policies not of China but of other Cold War powers as 
well.  
A close study of Mao and other principal policymakers, however, would be most 
useful when placed in the analytical framework of international relations or policy-
making. Often studies of a single leader become a pursuit in itself, especially for a 
prolific author like Mao. The release of archival material, moreover, provided the 
opportunity to cross-check pubic writings with private conversations and fill out 
chronological developments. But anyone exploring the astounding volume of Mao’s 
thoughts, speeches, and classified communications quickly discovers the ideological 
complexity as well as pragmatic flexibility in Mao’s thinking, and the ease with which 
Mao cited Marxist canon to justify swift changes in his thinking. The challenge for 
scholars is to employ a thoughtful textual analysis without turning it into a tautological 
exercise, as Mao’s thinking then explains Mao’s actions, and vice versa. Arthur Huck 
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observes that Mao’s increasingly defiant ideological discourse in the 1960s is 
“incorrigible” and can be used to justify any course of action.55 Instead, if care is given to 
explain his thinking and actions in an analytical fashion, with an eye on the international 
relations discourse, the findings are immensely enriching.  
In the end, the dissenting schools and views in the field of Chinese foreign and 
military policy fit into the two-level game first used by Robert D. Putnam to explain 
international negotiations. State leaders do not make a clean distinction between 
international and domestic decisions and constituencies but need to take account of both 
simultaneously. Decisions on either front send ripples through the other area, and a 
judicious leader can either manipulate international agreements to bolster a domestic 
group, a move that would otherwise meet stiff opposition, or turn his domestic weakness 
into an asset by forcing other leaders to concede to his demands for fear of destroying the 
deal.
56
 Putnam’s co-variant theory undoubtedly suffers from a lack of causal certainty, but 
his insight that leaders need to consider both sets of constituents is thoughtful. The 
difficulty in disentangling domestic from international concerns in China studies shows 
that the two are intertwined. For example, the more radicalized Mao was, the more 
threats China received or perceived internationally, which then encouraged more 
radicalism.  
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This dissertation is more narrowly focused on Chinese deterrence policy and does 
not purport to address bigger questions in Chinese foreign policy and use of force. 
However, findings of this study will contribute to the literature. By linking China’s 
perception of its own credibility to the decision to use force, and by tracing credibility to 
a host of both international and domestic factors, this study identifies one variable that 
helps bridge the divide. In all case studies, security interests remained the biggest reason 
for Chinese leaders to go to war. Security threats were grave enough that a forceful 
response was among the shortlist of policy decisions for leaders, but concerns about 
credibility helped rule out other, non-violent polices and arrive at a decisive blow that 
seeks to end the conflict once and for all. 
 
 
Methodology 
 
This study uses in-depth, qualitative case studies with a heavy reliance on textural 
analysis of first and secondary sources. While only three case studies are selected, they 
are structured along the same questions on deterrence and credibility to focus the reader’s 
attention on the hypothesis. In contrast to a large, comparative dataset, a deep analysis of 
a small number of cases is the best way to test this hypothesis. Because the concern about 
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credibility and the impact of reputation are difficult to quantify, the best way to trace their 
role in a deterrence episode is through careful textural analysis. 
The three case studies are chosen because they represent the best test cases for the 
thesis, that the defender can choose to go to war when challenged in deterrence situations 
when it is concerned about establishing or defending credibility. In all three cases, China 
decided to respond to challenges with overwhelming force. While scholars have argued 
before that realpolitik or ideology explained China’s belligerence, no efforts have been 
made to identify the common thread running in all three cases, that China, as a defender 
in deterrence, decided to end provocations through escalation. Comparing the three cases 
through a set of structured inquiries can help explain this anomaly. As explained earlier, 
deterrence successes are overdetermined and do not provide the same richness in analysis. 
Therefore all three cases are deterrence failures at the hands of China.  
China has used force frequently after 1949. The three cases are by no means the 
only instances where China uses force. So why were these three cases chosen? First of all, 
the number of clear deterrence instances is actually limited. Aside from the three cases 
mentioned here, there are also a number of deterrence successes, such as deterrence 
against the US during the Vietnam War and deterrence against Taiwan’s counteroffensive 
in the summer of 1962. Other instances of major conflicts fall more into the compellence 
or coercive diplomacy category, however. The 1979 war with Vietnam, for example, is 
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usually seen as compellence to punish Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia, which China 
perceived as Soviet-backed encirclement of China. The 1958 shelling of offshore islands 
and the 1995-6 military exercises in the Taiwan Strait fall into the category of coercive 
diplomacy, as force was used not to deter an advance, but to coerce the enemy toward 
less definitive ends. There are also numerous skirmishes with neighbors due to border 
disputes, both on land and at sea, but most were too small to qualify for a deliberate use 
of force as policy. The universe of deterrence cases is actually relatively small. 
On a practical level, the three case studies in this dissertation are among the most 
researched in the literature on Chinese use of force. Whiting’s classic analysis of Chinese 
use of force paved the way for later scholars, who combed over Chinese archives opened 
after the end of the Cold War. China was more selective in releasing information on the 
war with India and clashes with the Soviet Union, but generally speaking information 
available today is vastly more than in the past. Soviet and Eastern European archives 
greatly supplemented Chinese materials and provided means to test Chinese claims. 
Chinese scholars in recent years have also made use of provincial and municipal archives 
and interviews. Better availability of data clearly helps the type of qualitative research 
this study chooses, but the main reason for the choice of the three case studies is their 
robustness. 
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CHINA’S DECISION TO ENTER THE KOREAN WAR 
 
The structure for each case study 
To establish the significance of China’s concern about credibility, each case study 
will ask the same set of questions in order to frame what is a complex and interrelated 
web of decisions: 1) What is at stake in this conflict? 2) How does China think this case 
could affect its credibility? 3) How does China maintain its credibility? Without these 
questions, each instance can easily become overwhelmed by its rich historical 
idiosyncrasies and evolve into an unfocused discussion of foreign and military policy. 
Instead of examples of China’s use of force, case studies should be analyzed as windows 
of how China understands credibility in deterrence. 
The dissertation does not argue that a fear of losing credibility is the sole reason 
for China to decide to use force when faced with challenges. In many cases, for a new 
regime facing a hostile security environment, with a constantly shifting threat perception 
and increasingly volatile domestic politics, the decision to use force can be broadly 
explained as unsurprising, even necessary, solution to a security threat or the outcome of 
an increasingly fanatic foreign policy. The first question asked of each case study seeks to 
explain the main contours of conflicts, in many cases highlighting the security or 
domestic political reasons for conflicts that drove leaders to force. But explaining these 
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conflicts solely from the basis of the security environment for China, or the threat 
perception it faces, fails to recognize the very important subsidiary role played by China’s 
perception of its credibility and the interconnectivity of these conflicts. The second and 
third questions are therefore specifically focused on China’s perception of the 
relationship between the conflict and its credibility and the measures it undertook to 
safeguard its reputation. The progression of these case studies will show an increasingly 
self-conscious definition of credibility and an attempt to both justify past efforts to 
establish it and apply it to future usage. By asking these same questions in a structured 
fashion, the case studies then become a history of China’s concern about its credibility 
and reputation, which allows certain trends to be uncovered and analyzed.  
  
The Korean War 
As the first instance of deterrence for the young republic, China’s attempt to stop 
United Nations Command (UNC) led by the US from advancing toward the Chinese 
border, and its decision to intervene in the Korean War, were a defining moment for the 
Chinese leadership. The lessons learned from the Korean War were not only self-
consciously applied in future military conflicts and repeatedly tested against practice, but 
they also helped establish a near-consensus among Chinese leaders on the utility of 
deterrence, the importance of credibility and reputation for resolve, and the efficacy of 
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deploying certain signals and conducting military preparations. While Chinese leaders, 
especially Mao, saw strong reasons to intervene in the conflict in order to safeguard the 
security of Chinese territories, which would be severely undermined if a US-led 
unification of the Korean peninsular drove the North Korean Communist government 
into China and wage resistance campaigns from the Northeast, they also emphasized the 
value of establishing a reputation of resolve, especially after their warnings to the US 
went unheeded. While the Chinese decision to enter the Korean War was rooted in 
serious concerns about security, the long shadow of the future also weighed heavily in 
Beijing’s decision-making.  
The increasing availability of memoirs, academic studies and declassified 
documents from major parties in the conflict has helped clarify the procession of events 
prior to and during the Korean War, even though disagreements over specific events 
persist. Current scholarship sees the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) 
actively driving the decision by courting Soviet approval, with China preoccupied with 
its own civil war and misguided by what seemed like low entanglement risks. However, 
China’s decision to enter the war was not merely passed down from Stalin; China made 
the decision to intervene in close consultation with the Soviets but largely on its own. 
Kim Il-sung first appealed to the Soviet Union to strengthen the North Korean 
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military in March 1949.
57
 By early 1950, Stalin was both increasingly reassured that the 
US may not intervene to stop North Korea from invading and unifying the peninsula and 
convinced that a unified Korea could help bolster defense of Communist countries in East 
Asia. In 1949 and 1950, American policymakers were focused on countering Soviet 
influence in Europe and divided over the best recourse to Asian affairs, with many 
arguing that the US should accept the impending unification of China under Communist 
rule.
58
 On 12 January 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson excluded Taiwan and Korea 
from the US defense perimeter of peace, instead relying on “the people attacked to resist 
it and then upon the commitments of the entire world under the Charter of the United 
Nations.”59 The exclusion was interpreted as a shift in US strategy in Asia to that of 
distance and neutrality. Kim made plans to reunify the peninsula with an understanding of 
a neutral US. Stalin largely approved of Kim’s proposal after secret meetings in April 
1950 but told Kim that he must secure Mao’s approval as well.60 Kim traveled to Beijing 
on 13 May 1950. According to Chinese accounts, Mao also agreed, albeit reluctantly, 
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after confirming with Stalin that he had given the invasion the green light, but warned of 
the possibility of US intervention.
61
 On 25 June, North Korean forces crossed the 38
th
 
parallel and pushed into the south. Caught unaware, the routed South Korean army 
retreated quickly. 
The North’s invasion triggered an uproar in the US Congress. The US quickly 
decided to intervene to prevent South Korea from falling to Communist rule even though 
Eastern Europe had been the strategic focus for the country. President Harry Truman 
ordered the deployment of US air and naval forces on 27 June to assist South Korea and 
dispatched the Seventh Fleet to neutralize the Taiwan Strait. On 30 June, orders to deploy 
ground forces were also announced.
62
 This decision to intervene was not an aberration 
from earlier preference for disengagement, however. By mid-1950, American 
policymakers have become completely disillusioned with China. In contrast to previous 
hopes that a Communist China could carve out an independent policy from the Soviet 
Union, hostilities between China and the US and the signing of the Sino-Soviet 
Friendship Treaty in February 1950 proved to even moderates that Communist China was 
unlikely to respond to US overtures. NSC 68, which captured this hardened view of the 
Cold War, painted a bleak picture of coordinated threats against the US and warned 
against any weakening in US’s relative military power with the Soviet bloc. The North 
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Korean invasion provided the most opportune reason for the US to reassert itself in 
Asia.
63
 Also, Christensen finds the reason for the swift decision to intervene in Truman’s 
aggressive campaign that aimed to justify massive aid to Turkey and Greece but 
mobilized a sizeable anti-Communism lobby. To justify US strategy in Europe, Truman 
could not walk away from Communist advances in Asia.
64
  
While the deployment of the Seventh Fleet drew immediate condemnation from 
China, Whiting observes that China’s commentary in the party paper People’s Daily on 
US intervention was belated and muted, devoid of direct linkages to Chinese interests.
65
 
Yet behind the scenes Chinese leaders quickly realized the potential for calamity and 
began to prepare for what they hoped to be unnecessary – some kind of Chinese 
involvement. On 2 July, Premier Zhou Enlai told Soviet ambassador to China Nikolai 
Roshchin that if US forces crossed over to north of the 38
th
 parallel, China could send 
troops in support of the North Korean army. Therefore, China would move three corps to 
the northeast.
66
 Zhou apparently also used the occasion to complain bitterly that China 
had warned of the risk of US intervention as early as mid-May. In Zhou’s words, “we 
turned out to be right, but Kim Il-sung did not believe us.”67 On 5 July, Stalin sent a 
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telegraph to Zhou, calling China’s proposed precaution appropriate, namely using the 
nine divisions amassed in North Korea to operate in North Korea when enemy forces 
crossed into the north, and pledging to provide Soviet air cover to Chinese combat 
units.
68
 On 7 July, at the expanded meeting of the Central Military Commission (CMC), it 
was decided that a Northeast Border Defense Army should be established to safeguard 
the area and to “prepare for crossing the river to aid the DPRK at any moment,” 
depending on developments on the battlefield.
69
 Zhou ordered that if Chinese forces were 
to be deployed, they should don uniforms of a “volunteer army” and fly such flags.70  
As the war dragged on, sobering notes began to creep into official media 
commentary on the war. American forces began to arrive in large numbers in early July, 
and fifteen other states contributed forces to the UNC. The sheer imbalance of forces 
worried the Chinese leadership. Following the first major battle won by the North Korean 
army over UN forces on 20 July, a World Culture article published on 5 August for the 
first time termed the conflict a “prolonged war,” with the obvious connotations of 
                                                        
68
 Yu Yan, Wushinian Guoshi Jiyao: Junshi Juan (Excerpts of Fifty Years of National Events: The Military 
Volume) (Changsha: Hunan People’s Press, 1999), 89. Telegram, Stalin to Soviet ambassador in Beijing (N. 
V. Rochshin) with message for Zhou Enlai, 5 July 1950, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, 
no.6-7 (winter 1995-1996): 43. 
69
 Zhang Xi, “Peng Dehuai Shouming Shuaishi Kangmei Yuanchao de Qianqian Houhou (How Peng 
Dehuai Followed the Order to Lead the Army in Aid of Korea and against America),” Zhonggong Dangshi 
Ziliao (Chinese Communist Party Historical Material), No. 31(1989): 118. 
70
 “Transcript of First Meeting Discussing National Defense,” 7 July 1950. Cited by Qi Dexue, Juren de 
Jiaoliang: Kangmei Yuanchao Gaoceng Juece he Zhidao (Rivalry between Giants: High-level Decision-
making of the Anti-US and Aid-Korea War) (Beijing: Chinese Communist Central Party Institute Press, 
1999), 32.  
56 
 
 
hardship and possibility of attrition.
71
 Around this time the North Korean advance 
stagnated, as UN forces were able to establish a defensive perimeter around Pusan and 
hold it against repeated North Korean attacks. 
Gathering strength of the UN troops and the dwindling window of opportunity for 
the North Korean military to use its element of surprise for a swift victory convinced 
Chinese leaders to step up military preparation. At a 4 August Politburo meeting, Mao 
said that “if American imperialists won, they would get complacent and pleased and 
would threaten us. [We] have no choice but to help North Korea.”72 On the next day, Mao 
telegraphed Gao Gang that “there would likely be no combat operations in August, but 
Gao should prepare for battle in early September.”73 Soon afterward, UN forces repelled 
North Korean attacks over several days of intense fighting during 7-11 August and held 
its ground near Pusan. A People’s Daily commentary on 13 August acknowledged the 
new reality, declaring that the conflict “was in a new stage.”74 On 11 August, Xiao 
Jinguang announced at a meeting for military leaders that the Northeast Border Defense 
Forces would be tasked with combat in North Korea against the US and that the troops 
would go as volunteers, without a formal declaration of war against the US.
75
 On 13 
August, Gao Gang called a meeting of senior cadres above the division commander level, 
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relaying the same message and expounding on the need to stop the American master plan 
of aggression against China.
76
 On 15 August, however, Gao reported to Mao that troops 
were not yet prepared for combat and proposed to defer deployment.
77
 Also in mid-
August, Acting Chief of Staff Nie Rongzhen pointed out to Mao that a second and third 
line of defense would be needed within the Shanhai Fort, the entry point from the 
northeast to the vast North China plateau on which Beijing sits, in case the war 
escalated.
78
 Combat training nevertheless began on 20 August; on 30 August, Mao 
telegraphed Gao to demand “all preparation work must be complete by 30 September.”79 
As these high-level maneuvering intensified, China’s domestic propaganda and 
diplomatic warnings took on a new alarm, for the first time articulating a Chinese interest 
in the resolution of the Korean crisis. Part of the reason lay in China’s increasing 
conviction that the tide was about to turn in the war. In August and September, based on 
military intelligence, Mao and Zhou thought it likely that US troops could attempt an 
amphibious attack behind North Korean lines. Zhou’s military secretary Lei Yingfu 
reported US troop movements to Zhou on 23 August, suggesting that Inchon may be 
ideally located for a landing.
80
 He put the most likely date at 15 September, and Mao 
ordered to send a warning to Kim and Stalin immediately as well as telling the 13
th
 Army 
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Group to be prepared for prompt fighting in August and September.
81
 On 26 August, 
Zhou pointed out at a meeting for military leaders that if enemy forces landed at Inchon, 
the war would turn into a long-term conflict, and “the burden of annihilating US forces 
one by one will inevitably fall on our shoulders.”82  
This changing assessment of the balance of forces and the increasing likelihood of 
Chinese involvement led to first warnings to the US, but at this point diplomatic and 
public channels were still preferred. On 20 August, Zhou Enlai sent a cable to the UN 
convention at Lake Success, proclaiming that “the Chinese people cannot but be 
concerned about the solution of the Korean question,” as “Korea is China’s neighbor.”83 
On 26 August, World Culture declared that the “barbarous action of American 
imperialism and its hangers-on… seriously threatens the security of China in particular.” 
In an ominous message, China announced that “North Korea’s friends are our friends. 
North Korea’s enemy is our enemy. North Korea’s defense is out defense. North Korea’s 
victory is our victory.”84 At the same time, more belligerent signals were coming from the 
US: while the World Culture statement was published, US Secretary of the Navy Francis 
Mattews appeared to endorse preemptive attacks in a public speech, saying that the US 
could be the “first aggressors for peace.”85 In late August, US warplanes strayed into the 
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Chinese border city of Andong (later known as Dandong), bombing and strafing Chinese 
targets. Given already considerable alarm regarding US intentions and capabilities, this 
action, which the US later conceded as a mistake, must have further elevated threat 
perceptions.
86
 On 31 August, Zhou chaired a planning meeting on the Northeast Border 
Defense Forces; it was estimated at the meeting that casualties in the first year would 
reach 200,000, showing that military planning was advancing into more tactical stages.
87
 
Amid growing anxiety, Mao explained to a group of non-CCP officials on 5 September 
that a quick resolution is better than a drawn-out conflict but that China would be 
prepared for a “long, big” battle and even the atomic bomb, though Mao deemed the 
prospects of a nuclear attack unlikely.
88
 
The successful Inchon landing by UN troops on 15 September bore out the worst 
fears of Chinese leaders. Within days it was clear that the North Korean hope to unify the 
peninsula was dashed; when the South Korean army rushed toward the 38
th
 parallel and 
the North Korean army in disarray, the calculation quickly shifted from whether North 
Korea would win to whether it would survive. Little doubt remained that South Korean 
forces would enter North Korea, as South Korean president Rhee Syngman made his 
intentions clear shortly after the Inchon landing.
89
 At this point the leaders may have 
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made extensive arguments in favor of intervention, but preparations on the ground 
prevented imminent action. On 17 September, Mao wrote to Gao Gang, telling him to get 
the northeast ready to send forces. According to Zhou’s military secretary Lei Yingfu, 
Mao and Zhou preferred to first warn enemy forces; if they were to propose peace talks 
when they advanced near the 38
th
 parallel, then China should seize the opportunity. 
Internally, more careful considerations were needed over the best timing for attack, as 
“too early and it does not help to fully expose the enemy; too late and it is unfavorable to 
us militarily.”90 On 30 September, the day South Korean military crossed the 38th parallel 
and entered the north, Zhou addressed representatives of the China People’s Political 
Consultative Committee, announcing that “the Chinese people absolutely cannot tolerate 
foreign invasion and cannot ignore imperialism invade [sic] their neighbors with 
abandon.” He pointed out that “US aggressive forces have already encroached on the 
territory of the People’s Republic of China and may expand this invasion at any 
moment.”91 This may refer to bombings in Andong, but could also be seen as a 
conviction that encroachment was sure to come. Also on the same evening, Kim visited 
Chinese embassy in Pyongyang to send a message to the Chinese leadership, asking the 
Chinese to send the 13
th
 Army Group to Korea. Kim had first appealed for direct Soviet 
help, but Stalin instructed him to ask for help from the Chinese volunteers. The next day 
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Kim sent a formal message to Mao for help.
92
   
The prospect of an imminent collapse of the North Korean defense after 15 
September intensified Chinese efforts to deter the entry of US forces into North Korea 
and subsequent takeover of the country. China stepped up direct warnings to the US in 
late September and early October and sent leaders to the Soviet Union for urgent 
discussions over Chinese and Soviet responsibilities. These efforts will be examined in 
greater detail in the section on China’s attempts to maintain its credibility. On 1 October, 
General Douglas MacArthur, commander of the UN forces, issued an ultimatum for 
Kim’s unconditional surrender. On 7 October, US forces crossed into North Korea. After 
much deliberation and last-minute wavering, Mao made the final decision to commit 
forces on 18 October. Chinese troops began crossing the Yalu River the next day. 
Deterrence gave way to war. 
  
What was at stake? 
The four months between the onset of the Korean War and the actual commitment 
of Chinese troops allowed China to gradually define and articulate what was at stake for 
China. While evidence suggests that the risks and repercussions of US intervention 
entered the minds of Chinese leaders prior to North Korea’s invasion of the South, 
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rapidly evolving conditions on the battlefield as well as continual consultations with the 
Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, the DPRK, helped frame the North Korean crisis for 
top leaders over time. Direct threats by adversaries on the front of Taiwan, China’s 
northeast and Indochina could severely worsen the long-term security outlook for China 
with indeterminate but prohibitive costs. The loss of a socialist ally would also deal a 
blow to the camp to which China belonged, a less tangible damage but also significant. 
The stakes of Chinese inaction were high enough that Mao explicitly considered – and 
implicitly accepted – scenarios in which China would be engaged in drawn-out battles 
with the US and suffer heavy losses, especially if the US deployed nuclear weapons. 
While China clearly hoped for Soviet aid under the best-case scenario and halted its troop 
deployment when Stalin wavered, it decided to intervene in the end with just an implicit 
promise of armament aid and extended deterrence for Chinese territory. 
For China, the swift decision by the US to intervene in the Korean War against the 
DPRK and send the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait could not have come at a worse 
time. Since mid-1949, the CCP has begun focusing on a campaign to crush the 
Kuomintang (KMT) regime and forces that have fled to Taiwan to set up a government 
there. On 2 July 1949, Liu Shaoqi led a delegation on a secret visit to the Soviet Union to 
lay the groundwork for Sino-Soviet relations in face of imminent CCP victory to overturn 
the KMT regime. During the mission he informed Stalin of the plan to take over Taiwan 
63 
 
 
in 1950 and asked for military aid in the form of 200 warplanes and pilot training. Stalin 
approved the idea but rejected requests for Soviet air and naval support in the event of a 
forceful takeover.
93
 At the same time, the frontline commission of the Third Field Army 
ordered the four corps under the Ninth Army Group to start training for amphibious 
attacks and subsequently drew up a plan to attack Taiwan with eight corps.
94
 Yet the 
PLA’s overwhelming strength on land versus KMT forces did not translate to amphibious 
warfare. With little experience in landing battles and almost no real naval and air 
capabilities to speak of, the military failed to take the Quemoy and Dengbu Islands in 
October and November 1949, which alarmed the military leadership. By end-1949, the 
Third Field Army has decided to bolster the attack, putting all 500,000 troops in its main 
forces of 12 corps toward attacking Taiwan.
95
  
Stalin also lent more support to the proposal after speeches by Truman and 
Acheson that suggested non-intervention by the US, especially since the 5 January 1950 
statement by Truman explicitly ruled out any US wish to “obtain special rights or 
privileges or to establish military bases on Formosa” and any “military aid or advice to 
Chinese forces on Formosa.”96 Seeing that the US has vowed to stay away from the 
resolution of China’s civil war, Stalin subsequently agreed that China should make 
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necessary preparations for taking Taiwan and agreed that half of the Soviet military aid to 
China could be put toward purchasing weaponry for a Taiwan campaign.
97
 Military 
planning proceeded; on 17 May 1950, the Third Field Army issued Several Opinions to 
Ensure the Success of Attacking Taiwan, confirming that the army has turned its attention 
to amphibious attacks. The plan directs different military services to first train separately 
from July 1950 to March 1951, conduct joint exercises in April-May 1951, and then take 
Taiwan in a joint attack. In June 1950, during the Third Plenum of the Seventh Central 
Committee of the CCP, deputy commander of the Third Field Army Su Yu reported 
detailed battle plans to the central leadership and was appointed by Mao to head the 
campaign.
98
 Even after the dispatch of the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait, Chinese 
preparation to attack Taiwan did not immediately cease: during July and August 1950, the 
24
th
 and 25
th
 Corps as well as three artillery divisions of the East Military Region were 
still training to take over Quemoy.
99
 But the order finally came in July to indefinitely 
postpone plans to take over Taiwan “in order to aid Korea and counter the US.” Su Yu 
relayed the decision from top party leaders to reconfigure China’s defense stance to that 
of assisting North Korea in a land battle.
100
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The outbreak of the Korean War and US intervention first dashed the CCP’s hope 
to root out all opposition and fortify its coastal security. The survival of hostile forces in 
Taiwan, now with the political and military aid of the US, would clearly threaten the 
mainland for years to come. Zhou Enlai angrily protested the deployment of the Seventh 
Fleet as “armed aggression against the territory of China” within a day.101 Soon enough, 
even the maintenance of the status quo ante seems in doubt, and a much worse potential 
scenario surfaced, that of an attack on China from its two flanks, the northeast and 
southeast. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek proposed to send a 30,000-strong force to 
North Korea under the UN Command.
102
 Following a two-day visit to Taiwan, General 
Douglas MacArthur and Chiang issued a joint communiqué that the meeting had 
cemented a foundation of mutually defending Taiwan and military cooperation between 
the US and Republic of China.
103
 While public media reaction was muted, this 
communiqué undoubtedly left the impression on Chinese leaders that the US and KMT 
have reached a consensus on a role for the KMT that extended beyond self-defense. On 
25 August, General MacAruthur made the iconic statement that Taiwan is an “unsinkable 
aircraft carrier and submarine tender,” part of the “island chain from the Aleutians to the 
Marianas” from which the US air force can control every Asian port.104 While he was 
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forced to withdraw those remarks on President Truman’s intervention, these statements 
suggested not only the centermost significance of Taiwan to future US defense policy but 
an implied threat of attacks on China’s eastern seaboard. 
Not only were Chinese leaders immediately aware of the threat from a US-backed 
Taiwan, but the point was also driven home by China’s allies. Zhou pointed out that “if 
victory can be achieved on Korea, then it would be easy to resolve our Taiwan issue.”105 
In an effort to persuade China to send forces, Stalin also pointed out in his 5 October 
cable to Mao that if China waited passively that the Taiwan question could no longer be 
resolved.
106
 But the Chinese leadership had to know that the reversal of US security 
policy to cover Taiwan under its nuclear umbrella meant that the Chinese civil war would 
remain unfinished for a very long time. A rival regime, with a claim to all of Chinese 
territory, has survived and would now receive considerable aid from the US. China would 
have to live with this security threat for the foreseeable future. 
When the UNC smashed through the North Korean military after the Inchon 
landing, the threat of a hostile force pushing up against China’s northeastern border 
replaced Taiwan as the most immediate and urgent menace to Chinese security. In his 
plea for Chinese aid on 30 September, Kim Il-sung warned the Chinese ambassador to the 
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DPRK that after North Korea’s defeat the Koreas would become a US colony and 
military base.
107
 In a cable to Mao on 16 or 17 September, Stalin also asked if China 
would help if North Korea needed to establish a government in exile in China’s 
northeast.
108
 The cost of providing for and arming the remaining North Korean troops and 
housing a government-in-exile, which might also recruit actively among the two million 
ethnic Koreans in China’s northeast, would be considerable. 
A hostile, US-armed North Korea would also cost China its own security and 
severely constrain its policy choices for the foreseeable future. Providing a safe haven to 
the Kim regime, as appeared inevitable, would give the US the perfect excuse to directly 
harass Chinese forces, as the remnants of Korean forces would still pose a challenge to 
the US and South Korean authorities from behind the border. It would turn the region into 
a de facto hostile area to the South Korean and US governments, attracting espionage and 
covert operations as well as accusations in the international realm. Even if an all-out war 
could be avoided, thanks in part to the protection of Soviet alliance against a direct attack 
on China, the resulting standoff would require the active commitment of sizeable Chinese 
troops to deter US and Korean forces as well as maintaining a credible defense in case of 
actual war. The sudden loss of hundreds of miles of buffer zone would expose China’s 
industrial and agricultural heartland to enemy forces. Beijing’s hope to start demobilizing 
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the PLA and focus on reconstruction after decades of war might have to be postponed 
forever. A drawn-out standoff that could turn hot at indeterminate times would not only 
lead to a loss of North Korea but indeed make “our own rebuilding impossible,” as Zhou 
later paraphrased Mao’s thinking to Julius Nyerere, the president of Tanzania, in June 
1965.
109
 For a war-battered country in dire need of repair and consolidation, a perpetual 
distraction would prove tremendously costly. 
Moreover, the loss of a socialist ally in an emerging bipolar world order could 
also damage the cause with which Chinese leaders have publicly associated themselves. 
To allow a collapse of the North Korean regime was not just to lose a precious buffer, but 
also to concede the defeat of the Communist movement and renege on commitments by 
China and the Soviet Union. While China weighed the tangible costs and benefits of 
intervention, some of the cost of nonintervention was also less tangible. Zhou said that 
the Korean issue is not only “a problem for a brotherly nation, not only a problem 
involving [our] interests because of its adjacency to our northeast, but should be regarded 
as an important question of international struggles.”110 While the rhetoric was in part 
meant to justify the decision to intervene in order to convince domestic party officials, it 
also shows that nonintervention would deal a significant blow to the prestige of China in 
the Communist movement.  
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But most importantly, in the eyes of Chinese leaders, these security threats were 
not discrete and isolated, but symptoms of a grand strategy by the US to threaten China. 
In other words, the biggest threat to Chinese leaders was not just the loss of a buffer zone 
or the danger of an offensive Taiwan, but the overarching threat of a hostile US with both 
the intention and soon even greater military advantage to challenge China wherever it 
chose to, which would take forms that China could not yet envision but would 
nonetheless have to confront. This perception surfaced quickly and consistently, argued 
with increasing conviction by Mao and Zhou as more tangible security threats mounted. 
On 28 June, Zhou first pointed out in his protest at the dispatch of the Seventh Fleet that 
the US wanted to “create excuses for the US invasion of Taiwan, Korea, Vietnam and the 
Philippines.”111 At the 4 August Politburo meeting, Mao stressed that “Truman has issued 
orders, demanding that Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam and the Philippines should all do his 
bidding. We of course would not do their bidding (with the exception of the Philippines). 
In other words, [we] must contravene his orders. [We] must reclaim Taiwan, while we 
cannot stand by and ignore Vietnam and Korea.”112 The statement did not yet suggest a 
definitive intention to intervene, but it spelled out an overbearing concern by the two 
most important leaders, that of a consistent plan to undermine China’s security at will. 
Disparate threats were linked together in this grand US strategy. 
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On 13 August, at a meeting for senior cadres, Gao Gang elaborated on this theme, 
pointing out that intervening in Korea was a component of US aggressive plans, a launch 
pad for attacking China. He argued that the US was actively rearming Japan and South 
Korea in order to leverage their resources.
113
 These arguments were likely taken directly 
from Mao and Zhou’s thinking at the time. By 4 October, a matter of days before US 
forces would cross the 38
th
 parallel into the north, top leaders held some of the most tense 
meetings to debate whether to send troops. Zhou cited a report by the AFP that the US 
would hand over North Korea to an international army under the UN Command after it 
took over the territory. It would draw China’s forces to the northeast, freeing up US 
forces for other areas, including Taiwan and Indochina. “If this is true, we will be forced 
into a showdown with them in Taiwan and Vietnam.”114 If China faced a three-front 
assault from the US, “we should choose [to fight in] Korea, with the most favorable 
geography and transportation… and it would be the most favorable for us to get indirect 
help from the Soviet Union.”115 Peng Dehuai remembered that during the same 
deliberations, Mao proclaimed that “if tigers want to eat people, the timing will depend 
on its stomach. [We] cannot concede to it.”116 In the four months since US intervention, 
Chinese leaders went from an initially crude conception of US interest in Asia to one that 
                                                        
113
 Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzhengshi, 91. 
114
 Xu Yipeng, Zhihu: Chaoxian Tingzhan Gaoceng Juedou Lu (Straight Arc: The High-Level Duel over the 
Korean Armistice Talks) (Nanjing: Jiangsu People’s Press, 1998): 257. 
115
 Xu Yipeng, 257. 
116
 Peng Dehuai, Peng Dehuai Zishu (Personal Account of Peng Dehuai) (Beijing: People’s Publishers, 
1981) 257. 
71 
 
 
was increasingly more vivid and threatening. The shock of US policy reversal on Taiwan 
and South Korea led to a profound mistrust of US statements, and the many statements 
from military and political leaders such as General MacArthur and Secretary Mattews 
only served to deepen this conviction. What was at stake, in the eyes of Chinese leaders, 
was never just the failure of North Korea to reunify the peninsula, or the loss of an ally 
and a buffer zone, but the beginning of an all-new conflict involving the US and China, 
with China at a clear disadvantage that would only worsen.  
 
How does China think this case could affect its credibility? 
This gloomy assessment of the repercussions of the Korean conflict began to raise 
questions about China’s credibility very quickly. It helps explain why leaders began 
weighing intervention as a yet-undefined possibility as early as July, and why Mao felt 
compelled to intervene even though at the time Soviet military aid fell far short of what 
China had hoped for and expected. When Mao was pushed by developments on the 
battlefield to make a final decision on intervention, the Soviets agreed to provide large 
amounts of weaponry on lease and air cover for Chinese territory, but did not agree to 
join China in war efforts in Korea.
117
 After the war actually began and engagements 
between the Chinese and the US military grew quickly, Soviet pilots began shooting 
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down American planes near the Yalu.
118
 At the time of deciding, however, Mao had to 
operate under the assumption that the Soviet Union would not be a material factor in the 
war efforts. 
China quickly perceived the danger of inaction on China’s credibility. In fact, the 
conception of the last – and arguably most important – threat of having to fight the US 
elsewhere brought China’s credibility into sharp relief. Acquiescence of North Korea’s 
collapse would greatly amplify the danger of the last threat, as it would practically invite 
more severe challenges, while fighting the US in Korea would help reduce the potential 
damage of the future threat, even considering the cost of going to war. The perception of 
the threat was so structured as to in effect require that China place its credibility front and 
center in its considerations. 
For top leaders, future conflicts seemed inevitable once the US intervened in 
Korea and Taiwan, in no small part because Japan had also controlled these areas before 
finally invading China. For the Communists, who survived and defeated the KMT regime 
at least partially because the KMT had been severely weakened by years of fighting 
Japanese forces, the analogy could not have been more alarming. Zhou pointed out that 
the US “wanted to inherit the ways of Japan.”119 Gao Gang’s speech at the 13 August 
meeting of senior cadres already showed a sense of foreboding. He asked, “is it better for 
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us to fight [the US] after letting it take Korea, prepare and become more arrogant and 
attack China? Or is it better to seize the initiative and help the Korean People’s Army to 
annihilate the enemy and defend ourselves outside our territory? Clearly, defeating the 
enemy outside our territory is more favorable to us, to our friends and to the cause for 
peace and democracy by peoples in the world against imperialism.”120 Zhou explicitly 
called a conflict with the US on Korea “inevitable” at the 4 October meeting.121 Many 
civilian and military leaders referred to what Mao said on 13 October to Peng Dehuai, 
after Stalin clearly indicated that the Soviet air force would not be extending defense for 
Chinese ground forces. Mao said, “It is okay if we cannot win. [The US] would always 
owe us something, and we can fight them whenever we want. Otherwise, we would have 
no excuse if we want to fight [the US] in the future.” Peng remembered that this 
reasoning helped him make up his mind.
122
 He told other cadres that “we should not be 
afraid to smash up [our rebuilding] now. We should be prepared to smash it up and then 
rebuild; we should prepare for a long war, for smashing up,” because the US could 
threaten China at any point.
123
 Mao’s remarks were cryptic but striking in its candor. 
Engaging the US would mean many lives lost. Atrocities would be committed and 
remembered. Real pain and hurt will leave an indelible mark on the military, the 
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government and the people, providing the groundwork for future conflicts should China 
feel the need to confront the US again. 
The belief that the US had made the decision to encircle and challenge China in 
the long term also made it particularly important to defend China’s image as a resolute 
power in the face of the Americans. In the eyes of Chinese leaders, the US was China’s 
enduring rival, locked in a battle for influence in Asia. It both had the capability to sustain 
a long-term containment policy against China and the intention to do so, demonstrated by 
the swift decision to not only intervene in the Korean War but also neutralize Taiwan 
immediately. Backing down in front of the US would bring disastrous consequences, 
because the US was going to infer weakness from Chinese inaction and become “more 
arrogant,” as Mao and Zhou repeatedly stressed. 
Both the sense of the inevitability of conflict and the clear identification of the US 
as the biggest security threat for China in the foreseeable future convinced leaders that 
fighting now would be better than fighting in the future. The passage of time favored the 
US much more than China, despite China’s weak position at the time. Military leaders 
pointed out that delaying the conflict would in fact worsen China’s position, despite the 
many problems China faced at the time. Peng Dehuai explained to commanders and 
troops that in three or five years, the PLA could not improve its equipment significantly, 
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but the enemy could arm more troops.
124
 Acting Chief of Staff Nie Rongzhen also 
concluded that allowing the US to take Korea would force China to fight it on another 
battlefield, when China would be at a bigger disadvantage.
125
 When the time value of 
inaction actually worked against China, fighting now became a more attractive option. 
While China most urgently needed to establish credibility in the eyes of the US, 
its immediate and future challenger, it also perceived a wider audience for its reputation, 
one that included the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. For Beijing to propose to 
the Soviet Union some level of involvement by Chinese forces as early as July and then 
to renege might have also carried costs in the eyes of Chinese leaders. Only a year ago, 
China had just publicly announced that it was adopting the socialist model propagated by 
the Soviet Union; while the Soviet Union did not drive the Chinese decision to intervene 
in Korea, the looming threat of the US could only enhance the strategic importance of the 
Soviet Union to China. Stalin telegraphed Mao to ask that China send five or six 
divisions to Korea.
126
 After he reneged on the pledge to provide air cover to Chinese 
troops in Korea on October 14, heading into the war both carried distinctly higher risks 
but also the corollary benefit of cementing China’s image as a committed and resolute 
ally. Mao hinted at the wider implications of China’s credibility when he exclaimed to 
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Peng, “what kind of a big socialist country are we if we watch North Korea perish and 
not lending a hand, not show any internationalist spirit?”127 While these were likely 
secondary concerns, they also suggest that once credibility becomes a palpable concern 
for leaders, it tends to reinforce itself as leaders also consider other audiences for its 
reputation. 
The lessons learned from the war clearly illustrate the significance of credibility. 
From then-leaders and generals to contemporary historians and military strategists, the 
long-term credibility gained by China as a result of its intervention stands out as one of 
the most important lessons for Chinese security policy. After the end of the war, Peng 
listed four benefits of Chinese intervention at a December 1950 conference for senior 
military cadres: China safeguarded the security of its northeast by reclaiming the 38
th
 
parallel, boosted its confidence in struggles with imperialists, mobilized social reforms 
and construction and deferred the next imperialist invasion.
128
 The last one directly 
credits Chinese intervention for deferring future challenges, while the second one touches 
on the impact of resolve on China’s own morale. Mao pointed out after the armistice 
treaty that “imperialist invaders should understand that the Chinese people are now 
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organized and not to be messed with. If they mess with China, things will be difficult.”129 
Former Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua concluded in a 1998 review of the war that China 
“created this recognition in the world that statements by the Chinese are not diplomatic 
antics; they count.” He argues that this reputation – that China’s words count – carried all 
the way into the 1970s, when China reestablished diplomatic relations with the US.
130
  
Contemporary accounts of the war by military historians and strategists routinely 
stress lessons about the damage of a reputation of weakness and the rewards of gaining 
that credibility through intervention. Qi Dexue argues that the US ignored Chinese 
warnings against sending US troops into North Korea because China was weak, and 
therefore China concluded that it must not show weakness when faced with imperialist 
provocations.
131
 Renowned scholar Shi Yinhong concludes that “without a direct 
showdown, the US will find it difficult to understand [the need to] respect the power of 
the new China.”132 General Xu Genchu of the PLA argues that with intervention, China 
established “an image of not fearing anything and having the courage to fight any strong 
enemy to a bloody end… an image of following words with deeds and seeing any action 
to its end.” As a result, imperialists “learned a lesson” and “had to account for the China 
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factor when considering issues in Asia and the world.”133 In a volume edited by the Vice 
Chairman of the Central Military Committee Zhang Wannian, it is repeatedly argued that 
“the foundation of Chinese deterrence thinking is to achieve the result of thwarting the 
enemy’s military without fighting by daring to fight and fighting well.”134 Through these 
modern cannons the lessons on credibility are learned and passed on. 
The lessons drawn from the war by officials and orthodox scholars notably define 
credibility through action, something that can only be defended by following up threats 
with action and by, if not winning, then at least incurring enough costs to both the enemy 
and China itself to demonstrate the seriousness of its commitment. Less mention is made 
of perfecting the signaling process prior to the use of force. Chinese scholars did not 
blame miscommunication or ineffective signaling for the breakdown of deterrence; they 
put the blame squarely on US arrogance borne out of the perception that China was weak 
and therefore its threats were not credible. While Chinese leaders showed marked 
awareness of the timing and calibration of threats during subsequent deterrence episodes, 
suggesting that there was also procedural learning, the biggest lessons from the first and 
largest armed conflict by the new government portray credibility as a precious good that 
has to be acquired through costly action. These lessons are likely instilled in generations 
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of Chinese civilian and military leadership through official education.  
 
How did China maintain its credibility? 
The novelty of a deterrence situation and the severity of the stakes likely forced 
China to both improvise and draw on its past experiences in decades of warfighting. 
China used a variety of means to communicate its intent, gradually clarifying its objective 
over time, but at the same time focusing increasingly on the military preparation that 
would help China attain its goals on the battlefield should verbal signaling fail. The 
belated use of direct warnings was the result of many factors: the difficulty of defining 
China’s objective, the fact that the relative strength of the two sides changed quickly, 
advice from generals that it was best to commit Chinese forces north of the 38
th
 parallel, 
and tense last-minute negotiations with the Soviet Union. While these constraints 
possibly interfered with the communication of clear objectives and deterrence threats, 
military preparation, over which Chinese leaders had full control, persisted even though it 
was not immediately clear whether it would be for large-scale intervention. CCP leaders 
were incubated in long and often difficult conflicts, with a thorough appreciation for the 
importance of military preparedness. As China’s warnings were ignored, leaders decided 
that the best way to maintain credibility was to inflict high costs on the enemy and on 
itself in combat.  
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As Whiting points out, China did not publicly link the Korean War with Chinese 
interests until 20 August, when Zhou cabled the UN to demand Chinese participation in 
any talks on Korea since China was concerned about the resolution of the issue. The 26 
August World Culture article quoted earlier used far more explicit terms, calling North 
Korea’s enemy China’s enemy. The domestic propaganda machine kicked into high gear 
after US warplanes bombed north of the Yalu, portraying the US as a rabid militant bent 
on hurting China.
135
 But this militancy did not entail “committing the government to any 
specific action.”136 Broadly speaking, what China initially communicated did not go 
beyond expressing concern and conveying vague threats, common in proxy wars. 
It is not that Chinese leaders did not want to warn the US. If anything, evidence 
suggests that careful thought went into the selection of venue and the wording of the 
warnings, which would characterize later deterrence interactions. Lei Yingfu remembers 
that both Mao and Zhou wanted to warn the enemy first, in hope that it would retreat in 
the face of the difficulties.
137
 Before Zhou sent the clearest warning on 2 October through 
Indian Ambassador to China K. M. Panikkar that China would intervene if US troops 
crossed the 38
th
 parallel, he specifically asked his translator how to accurately convey the 
meaning of the Chinese word guan, which had a connotation of “take care of” or “take 
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over.”138 There was an awareness of sending a clear and accurate message to dissuade the 
enemy. 
But most of China’s direct warnings were crowded into the short period between 
20 September and 10 October, as increasingly clear indications that they were not being 
heeded mounted. On 21 September, Zhou told Panikkar that China did not have any 
obligation to the UN since the US did not recognize China.
139
 In hindsight that was an 
oblique reference to China’s freedom from any UN actions or resolutions, but the threat 
was rather open-ended. On 25 September, Nie Rongzhen told Panikkar that China would 
not “sit back with folded hands and let the Americans come up to the [Sino-Korean] 
border.”140 He went on to say that “if imperialists indeed want to wage wars, we have no 
choice but to rise up and resist.”141 By the time Panikkar delivered a letter by Indian 
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru on 29 September reassuring China that foreign 
ministers from the US, France and the UK had agreed not to cross the 38
th
 parallel 
without UN authorization, China has received plenty of signals that suggested otherwise. 
Zhou reported to Mao on the same day that South Korean and US forces were advancing 
northward and that the US had openly announced its plans to cross the 38
th
 parallel. The 
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situation was dire, as Pyongyang may soon be threatened.
142
 The central leadership 
concluded therefore that US reassurances were simply to “pacify China when crossing 
the 38
th
 parallel” in order to “mess with” China afterward.143 On the next day, Zhou 
issued the clearest warning when addressing the CPPCC that China “absolutely cannot 
tolerate” US aggression. At the same time, US Ambassador to the UN Warren Austin 
practically announced that the US was interested not in restoring the status quo ante but 
to destroy North Korea once and for all: “the aggressor’s forces should not be permitted 
to have refuge behind an imaginary line.”144  
Therefore, an even more direct warning was deemed necessary, when Zhou 
summoned Panikkar for a meeting on 2 October and specifically told him that if US 
troops crossed into North Korea, China would intervene in the war.
145
 While these 
warnings were transmitted to the US, they were discounted as inconsequential. Two days 
after US troops crossed into North Korea, the US Joint Chief of Staff authorized fighting 
either open or covert Chinese forces in dispatches to General MacArthur on 9 October, as 
long as there was “a reasonable chance of success,” a dramatic departure from orders two 
weeks ago that authorized action in North Korea only if there was no recorded or threat 
of entry by Chinese or Soviet forces.
146
 China sounded its final alarm on 10 October, 
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declaring through a Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson that “the Chinese people 
cannot stand by idly with regard to… the invasion of North Korea and its accomplices 
and to the dangerous trend toward expanding the war.”147 
While the lack of formal diplomatic channels impaired China’s ability to 
communicate messages quickly and directly, China also hoped to send a message through 
large-scale troop movement that corresponded with the growing intensity of its verbal 
warnings. It has been noted by the US press and certainly by the US military that the size 
of Chinese deployment to the northeast increased from 180,000 in July and August to 
320,000 in September.
148
 On 22 September, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs also 
publicly confirmed reports that China had transferred ethnic Korean troops to North 
Korea prior to the outbreak of the war, adding that China “will always stand on the side 
of the Korean people.”149 The calculation that troop movements would be detected by the 
US and the public confirmation of essentially military aid to North Korea were supposed 
to augment and substantiate verbal warnings. When they prompted only more belligerent 
US maneuvering and rhetoric, the Chinese leadership concluded that the US had heeded 
and chose to either discredit or discount the risk of some form of military intervention by 
China.  
Not only did battlefield conditions change too rapidly after the 15 September UN 
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counteroffensive, but the belated and difficult negotiations with the Soviet Union over aid 
commitments also complicated signaling efforts during the crucial final days. As a result, 
by the time China made the final decision to cross the Yalu, the utility of diplomatic 
warnings had been eclipsed by the demands of the battlefield. Chinese leaders had 
reached a consensus that the US was unlikely to compromise, that the advantage of 
fighting far outweighed that of waiting to see if the US would stop short of the Yalu. 
Chinese and Soviet historians disagree over whether China made the decision to 
intervene prior or after Stalin cabled Mao to urge China to intervene, and whether Zhou 
and Lin Biao told Stalin that China would not intervene in their 10 October meeting.
150
 
But one thing is clear from competing accounts: while Mao and Zhou made up their mind 
enough to send the order to commit troops to the northeast forces by October 8, the need 
to secure Soviet pledge of aid created additional problems and forced top leaders to halt 
their orders and reconsider the decision several times. By the time the final order was 
given on 18 October, Pyongyang was hours from falling to the UN Command. The hour 
for diplomacy had passed. 
The two-week consultation, both internally and with the Soviet Union, also 
reveals the difficulty of defending one’s credibility both in the eyes of the challenger and 
its ally while negotiating for explicit or implicit pledge of aid from the ally that could 
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boost the chance of a successful defense should deterrence fail. To prove its resolve to the 
US, Mao needed to convince all top leaders of the need to intervene, when many of them 
were reportedly ambivalent or critical of intervention.
151
 On 1 October, Stalin cabled that 
China could send five or six divisions.
152
 On 2 October, Mao discussed intervention with 
top leaders including Zhu De, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Gao Gang and Nie Rongzhen, and 
Gao received confirmation that troops would be ready by 15 October.
153
 The meeting was 
possibly not determinate, but enough to allow Zhou to issue his last warning through 
Panikkar the same night. On the same day, Mao drafted two cables to Stalin, one pledging 
Chinese forces, the other stressing two serious consequences of Chinese intervention: one 
is that a few divisions cannot solve the problem, and the other is that the Soviet Union 
might be entangled. The first cable was apparently not sent, while the second cable was 
apparently meant to probe Soviet reaction to its possible involvement.
154
 On 4 October, 
Peng Dehuai was summoned for another emergency Politburo meeting, and Mao again 
expressed his belief that a war with the US was inevitable since the US was like a hungry 
tiger.
155
 The next day, Peng gave his opinion as a military commander that it would be 
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better to fight now than later, to which Mao agreed.
156
 Peng was appointed commander of 
the forces to aid Korea.
157
 On the same day, Stalin held a Politburo meeting to discuss 
Mao’s suggestion that there would be difficulties. Afterward he cabled Mao that the US 
would likely abandon Korea if China intervened and that China and the Soviet Union had 
a treaty. Together the two allies were stronger than the US and Great Britain. If war was 
inevitable, then China might as well fight now.
158
 The cable likely helped Mao and Zhou 
convince military leaders at a 6 October meeting to rally behind intervention, though Lin 
Biao reportedly opposed intervention and open war. Officials at the meeting still stressed 
the need to clarify Soviet obligations.
159
 The 6 October meeting discussed implications of 
intervention, including the possibility that the US could enter into war with China and 
potential maneuvers by KMT forces in Taiwan.
160
  
On 7 October, Mao replied to Stalin that China would intervene with nine 
divisions, but not right away.
161
 The move was probably meant to prep Soviet leaders for 
negotiations, as Zhou and Lin departed for Moscow on 8 October. Internally, however, 
preparation went ahead with full force. By 8-9 October, an order was sent to officially 
organize the Northeast Border Defense Army into the Chinese People’s Volunteers, and 
Peng and Gao announced to the troops the decision to intervene. The fact that Zhou, Peng 
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and Gao all left Beijing was seen as strongly supporting the argument that the decision to 
intervene was already final.
162
 But when Zhou and Lin arrived in Moscow, they presented 
a far less definitive decision to Stalin. Shi Zhe’s memoir suggested that the two Chinese 
leaders told Stalin outright that China would not intervene, as the war would be long and 
costly.
163
 Other accounts challenged this version of events. Zhou’s confidential secretary 
Kang Yimin remembered that Zhou and Lin told Stalin that China would send troops.
164
  
In a meeting with Kim Il-sung on 10 October 1970, Mao and Zhou recounted the 
visit to Moscow, and Zhou confirmed that he presented both options to Stalin, making it 
clear that Chinese intervention would need Soviet air cover.
165
 While it may be argued 
that Mao wanted to claim credit for intervention in front of Kim, when Sino-Soviet 
relations were at their worst, other details of the conversation were confirmed by separate 
historical accounts. Presenting a conditional decision to intervene had its distinct 
advantages; China did not want to be seen as washing its hands of the intervention, when 
military preparation was already advanced and China had serious security interests to 
defend, but it also did not want to look so resolute as to expose itself to Soviet 
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abandonment. But Stalin still decided that Soviet involvement would be too risky. Zhou 
later recounted that Stalin “wavered and said it was okay for China not to send troops” as 
the Soviet military cannot go into battle.
166
 Stalin decided on 11 October that Soviet air 
force would only support Chinese troops two months after engagement began.
167
 The 
next day, Mao sent an urgent cable to Peng and Gao to halt the dispatch of troops. During 
another emergency Politburo meeting on 13 October, Mao still argued that China should 
intervene. Peng remembered that Mao asked him if he thought if it was feasible to fight, 
if the Soviet Union had “washed its hands.”168 Peng said, “[the Soviets are] half-washing 
their hands; we can fight.” This was when Mao made the comment that even if China 
were to lose, it was still better to fight first since it would give China an excuse to fight 
later if it so chose.
169
 On 14 October, China sent more questions to the Soviet Union after 
the Soviets promised loans and specified the size of the air force units to be dispatched. 
But Stalin decided on 15 October that Soviet air force would only move into the Chinese 
northeast and would not enter combat in North Korea even after two months.
170
 On 17 
October, the 42
nd
 Army Corps, which had already crossed into North Korea, received 
emergency orders to stop advancing to await further instructions, after Mao decided to 
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postpone action for another two days.
171
 In the final Politburo meeting on 18 October, it 
was decided that no matter how great the difficulties were, the decision to send the 
volunteers across the Yalu would not change and the timing could not be delayed further, 
as enemy forces were already attacking Pyongyang and could press on the Yalu in 
days.
172
 
These intense negotiations both to convince domestic elites and to bargain to the 
fullest extent with the Soviets very possibly distracted China from making additional 
warnings through diplomatic channels. Moreover, as it became increasingly clear that the 
UN Command would not slow its advance in the face of Chinese admonishments, 
credibility was seen as best gained through not warnings, but a credible, bloody and 
determined counteroffensive. Nie Rongzhen clearly laid out China’s willingness to take 
costs in his 25 September warning to Panikkar: “[the US] might even drop atomic bombs 
on us. What then? They may kill a few million people. Without sacrifice a nation’s 
independence cannot be upheld.”173 Mao best summed up the link between absorbing 
costs and establishing credibility: “we should deal a blow to the US and to deflate its airs. 
Although there are many concerns, they are all difficulties that can be overcome, or 
difficulties that should be endured, and they are the costs we have to pay to strive for this 
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great victory.”174 Credibility cannot be had without necessary costs that China’s leaders 
decided were preferable to the cost of inaction. 
 
In sum, China’s experience in the Korean War helped the Chinese leadership 
reach certain conclusions about deterrence that would prove seminal in later interactions. 
China’s conception of a long-term, worsening threat posed by the US basically 
determined the premium it placed on establishing a reputation for resolve in order to deter 
future attacks. As Chinese warnings were either ignored or heavily discounted, Chinese 
leaders also concluded that a costly, at least relatively successful counteroffensive was the 
only way to establish credibility. The conception of credibility as not just a political 
communication but also a military condition that meant that practical military 
considerations would figure heavily in Chinese calculations: the need for secrecy, 
overwhelming force and the element of surprise would increasingly dominate political 
considerations as challenges intensified. These lessons from the war were to be learned 
and adopted in future deterrence interactions. 
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SINO-INDIAN BORDER WAR 
 
While the Korean War in 1950 proved a fertile learning ground for newly 
anointed Chinese leaders, border disputes with India that erupted into war over two 
months in 1962 still posed a novel challenge. The long border China shared with over a 
dozen countries naturally created tensions as the new regime with a revolutionary 
ideology sought to consolidate its rule, but China’s alliance with the Soviet Union and 
other socialist neighbors dulled many such concerns during much of the 1950s. When 
India backed territorial claims with actual exertion of border control, Chinese leaders 
were faced with a dilemma: as the leader of the non-aligned movement, India 
commanded both international respect and a special place in China’s official foreign 
policy as a friendly state, or at least a state to be won over. On the other hand, Beijing 
was increasingly wary of India’s aggressive rhetoric and tactics, especially in the context 
of its interests in Tibet. The combination of these factors made it difficult to apply past 
lessons learned in conflicts with the KMT, militaristic Japan or the US to relations with 
India; to compound the issue, the border dispute escalated from 1959 to 1962, a period of 
disastrous domestic experiments and foreign policy reorientation that focused the leaders’ 
attention elsewhere.  
In his seminal study on China’s deterrence episodes from the Korean War to the 
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early stages of US intervention in Vietnam, Allen Whiting argues that the 1962 war is 
largely a rational response to repeated and escalating provocations by New Delhi, despite 
signs of puzzling tactical inconsistencies that may be a result of a divided leadership on 
how best to force India to the negotiating table. In attempting to deter and then deciding 
to fight a war with India, Chinese leaders employed many tactics similar to those used to 
deter US troops from crossing into North Korea in October 1950.
175
 Chinese historians 
studying the security dimensions of the conflict likewise broadly agree that India’s 
pursuit of its forward policy despite repeated Chinese warnings forced China to respond 
with a decisive attack.
176
 More recently, however, some historians argue that the war has 
to be understood in the context of Mao’s governance challenges – most notably for 
launching the Great Leap Forward – and his radicalization.177 As scholars debate over the 
cause and severity of the Sino-Soviet split and the full extent of Mao’s radicalization 
during this period,
178
 studies of the Sino-Indian war must address questions on China’s 
foreign policy and the impact of radicalization on decision-making. Although a number 
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of authoritative accounts of the war have been published in Chinese in recent years, 
scholars are handicapped by insufficient archival material that records leadership 
deliberations, especially compared with ample exchanges between Mao and Stalin that 
chronicle China’s intervention in the Korean War. 
As this dissertation is focused on analyzing the role of China’s concern with its 
credibility in deterrence instances, it does not seek to offer a novel or all-encompassing 
explanation of China’s decision to use force. While it acknowledges the various contexts 
for the conflict and engages in certain debates in the field on these subjects, its purpose is 
to show that in addition to compelling interests in defending China’s territorial claims, the 
need to repel future challenges through the establishment of resolve again played an 
important, albeit subsidiary, role. This study both notes the similarities between China’s 
conception of credibility in the Korean War and the border clash and identifies key 
differences.  
The historical background of Chinese and Indian claims on the Tibetan-Indian 
border deserves only minimal mention for this study. Tibetan authorities stepped up 
efforts to claim independence at the beginning of the 20
th
 century, after an extended 
period of a weak central Chinese government, but as Whiting notes, “no government ever 
recognized Tibet as an independent country.”179 Competing regional and central 
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authorities, however, helped give rise to territorial disputes. The key point of contention 
in the eastern sector of the Tibetan-Indian border revolved around the McMahon line, 
between Bhutan and Burma. It was agreed in secrecy between Tibetan and British 
representative at the 1914 Simla conference between China, Britain and Tibet and pushed 
the line of control up into Tibetan territory. Because the Chinese representative rejected 
the proposal at the conference, China denied ever conceding to the demarcation, and the 
line was kept out of public knowledge for decades. In 1935, the secret accord and the 
McMahon line were rediscovered accidentally by an official of the Indian government, 
and the British government quietly adopted the line since it increased India-controlled 
territory by some 90,000 square kilometers. China consistently protested that the secret 
deal was illegal, but India largely controlled the area. In addition, China and India also 
had competing claims over the western sector of the border near Kashmir and Xinjiang, 
in what is known as Aksai Chin. This area, around 37,000 square kilometers, has not been 
formally demarcated between India and China, and historical claims on the area are even 
murkier. China had effective control over the region. 
The founding of the new republic in China led to a consolidation of Chinese 
sovereignty over western borders that tested bilateral relations. Mao ordered troops to 
press into Tibet and Xinjiang in 1950 in order to establish CCP rule over all Chinese 
territories and eradicate remaining resistance. In Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal 
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Nehru’s eyes, the CCP takeover threatened traditional Indian interests in Tibet, although 
he was also wary of hurting bilateral relations if India protested too aggressively.
180
 India 
made several representations to Beijing when the PLA advanced into Tibet and finally 
asked to preserve India’s historical privileges in Tibet on 1 November 1950.181 The PLA 
pushed through Tibet territory with relative ease, prompting an agreement between Tibet 
and Beijing on 23 May 1951 that settled Beijing’s political authority over Tibet but 
promised a significant degree of local autonomy. A separate negotiation with India 
concluded on 29 April 1954, recognizing certain trade and pilgrimage rights by New 
Delhi while asserting Chinese sovereignty.
182
 Soon afterward, however, Nehru apparently 
instructed defense and foreign ministry officials to establish border posts in disputed 
areas.
183
 Minor standoffs between the two sides recurred from 1954 to 1958, especially in 
Wuje (Barahoti) in the central sector.  
During this time, both sides were conscious of outstanding territorial claims but 
did not press for a public resolution. During negotiations over the trade agreement signed 
in April 1954, Nehru had pondered whether to touch territorial issues but decided against 
it, hoping to forestall China from turning the negotiation into territorial talks.
184
 China 
was also pursuing better ties with its neighbors at the time and enunciated a set of 
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diplomatic principles on peaceful existence in the trade agreement. However, China was 
pushing ahead with its consolidation in Tibet, which would eventually have implications 
on the border issue. Aware that its hold on the far-flung region was tenuous, it built and 
completed two roads from Sichuan and Qinghai into Tibet in 1954. The third and most 
strategically important Xinjiang-Tibet road was built from 1956 to 1958, which crossed 
Aksai Chin in the western sector and prompted India to formally declare its claim on the 
territory in October 1958. 
The relative calm of this period began to dissipate in 1959. The large-scale revolt 
in Lhasa against Chinese rule in March 1959, as well as Dalai Lama’s escape into India, 
pitted the two countries against each other. To Chinese leaders, India’s decision to grant 
political asylum to the Dalai Lama removed all doubt where India’s policy priorities lie. 
China held India responsible at least in part for instigating the revolt and providing refuge 
for the Dalai Lama and his followers, which created a long-term base for anti-Beijing 
operations in the southwest. For a second time, a rebel group was allowed to survive 
outside China, and China understood that its rule in Tibet would be subject to challenges 
from outside the border – a double threat to Chinese sovereignty. Tibet, on the other hand, 
reacted to the violent PLA crackdown in Lhasa and Beijing’s dissolution of the Tibetan 
government. It implemented an embargo on an increasingly large list of exports to China 
both from India and from its neighboring states, starting with rice and kerosene and 
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broadening to include car parts and steel products.
185
 Hostilities between the two 
neighbors reached a new level. 
Publicly China kept a restrained response to India. Mao instructed propaganda 
officials to use phrases such as “British imperialists and Indian expansionists collude like 
wolves to openly intervene in China’s internal affairs and take Tibet,” but also cautioned 
them not to directly attack Nehru.
186
 In a 6 May meeting with diplomats from 11 
countries, Zhou Enlai pointedly argued that the “focal point of disputes between China 
and India” was India’s wish to “keep Tibet backward for the long run so as to act as a 
buffer state between China and India.”187 While maintaining that the two peoples have 
been friendly, China must “tell the world… that Indian capitalists are two-faced.”188 The 
next day, however, Mao halted media coverage and criticism of India’s policy toward 
Tibet, apparently sensitive to the political fallout from the crackdown.
189
 Moreover, 
Chinese troops in pursuit of Tibetan rebels also extended and strengthened their reach 
along the border, pushing up to the disputed territories in the eastern sector, toward a 
“physical collision” with Indian border troops that also advanced up to – and sometimes 
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over – the McMahon line.190 The inevitable hardening of Chinese rule over Tibet and 
military outreach revived India’s fears of national security, the top concern in Nehru’s 
Tibet policy. India began to meet China’s heightened security presence in the Tibetan 
border region with its own patrols.
191
 
Against this backdrop of heightened hostilities and suspicions, two armed clashes 
in August and October 1959 in both eastern and western sectors raised tensions 
significantly. India border police endured casualties in the October clash, leading to calls 
of retaliation. The conflicts triggered much more pointed exchanges between Zhou and 
Nehru, but the tone was still carefully calibrated. Prior to the clashes, Mao personally 
toned down a Ministry of Foreign Affairs note to India when the latter refuted Beijing’s 
accusation that India had interfered in Tibet. Mao called India China’s friend “for over a 
thousand years in the past and we believe for another thousand or ten thousand years.” 
The statement continues, “China will not be so foolish as to antagonize the United States 
in the East and again to antagonize India in the West… We cannot have two centers of 
attention, nor can we mistake friend for foe.”192 Following the first clash, during which 
China maintained that Indian patrols fired on the Chinese first, Zhou blamed India for 
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causing border tensions but expressed confidence in a peaceful resolution.
193
 The long 
letter, however, appeared to anger Nehru as a “breach of faith,” who accused China of 
trying to bully India.
194
 After the second clash that aroused even more nationalistic 
outbursts in India, Zhou proposed on 7 November that both sides withdraw their patrols 
by twenty kilometers from the line of actual control, which was rejected by Nehru on 16 
November.
 195
 He had already vowed to use everything within his power to defend 
India.
196
 A fresh round of embargo was enforced, effectively cutting off flows of all tools, 
grains, petroleum products and autos.
197
 Meanwhile, the commander of China’s Tibet 
Military Region Zhang Guohua held a meeting three days after the August clash to stress 
that China must increase military preparedness, beginning with building more roads.
198
  
In early 1960, Nehru agreed to a summit with Zhou in April, but neither gave 
ground on their positions during the talks. India was not prepared to drop claims on Aksai 
Chin in the west even if China reciprocated by accepting the McMahon line in the east. 
By this time, Nehru was convinced that India had a stronger historical claim to Aksai 
Chin than China and enjoyed actual control of the McMahon line, so he was not willing 
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to concede on either.
199
 The PLA’s General Staff Department passed on Mao’s 
instructions on the southwest border issue, demanding to “quickly stabilize the southwest 
border region both internally and externally.”200 Operationally this meant no firing within 
thirty kilometers of the Chinese border no matter what the provocation.
201
 This 
conciliatory stance was quickly implemented. On 29 July, the CMC issued eight policy 
documents on border defense, reiterating the no-firing policy and withdrawing Chinese 
troops from Longju, the site of the August 1959 clash with India.
202
 But China also 
sought to strengthen its capabilities in other border areas at the same time. On 1 
December, Zhou instructed the Ngari border region along the western sector to modestly 
increase the number of troops and fortify the outposts more quickly.
203
 
India’s adoption of a “forward policy” to move outposts into territory controlled 
by China in 1961, however, put the two militaries in direct contact with each other. The 
policy was meant to deny Chinese troops room for further advancement but also to 
establish actual control of the territory in order to back up India’s claim on these areas. It 
was not fully implemented until November 1961. An Indian directive issued on 2 
November articulated that the policy was to entail “patrol[ling] as far forward as possible 
from our present positions towards the international border” while cautioning that “this 
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must be done without getting involved in a clash with the Chinese, unless this becomes 
necessary in self-defense.”204 The vows to avoid clashes, however, would soon prove 
difficult as the policy directly challenged Chinese military forces. As Indian forces 
advanced, China kept a tight rein on frontline maneuvers, but also began making 
necessary provisions for a military response. In a 1 February 1962 notice, the CMC again 
repeated the no-firing rule and pointed out that the CMC was solely responsible for 
deciding whether to engage Indian forces.
205
 The next day, the Xinjiang Military Region 
instructed border troops that without orders from above, border patrols must not leave 
their outposts under any circumstances; they must neither retreat from their position nor 
engage the enemy. But the same directive also instructed troops to “decisively, 
thoroughly and cleanly” wipe out Indian forces that have advanced deep into Chinese 
areas after orders to engage are decided and passed down from the above. To do so would 
require additional capacity, and border troops were told to prepare for combat by 
stockpiling supplies and studying battle plans.
206
  
The inherent conflict between India’s forward policy, which was a fait accompli 
policy, and China’s decision to deny it, led to inevitable military preparations. As the 
border ran along largely uninhabited, harsh terrain, the need to deploy additional logistics 
and warfighting capabilities well in advance of any actual engagement was even more 
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acute than in other conflicts. A 12 April Southern Xinjiang Military Region meeting 
concluded that India has initiated an attempt to resolve border disputes by force, and 
troops must do all they can to fully prepare for battle.
207
 Several days later, the Xinjiang 
Military Region held another meeting to discuss preparedness and noted that India has 
stepped up air drops of supplies and increased the number of troops stationed in the area. 
The meeting concluded that India might be considering a “big engagement” but was yet 
unprepared, and was confined to a “nibbling strategy” to advance into Chinese-controlled 
areas in close proximity with Chinese forces. Troops were told to both prepare for 
smaller-scale provocations and for “big engagements.”208 On 19 April, the General Staff 
Department issued border patrol protocols approved by top leaders, authorizing the setup 
of more outposts in areas then sparsely controlled by Chinese positions along the western 
sector.
209
 The last decision clearly made it more likely that advancing Indian troops 
would meet with defending Chinese forces.  
At the same time military tensions flared, political jostling continued between 
Beijing and New Delhi. After fairly even-keeled communications to India pronouncing 
that the “door for negotiations is still open,”210 Beijing sounded more alarmed and began 
to issue sterner warnings in April, publishing its past diplomatic exchanges with India on 
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13 April, and on 30 April protested Indian “provocations” by “demand[ing] that the 
Indian Government immediately withdraw the Indian military posts and intruding Indian 
troops from Chinese territory.” Notably, it proclaimed that in case India failed to heed 
these demands, “the Chinese frontier guards will be forced to defend themselves.”211 
These warning had scarcely any impact, judging from India’s response. On 2 May Nehru 
declared that a war with China “[was] not within India’s control.” Additional troops were 
moved into Ladakh and the Chip Chap area at the same time.
212
 On 19 May, China 
lodged a protest against another alleged incursion into its territory in the ominous words 
Beijing used to deter the US before China’s intervention in the Korean War: “the Chinese 
government will not stand idly by seeing its territory once again unlawfully invaded and 
occupied.”213  
While Whiting and others observed that this unusual statement was not 
accompanied by changes in China’s military posture,214 it is now known that it signaled 
internal efforts to articulate a more comprehensive contingency plan that included for the 
first time plans for offense. On 6 May, the General Staff Department’s order to resume 
patrols still focused almost exclusively on avoiding bloodshed. Self-defense was 
authorized if Indian troops surrounded the Chinese post and threatened to inflict major 
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casualties on Chinese forces, but defense was conceived as a stage process: first fire shots 
in the air, then fire to stop Indian advances and last capture Indian soldiers.
215
 On 22 May, 
after Beijing issued that stern warning, Zhou instructed that troops must finish all 
preparation to counter further armed provocations by the end of June. “If the Indian side 
dares to open fire then, our side either does not fight or must fight for a complete victory 
and reclaim land invaded by Indian forces.”216 This was the first time Chinese leaders 
envisioned a military response that went beyond denying Indian advances. Zhou warned 
at the same time that “we must not be distracted by our enemy, and our main focus should 
still be offshore,”217 reflecting China’s intense concern that the KMT was planning an 
attack on China’s southeast coast.  
On 29 May, the General Staff Department issued the Substantive Plan on Military 
Struggles on the Sino-Indian Border approved by the CMC and Zhou. The notice 
repeated Zhou’s order that all preparation be completed by the end of June. While Indian 
forces were mostly bent on expanding into Aksai Chin, which was considered China’s 
primary concern, troops along the eastern sector should “mostly prepare for an offensive 
in order to complement the struggle in the western sector when necessary,” with about 
five thousand troops along three identified fronts.
218
 This was to become the blueprint of 
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China’s October-November offensive. Such a plan made military and political sense, as 
the McMahon line has more favorable typography for combat and was drummed up 
under suspect circumstances, lending more legitimacy to Chinese counterclaims. Beijing 
began to prepare for a more comprehensive campaign that would definitively resolve 
escalating disputes. On 5 June, the Tibet Military Region issued a troop training plan, 
instructing troops to prepare for a large-scale invasion into India.
219
 
As the PLA started making military preparations for a clash with India, a slew of 
other crises briefly took the attention away from the Himalayas. In spring 1962, the KMT 
regime began making counterattack plans in earnest, with numerous troop movements in 
Taiwan and offshore islands and raids. Chiang appealed urgently for US support in a 
large-scale invasion of the mainland. He reasoned that the Chinese people would rise up 
against the CCP given famines and harsh political conditions.
220
 On 10 June, the 
leadership in Beijing circulated a Notice on the Preparation to Crush Invasion by KMT 
Troops on the Southeast Coast to major municipal and division party committees, 
publicly mobilizing the country to prepare for combat.
221
 Also in early May, US reacted 
to Communist advances in Laos by promptly dispatching the Seventh Fleet to the Gulf of 
Siam and deploying thousands more troops to Thailand. On 19 May, a People’s Daily 
editorial warned that “the Chinese people… absolutely cannot tolerate the establishment 
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by US imperialism in areas close to China or any new military bridgeheads directed 
against this country.”222 A long and candid statement to the press by Foreign Minister 
Chen Yi on 29 May portrayed a China under threat from both domestic economic 
difficulties and foreign enemies who want to take advantage of Chinese weakness. The 
US “may support Chiang Kai-shek in starting a ‘counter-offensive on the mainland’… or 
they may be planning to raise trouble on the western border area of China by utilizing the 
China-India border dispute.”223 He claimed that “the Himalayas are not fit for waging a 
war.”224 In May, two instances of Chinese refugees fleeing into Hong Kong and the 
Soviet Union also trained the international spotlight on the plight within China brought 
by the disastrous Great Leap Forward.
225
 With military training and logistics planning 
still in early stages, the General Staff Department instructed border troops in Tibet on 20 
June that “the most practical question now is to use every means possible to stop the 
nibbling campaign by Indian forces,”226 with the emphasis still squarely on passive 
defense. Chinese troops set up more outposts before Indian forces could. 
In July, more aggressive Indian maneuvers and the easing of tensions in other 
areas allowed China’s top leaders to return their attention to the Sino-Indian border, but 
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Mao decided against using force to repel Indian advances. On 5 July, an Indian platoon 
set up positions in the Galwan valley in the western sector, threatening to encircle a 
Chinese outpost there. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs protested on 8 July that 
“China absolutely cannot capitulate in front of India’s ever-increasing military 
deployment, and China will never give up the right to self-defense when faced with 
unprovoked attacks.”227 The standoff between the two sides escalated with multiple 
reinforcements on both sides until 13 July, when Chinese troops were ordered to let 
Indian patrols move out of the area.
228
 During this period, Zhou Enlai asked for updates 
once every two hours and warned border troops not to make unauthorized moves.
229
 
During a Politburo meeting on Sino-Indian border issues, Zhou and Liu Shaoqi reported 
to Mao two military proposals on the Galwan valley incident: one was to drive out Indian 
troops by force, and the other was to find peaceful ways to force out Indian patrols. After 
listening, Mao argued for restraint even though “we have every reason to fight,” so that 
“Nehru’s true face can be exposed further” and China can win over more countries to 
China’s side. He argued that the problem went far beyond India: “US imperialists and the 
Soviets are all supporting India. They want to take advantage of our temporary 
difficulties… but we will not fall for this trap and must not fire the first shot.”230 This 
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decision was passed on to border troops on the western sector on 14 July; on 20 July, the 
General Staff Department formally described the “anti-nibbling strategy” as one that 
“must not cede ground but strive to avoid bloodshed in a long-term armed co-
existence.”231 Troops were urged not to make any rash decisions, as Liu and Zhou 
handled most questions themselves and Mao made the final call on bigger issues.
232
 
Leaders also hoped to exploit what appeared to be a brief softening of India’s 
position on border talks. In late July, Chen Yi was pleased with talks with Indian Defense 
Minister Krishna Menon on the sidelines of the Geneva conference on Laos and proposed 
issuing a communiqué on holding negotiations, but Menon turned down the proposal.
233
 
On 26 July, India’s response to a Chinese protest dropped the earlier insistence that 
Chinese troops withdraw from disputed territory before talks could begin, instead 
proposing discussions “as soon as the current tensions have eased and the appropriate 
climate is created.”234 China agreed to holding talks on 4 August, but also chided India 
for causing tensions. “India… should first stop invading Chinese territory and stop all 
armed provocations… Border situations would immediately relax if India stops 
advancing into Chinese territory.”235 Chen and Zhou reportedly concluded after Menon 
rejected Chen’s proposal that India had zero real interest in talks; it is possible that they 
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therefore decided against more conciliatory language. In any event, Nehru soon applied 
the pre-condition that Chinese troops withdraw from disputed territory before talks could 
be inaugurated.
236
 This would mean giving up control over the strategically important 
Aksai Chin. A formal response from India on 22 August clearly stated that China must 
restore the status quo ante before talks could begin.
237
 The fleeting opportunity passed. 
China’s threats became increasingly explicit in September, issuing effectively an 
ultimatum on 13 September that talks must resume on 15 October.
238
 These final attempts 
at deterrence will be explored more fully in the later section on how China maintained its 
credibility. The final decision to retaliate against Indian advances through a large-scale 
attack was apparently made on 5-6 October. Mao called a meeting with top civilian and 
military leaders, asserting that “the situation looks like we have no choice but to fight” 
and asked for his colleagues’ opinion on how to fight and what the scale should be.239 It 
was decided that the purpose of the attack was to repel Indian troops and force diplomatic 
negotiations.
240
 On 5 October, troops on the western sector had just begun withdrawing 
from their positions on the mountain top before winter storms hit. In transit on 6 October, 
they received an emergency order from the General Staff Department to go back to their 
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positions in order to coordinate with troops on the eastern sector for a major offensive.
241
 
The General Staff Department described Mao’s order as such: “If Indian troops advance, 
we should forcefully fight them. Tibet on the eastern front must prepare, but the western 
sector should also contribute. If they advance, [we] must not only repel them but also hurt 
them.”242 On 8 October, China informed the Soviet ambassador to China that “if India 
wages an offensive, we will resolutely defend ourselves.”243 Detailed battle plans were 
issued on the same day.  
After more skirmishes on 10 October and more aggressive maneuvers on both 
sides, the PLA launched an attack on 20 October on both western and eastern sectors, 
routing the ill-equipped and largely unprepared Indian troops. The PLA halted the 
offensive on 27 October, but waged a second attack on 16 November after India amassed 
more troops and appealed to the Soviet Union and the US for aid instead of agreeing to 
negotiations on China’s terms. PLA troops overran Indian forces and pressed deep into 
the Northeast Frontier Agency south of the McMahon line, causing widespread panic in 
India that the PLA might attack central India. However, Zhou announced a unilateral 
cease-fire starting at midnight, 21 November, and starting on 1 December Chinese troops 
withdrew to twenty kilometers behind the line of control on 7 November 1959. 
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What was at stake? 
Whiting comments that territorial security was at stake in every Chinese 
deterrence case, including its intervention in Korea and deterrence against the US in the 
early stages of the Vietnam War. It was the same in the war against India, even though the 
area directly under the threat of India’s forward policy was not nearly as strategically 
critical.
244
 However, the area is in fact strategic to Chinese interests in the broader sense. 
It is true that the Sino-Indian border overall is so far removed from China’s heartland and 
the natural barriers to occupying large areas of Chinese territory in this region so high 
that India’s advances hardly compared to the direct threat a US-occupied North Korea or 
US-backed attack by the KMT posed to China’s physical security. But it was, first of all, 
a large piece of territory. Mao said in the plainest terms when making the final decision to 
launch an attack that “we cannot give in; if we did, they would take over an area as big as 
Fujian.”245  
In addition, the western sector of disputed areas was of high strategic significance 
because of the vital Xinjiang-Tibet highway, the only route that allowed the movement of 
troops along the harsh western frontier. The road through Aksai Chin in effect connected 
Xinjiang with Tibet directly, making it easier for China to move troops and supplies 
against hostile forces in these two border regions with the highest risks for irredentism. 
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That is why China essentially hoped that India would concede to Chinese control of the 
area in exchange for Chinese acceptance of the McMahon line in diplomatic negotiations, 
even though the eastern sector involves three times as much territory. When India made it 
clear on 14 May 1962 that the most it would offer on the western sector was to let China 
use the Xinjiang-Tibet road for civilian purposes provided that China withdraw first from 
Aksai Chin – a position that would render the road useless to China – China not only 
found it unacceptable but also offensive. An official statement angrily charged, “How can 
anyone think that China would give in to such a one-sided condition? Is China a country 
defeated in war?”246 To give up Aksai Chin would leave Beijing in a more vulnerable 
position should unfriendly forces decide to attack. 
More importantly than the territory directly under dispute, India’s interests and 
influence in Tibet presented a much bigger problem to Chinese leaders. As soon as the 
CCP secured Tibet it felt the long arm of India and its significant interests in the region, 
and China had to negotiate with India to accommodate some of its interests in return for 
Indian support for Chinese sovereignty. But China knew India could use its influence to 
the detriment of Chinese interests. After the takeover, the PLA intelligence unit reported 
that Bhutan was pressured by India to stop rice exports to Tibet, which led to 
destabilizing inflation. Grain prices doubled soon after.
247
 In February 1953, China’s 
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Ambassador to India Yuan Zhongxian said in a telegram to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs that India’s policy was to “instigate internal chaos and conflicts in Tibet and 
obstruct its progress and construction… to continue its ambitions in Tibet. These are the 
same policies as the US and UK.”248 Throughout the 1950s, Zhou Enlai and the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs had warned India that militants in exile had congregated in India and 
actively engaged in espionage and insurgence and asked the Indian government to crack 
down on these activities. India, however, routinely denied the allegations.
249
 
The 1959 revolt showed that the threat of Tibet breaking away from Chinese rule 
and moving closer to India was all too real. On 17 March 1959, a week after the 
beginning of the Lhasa uprising, Zhou Enlai pointed out at a Politburo meeting that the 
revolt was connected to India, which was acting on behalf of the US and Britain.
250
 
Politburo members decided, however, that China should not name Nehru in its 
propaganda offensive, to which Mao agreed.
251
 After the Dalai Lama crossed over into 
India, received political asylum and issued a statement criticizing the CCP’s Tibet policy 
on 18 April, however, Mao toughened the rhetoric and personally revised the People’s 
Daily editorial on 20 April to accuse “Indian expansionists” for inheriting the British 
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legacy of cultivating Tibetan rebels.
252
 While Mao decided to tone down the vitriol in 
official statements in early May and the Indian government publicly distanced itself from 
Dalai Lama’s demand for an independent Tibet in June,253 the tens of thousands of 
Tibetan rebels who fled to India was a constant reminder of the internal risk posed by 
sharing a border with a country that held unsettled grudges with China on territorial 
issues. After Sino-Indian tensions escalated in the early 1960s and the trade agreement 
was allowed to expire in June 1962, India shut down border trade and cut off a crucial 
source of food for the Ngari region. The local foreign affairs bureau worried that if grain 
shortage continued, “the population will experience major turbulence and could flee on a 
large scale in the fall-winter season.”254 In the eyes of the Chinese leadership, India was 
bent on exerting its traditional influence in Tibet, to the point of challenging and 
damaging Chinese sovereignty. If Tibet were to try independence or strike closer ties to 
India, Beijing would stand to lose a vast territory and strategic depth.  
India’s fait accompli strategy in challenging Chinese borders also posed larger 
security questions. While Chinese leaders were not concerned that India had the intention 
or capability to mount a full-scale invasion, the “forward policy” made it clear that India 
would not stop unless made to by force. The risk India’s encroachment posed was a 
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unique one: unlike a large attack or guerilla warfare, the forward policy was incremental 
and relentless, with clearly negative implications for diplomatic negotiations over border 
issues. Unlike larger-scale attacks on China, which had little chance of quickly 
overpowering the PLA and forcing it to accept unfavorable political arrangements, the 
forward policy would create a fait accompli that would quickly erode China’s claim to 
line of actual control. China’s “anti-nibbling strategy” adopted in spring 1962 could be no 
more than a stop-gap measure, as it was a strategy of passive control through maintaining 
a Chinese foothold and denying India’s advancements. When Indian patrols pressed on, 
Chinese guards had no choice but to withdraw in some instances so as to avoid firefights.  
India’s persistent advances, coupled with increasingly strident rhetoric and 
appeals for assistance from the US and Soviet Union, also raised fears that India’s 
challenges would only worsen over time, its greater capabilities whetting its appetite for 
more concessions from China. In 1962, Chinese newspapers noted many instance of 
bluster in the Indian press. On 24 July 1962, the PLA Daily quoted an article in the 
Hindustan Standard that the Chinese would have to go away if India could catch Chinese 
troops off guard.
255
 On 20 August, the PLA Daily again reported on a Nehru speech in 
front of Parliament that trumpeted India’s better warfighting and logistics capabilities as a 
result of weapon purchases from the Soviet Union and the US and domestic 
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production.
256
 In September and October, not only did Chinese forces observe more 
frequent air drops of supplies, but the Chinese press also noted that Lieutenant General B. 
M. Kaul was appointed commander of a new IV Corps on 4 October, reported as a 
“special task force to oust Chinese” in an “all-out effort.”257 While the announcement was 
an almost entirely gratuitous measure to assign a new name to existing troops, the 
impression of an impending attack was at this point impossible to shake. The Soviet 
Union and the US also promised more economic and military assistance to India as the 
border dispute unfolded. In April 1961, India purchased eight Antonov-12 transport 
planes to be deployed to Ladakh along the western sector. In May 1961, US Congress 
approved an aid package of 500 million dollars to India. The clash between China and 
India also deepened chasms between Beijing and Moscow, which in turn made Soviet 
assistance a menace.  
Border disputes with India also coincided with a series of border issues with 
China’s neighbors, which Beijing tried to resolve to varying degrees of success. Failure to 
stop India’s forward policy could have had a demonstration effect and encouraged other 
countries to use the fait accompli policy rather than negotiations to strike deals favorable 
to their claims. Despite its insistence on the legality of its historical claims, China was 
open to border settlements and has recognized borders that it claimed to be illegitimate. 
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In early 1960, Chinese leaders were forced to re-evaluate their foreign policy guidelines 
in light of mounting domestic problems in the aftermath of the catastrophic Great Leap 
Forward.
258
 At a Politburo Standing Committee meeting from 1 to 17 January 1960, top 
leaders decided on a moderate foreign policy line to reduce external threats to what was 
already a highly fragile domestic situation.
259
 After a comprehensive discussion of 
China’s border issues, it was decided that resolving the Sino-Indian dispute was the top 
priority, but China should also try to resolve disputes with North Korea, Mongolia, 
Burma, Nepal and Laos more quickly. The border with the Soviet Union was the longest 
and most complicated, but China should try to resolve it as well.
260
 China subsequently 
accepted the McMahon demarcation in negotiations with Burma, which would make it 
impossible for China not to set its border with India along the same line. Through 
numerous notes to India, China made it increasingly clear that it was willing to accept the 
McMahon line as the line of actual control and formally demarcated border with India in 
exchange for India’s acceptance of China’s control of Aksai Chin. But this willingness to 
accept arrangements based on political needs did not mean that China would accept a 
constant erosion of Chinese control. To do so would send the message to China’s 
                                                        
258
 For a discussion of this internal debate and review based on available material, see Niu Jun, “1962: 
Zhongguo Duiwai Zhengce “Zuo”zhuan de Qianye (1962: The Eve of the “Left” Turn in Chinese Foreign 
Policy),” in Niu Dayong and Shen Zhihua, eds., Lengzhan yu Zhongguode Zhoubian Guanxi, 556-594, and 
Wu Lengxi, Shinian Lunzhan: Zhongsu Guanxi Huiyilu, 1956-1966 (Ten Years of Polemics: A Memoir of 
Sino-Soviet Relations, 1956-1966) (Beijing: Central Documents Press, 1999), vol.1.  
259
 Niu Jun, “1962: Zhongguo Duiwai Zhengce “Zuo”zhuan de Qianye”: 566. 
260
 Wu Lengxi, 248. 
118 
 
 
neighbors, especially as China faced challenges on multiple fronts, that China would back 
away from the risk of armed clashes and compromise on territorial security.  
Lastly, allowing India to nibble Chinese territory would prove to the world that a 
China weakened by famine and increasingly isolated from its Soviet ally could not 
defend its interests. The Chinese leadership already suspected and denounced collusion 
among imperialists, revisionists and counter-revolutionaries at this time. KMT’s plan to 
attack the mainland and subvert the regime was treated with the greatest alarm. In the 
same spring, more than 60,000 people in Xinjiang fled to the Soviet Union with the 
latter’s tacit encouragement. The leadership was increasingly under siege. To back down 
now could only invite more challenges. 
  
How did China think that this case could affect its credibility? 
As India stepped up its troop deployment and advanced toward China’s positions 
on the border after China warned repeatedly of dire consequences and increased counter-
maneuvers of its own, it became clear to Chinese leaders that at the root of India’s 
intransigence was the conviction that China did not have the capabilities and resolve to 
counter challenges. Chinese leaders asked incredulously in official articles, “how could 
the Chinese people possibly be so weak-kneed and faint-hearted as to tolerate this?”261 
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The thought that India flaunted its military might in front of China – which the 
commander of the Tibet Military Region compared to average KMT troops crushed by 
the PLA in the Chinese civil war
262
 – was unacceptable. As China’s offers to negotiate 
were not only turned down but also reciprocated by military moves, China could only 
conclude that India was taking “China’s restraint as a sign of weakness.”263 Leaders could 
not help but draw the conclusion that diplomatic warnings and more active military 
maneuvers failed precisely because they did not credibly convey that China was willing 
and able to take risks and incur costs on itself in defense of its territorial security.  
If this perception of a weak China holds, the repercussions would be felt much 
beyond the border issue, even if China faced little existential threat from India. Zhou 
explained, “if we take a conciliatory approach to Nehru, he would not only be more 
reactionary because he would think that he is right and we are wrong and whitewash his 
reactionary side, but he would also gain more advantage. We cannot take this 
approach.”264 The sense that Nehru would be emboldened and stronger to undertake other 
undefined challenges to China made it more imperative to convince him of China’s might 
as well as resolve. The official justification for the war as seen by top political and 
military leaders articulated this element of changing perceptions as well as countering a 
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tangible threat: “Central [leaders of the] CCP has decided to wage a counteroffensive to 
deal a blow to the arrogant airs of Indian reactionaries, safeguard the motherland’s 
borders and create conditions for Sino-Indian negotiations."
265
  
 The concern about credibility did not manifest as a distinct concern until India 
adopted the forward policy to change the status quo with the use of force. Until then, 
Chinese leaders had focused on persuading India to negotiate. Military preparations were 
already under way in summer 1962, evidenced by explicit orders by the General Staff 
Department on 29 May to prepare for a large counteroffensive, but apart from logistics 
preparation, troops were told to passively resist the forward policy and even began to 
move out of the theater on 5 October ahead of winter. The reason for the constraint was 
multifold: for one, Chinese leaders did not think Indian troops were in the position to 
launch a meaningful attack on the border in the summer,
266
 and attention must be given to 
thwarting a KMT attack on the southeast coast that appeared imminent in May-June 1962 
and would pose a much more critical threat to China’s physical security. After the threat 
of an attack from Taiwan passed, India’s seemingly modest 26 July 1962 note also held 
out some hope of diplomatic resolution.  
Moreover, Chinese leaders were preoccupied in August and September by a series 
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of party meetings that marked Mao’s return to radical policies, two years after he was 
forced to acquiesce to the disasters of the Great Leap Forward and endorse moderate 
domestic retrenchment and conciliatory foreign policies.
267
 At the 6 August work 
conference in Beidaihe, Mao deviated from the agenda; instead of discussing economic 
work, Mao wanted to debate the issue of class struggle for socialist countries and 
attacked criticisms of the Great Leap Forward, which have become mainstream opinions 
among top leaders at that point.
268
 At the Tenth Plenum of the Eighth Party Congress in 
September, Mao would argue forcefully that “now [we] can be sure that classes exist in 
socialist countries, and so do class struggles.”269 He concluded that criticism of the Great 
Leap Forward was a reflection of class struggles, and domestic critics could collude with 
foreign revisionists in subverting the state, as clashes with the Soviet Union turned 
increasingly acrid.
270
 This belief that class enemies were alive and well and would 
constantly threaten the survival of the socialist regime would later balloon into a full-
scale purge in the Cultural Revolution. It is within reason that such an important and 
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largely unexpected turn toward radicalism would preoccupy top leaders as well. 
Once Chinese leaders became convinced that India did not believe that China was 
powerful or resolute enough, however, they expressed concerns about China’s credibility 
that was both broadly conceived and specifically directed toward India. During the early 
October discussions chaired by Mao that made the final decision to fight India, Mao said, 
“we have fought Chiang [forces], we have fought the Japanese, and we have fought the 
Americans. We have never had any fear, and we defeated them all. Now the Indians want 
to fight us, and we of course do not have any fear. We cannot give in; if we did, they 
would take over an area as big as Fujian.”271 Leaders decided that China must make sure 
to win the war; otherwise “rebels will cause trouble again, the West and the Soviet Union 
will gloat in our loss, China’s diplomatic prestige will fall precipitously, and all [Chinese] 
people will be deeply pained. A loss would be more than the loss of one battle, and 
victory will be more than the victory of one battle.”272 Zhou pointed out that after four 
years of skirmishes since the first armed conflicts in 1959, China was in a position where 
“there was no backing down anymore,” and that if China did not retaliate, “it really 
became a show of weakness and [India] would think that China could be bullied.”273 
These statements demonstrate that Chinese leaders see the shadow of the past and future 
in each conflict, and at this point a series of conflicts in which the PLA engaged much 
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stronger enemy forces and at least fought them to a standstill have imbued them with 
confidence, but the deepening siege mentality also made leaders hope all the more for a 
victory that shows not only to India but also to other countries that China was not to be 
challenged.  
Yet the leadership also exhibited a particular conception of India as a weak power 
that had no business challenging China. In 1962, Liu Shaoqi told visiting North 
Vietnamese officials that China would never tolerate it if India acquired the attitude of a 
major power or if Indians thought they were superior to the Chinese.
274
 The 27 October 
People’s Daily editorial entitled “More on Nehru’s Philosophy in Light of the Sino-Indian 
Boundary question” vilifies Nehru not only for the capitalist interests he purportedly 
supported, but also for “dreaming of a great Indian empire.”275 The indignation is 
palpable: for a country like India to challenge China would not only embolden other 
adversaries to follow suit, it was simply unacceptable. Deep down Chinese leaders did 
not consider India on a par with the level of prestige China commanded or should 
command among other countries, and the realization that India did not think Chinese 
threats credible made establishing that credibility more critical. After the second 
offensive concluded the border war, a statement by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign 
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Affairs again hinted at the injustice of India’s position. It implores, 
 
The basic starting point of the Indian government’s approach to the Sino-Indian 
border is such: India thinks that it has the right to achieve its territorial demands, and 
China can only capitulate and cannot retaliate in self-defense... Regarding India’s 
invasive, haughty expansionist attitude, China duly advises the Indian government not to 
blindly believe in the power of force.
276
 
 
China’s concern about its reputation in this episode of deterrence failure both 
resembled the concern prior to its intervention in the Korean War and displayed subtle 
differences. Much like the Korean War, China was facing domestic troubles as well as 
what appeared to be a deteriorating security environment. In 1950, the CCP had just 
begun economic reconstruction but faced constant harassment from the remnants of KMT 
forces and had to commit troops to Tibet and Xinjiang to consolidate its control. The 
outbreak of the Korean War not only meant that Taiwan would remain off limits to the 
CCP and serve as a launch pad for future tensions, but also brought the US close to its 
northeast and southwest. In 1962, China was just beginning to recover from the 
disastrous Great Leap Forward, which has weakened Mao’s position within the party, but 
also had to prepare for attacks from Taiwan and a deepening Sino-Soviet split that could 
have security implications, as shown by the flight of 60,000 Chinese citizens with close 
ties to the Soviet Union in summer 1962. As Whiting argues, China has shown a 
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particular wariness of the possibility that domestic weakness would encourage more 
attacks on China.
277
 Accordingly, China conceived of credibility in broad terms that cast 
the reputation for resolve as transferable from one instance to the next, and likewise, the 
cost of failing to establish this resolve would also be felt across a variety of situations.  
But unlike the US, which China convinced would be its enduring rival capable of 
threatening the survival of the regime or at least cause significant hardship, India was 
perceived as engaging in persistent and escalating challenges, but in a very confined 
setting of a border conflict. While the issue of territorial security was clearly vital, deep 
down Chinese leaders did not believe that India was interested in taking vast swaths of 
Chinese territory or that India could pose a lasting existential threat to China. Likewise, 
the counter-attack on India was both carefully scaled and also promptly deescalated after 
it sent the message home. Even as Mao adopted an increasingly radical framework for 
domestic and foreign policy in this period and began to cast the conflict in class terms 
after the Tenth Plenum of the Eighth Party Congress, China did not veer far from its 
professed goal of forcing India to stop challenging China’s border claims militarily. Once 
it was observed that Nehru ordered the army to comply with China’s unilateral truce and 
sent a private message to China that it would not cross over the McMahon line, China 
ignored continued public bluster in India.
278
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How did China maintain its credibility? 
By the time China and India went to war, Chinese leaders had clearly learned 
from its first failed deterrence against the US. It both drew on the precedent established in 
the previous conflict – using the same words and phrases to signal rising threat levels and 
the possibility of intervention – and also benefited from greater autonomy, since the 
limited scope of the conflict and strained Sino-Soviet relations meant that China did not 
need to coordinate its policy with the Soviet Union. As diplomatic channels proved futile, 
China both visibly amassed troops to the area (another lesson from the Korean War) and 
devised the “anti-nibbling” strategy to force India to challenge Chinese troops, in the 
hope that the threat of higher risks would make China’s diplomatic warnings credible. 
When that strategy failed, China again explicitly referred to the lesson learned in the 
Korean War, that the only way to establish credibility is through a decisive battle 
inflicting real costs. Having the benefit of hindsight helped Chinese leaders plan the 
counteroffensive more thoroughly. Finally, when the first one-week offensive fell short of 
compelling India to concede defeat, a second offensive became necessary to suggest the 
full extent of potential costs to India if it continued to challenge China. 
Warnings both featured escalating language to convey the seriousness of Chinese 
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intent and explicitly evoked the same phrasing used prior to Chinese intervention in 
North Korea. On 5 September Beijing warned India that “whoever plays with fire will 
burn himself”; on 13 September the warning was stepped up, as “he who plays with fire 
will eventually be consumed by fire”; and another eight days later China warned that the 
“flames of war may break out” over the McMahon line.279 The ominous phrase used to 
deter the UNC from crossing the 38
th
 parallel during the Korean War – that China would 
never “sit idly by” – also surfaced in a deliberate pattern. On 19 May, it was first 
announced that China “will not stand idly by seeing its territory once again unlawfully 
invaded and occupied”;280 on 22 July, Beijing again warned that China “can by no means 
sit idle while its frontier guards are being encircled and annihilated by aggressors.
281
 This 
phrase was later replaced by the most explicit warning on 3 October, that “whenever 
India attacks, China is sure to strike back.”282  
China also supplemented these official statements with an attempt to reach India 
through more private channels for more sensitive messages. When author Elizabeth 
Comber visited Zhou in summer 1962, Zhou told her, “we know that the Indian military 
has drawn up plans, but we ourselves have also drawn up plans. Please tell your Indian 
friends that we are not afraid… We do not want war, but we are not afraid of 
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intimidation.”283 It is not clear if Comber relayed the message, but Zhou clearly hoped to 
warn India of the military preparation that China had under way as public channels would 
not be suitable for this type of a message. While he did not reveal the extent to which 
China was prepared, such as planning to wage a counteroffensive if all else failed, the 
message was a very specific warning. As this came during the same period when 
diplomatic statements were becoming harsher, Chinese leaders likely hoped that the 
combination of public, vague and private, more specific threats would work. 
Just like the summer and fall before China’s intervention in the Korean War, 
China also did not conceal the amassment of troops in the months prior to the large-scale 
offensive. China moved its better-equipped infantry divisions to replace the light-infantry 
border defense units to prepare for the conflict, even though the official press consistently 
referred to the troops as border patrols or border defense units.
284
 Indian commanders 
observed the systematic buildup of supplies across the frontlines and the deployment of 
fresh divisions and artillery units.
285
 To prepare for battle on the McMahon line, 
engineering troops built many roads and infrastructure for radio communication.
286
 China 
had reasons to believe that these moves would not have gone unnoticed by the Indian 
                                                        
283
 Wang Hongwei, 159. 
284
 Cheng Feng and Larry M. Wortzel, “PLA Operational Principles and Limited War: The Sino-Soviet War 
of 1962,” in Mark A. Ryan, David M. Finkelstein, and Michael A. McDevitt, eds., Chinese Warfighting: 
The PLA Experience since 1949 (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003, 173-197), 177-178. 
285
 Brig. J. P. Dalvi, Himalayan Blunder (Bombay: Thacker and Co., 1969), 153-154. Quoted in Whiting, 
The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence, 97. 
286
 Zhongyin Bianjing Ziwei Fanji Zuozhan Shi, 188. 
129 
 
 
military. When the latter responded by accelerating air drops of its own and restating its 
goal to drive Chinese forces out of disputed areas, Chinese leaders could only conclude 
that they did not believe China had the will or the capabilities to fight. 
The last measure China used to signal resolve short of an all-out offensive was to 
choose the anti-nibbling strategy that effectively upped the ante from April to September 
1962, forcing Indian troops to either back down or deliberately move into areas with 
heavy Chinese presence. Instead of populating uninhabited and unpatrolled areas, Indian 
forces would have to consider the costs of moving up to Chinese patrols either already 
there or would soon be deployed to the area. Instead of mere diplomatic warnings or 
troop deployment, this strategy would materially raise the odds of skirmishes and 
casualties, which would in turn raise the domestic political cost of inaction for the CCP 
regime. China hoped that India would back down or slow its forward policy when made 
aware of the higher risks that China was willing to take and was forcing India to take. 
The difficulty of executing this strategy as a signal as well as operational defense, 
however, made larger-scale conflict even more likely in the end. Instead of backing down, 
Indian patrols more often pressed close to newly established or reinforced Chinese 
positions, either cutting off their supply routes or encircling the positions at close range. 
India was likely also aware of the high political costs of backing down in front of Chinese 
border controls. Because China was not ready to launch an offensive yet but simply 
130 
 
 
wanted to send a more costly signal, it also had to instruct troops to passively resist 
India’s forward policy and not fire the first shot. This defensive posture in turn led to 
several casualties in September according to Chinese accounts.
287
 Paradoxically, this 
strategy meant that China was the party that had to back down repeatedly, which likely 
reinforced the Indian perception that China was too weak to fight, and this misperception 
then convinced China that India would not find any Chinese threat credible.  
Moreover, the anti-nibbling strategy also likely spurred widespread outrage 
among the rank-and-file and pressure on the leadership to react forcefully. The official 
PLA account of the war is littered with references to soldiers who asked to fight. While 
the PLA has the incentive to portray itself as the party exercising self-discipline, higher-
level military officers detailed the amount of consultation they had to do in order to talk 
down soldiers. The pressure was likely genuinely felt, especially as the military was also 
increasingly indoctrinated with radical views. For example, Vice Director of the 
Intelligence Division of the General Staff Department Chai Chengwen repeatedly 
cautioned troops on the western sector to exercise restraint when they asked to punish 
Indian patrols. Chai arranged mock interactions to better implement the CMC’s rules of 
engagements under the anti-nibbling strategy. Other commanders also reportedly visited 
each outpost to explain the CMC instructions.
288
 Chinese officers remember that this 
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sentiment dates back to 1959, after the first bloody clashes, a natural response to the 
deadly incidents. Zhou proposed a twenty-kilometer withdrawal of forces at that time 
partly because Chinese leaders thought a disengagement of forces was necessary to avoid 
open conflicts.
289
  
When the riskier but still defensive anti-nibbling strategy failed to deter Indian 
troops from pursuing the forward policy, China resorted to the final lesson that it learned 
during the Korean War, that the best and sometimes only way to establish credibility is 
through a decisive battle that proves to the opponent China’s will and strength to defend 
its interests. The final order for battle emphasized the need to not only defeat the enemy 
but also demonstrate China’s overwhelming capability. The 6 October order from the 
central leadership specifically demanded troops to “not only repel the [enemy], but also 
hurt it in a forceful blow.”290 On 10 October, Chief of Staff Luo Ruiqing instructed the 
Tibet and Xinjiang military regions that “this battle must be fought well, not poorly. This 
issue has implications for the national and military prestige and major international 
developments. [We] either do not move at all, or we must resolutely hurt the enemy.”291 
Commanders paid special attention to defeating the newly formed IV Corps, for it 
represented the crown jewel of India’s military.292 By going beyond the immediate 
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territory and disputes in question, China hoped to make it plainly obvious that the costs of 
challenging China would be prohibitive. The supplementary need to establish credibility 
explains the order to “hurt” the enemy. 
A successful deterrence of Chiang’s counteroffensive shortly before the Sino-
India conflict flared up likely proved the dividends of fighting the US during the Korean 
War. Chiang Kai-shek lobbied for an offensive against the mainland in the spring of 1962, 
seen in the significant buildup of forces across from the Fujian coast and ramp-up in 
reconnaissance flights. China responded with both threats of retaliation and a 
corresponding buildup of troops, including a 10 June mobilization order that went to all 
party committees on the prefecture and division level.
293
 The US then reined in Taiwan 
and sought to reassure China through both public and private channels, with President 
Kennedy stating plainly that the US would not support Taiwan in an invasion.
294
 Finding 
US reassurances credible, China later ended the preparation for battle. Security interests 
aside, the fact that the US found Chinese threats credible likely demonstrated to the 
Chinese leadership the rewards of intervening when the US ignored Chinese threats 
during the Korean War. Without inflicting heavy costs on the enemy – and bearing the 
same costs itself – it would be very difficult to establish credibility decisively. Since India 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Deterrence Thinking and Practice after the Founding of the New China),” Junshi Lishi (Military History), 
no. 1 (2002): 24. 
293
 Zhongyin Bianjing Ziwei Fanji Zuozhan Shi, 466. 
294
 Whiting, Chinese Calculus of Deterrence, 68-69. 
133 
 
 
did not pose the same level of threat as the US, Mao’s final deliberations prior to the war 
focused not so much on the immediate material costs but rather diplomatic repercussions; 
he pointed out that once China and India went to war, many countries would likely side 
with India, and China might become isolated.
295
 But he then pointed out the long-term 
payoff that justifies the short-term costs: “as long as we fight a good battle, we will enjoy 
the initiative… we either do not fight or must fight to impress. We must secure at least 
thirty years of peace.”296  
Finally, when India responded to the first offensive with defiance and appealed to 
the US and Soviet Union for aid, China followed up with a second offensive meant to 
drive the point home. Beijing issued a statement on 24 October, repeating its earlier 
proposals that both sides withdraw troops twenty kilometers from the line of actual 
control and that the two premiers meet for talks.
297
 The appeal and the moderate tone may 
have been an effort to contain the fallout of the attack.
298
 The Chinese offensive hardened 
India’s public opinion even further, however, and all were clamoring for war. New Delhi 
rejected China’s proposals on the same day, demanding that China withdraw instead to 
the line prior to 8 September 1962. Beijing has found the position unacceptable because it 
would restore the Dhola post north of the McMahon line. There was certainly no sign of 
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India softening its diplomatic position publicly; militarily, India appeared to be gearing 
up for war with China. India announced a state of emergency on 26 October, and the US 
State Department said on 31 October that the US would begin supplying India with 
infantry arms and communications equipment.
299
 China could only conclude that it had to 
hurt India even more. 
The CMC instructed troops on 24 October that if India rejected negotiations again, 
the PLA should “deal a more resolute blow to Indian reactionaries to force them to sit 
down and negotiate.”300 On 12 November, the CMC defined the objective of the second 
offensive as annihilating three to four Indian brigades. The PLA ended the three-week lull 
on 16 November with a forceful attack on both the east and west and in three days forced 
Indian troops into a hasty retreat, driving all Indian military out of its Northeast Frontier 
Agency in four days. Refugees filled the streets and officials burned money and 
documents. It was feared that Chinese troops could press into the Assam plateau on the 
heels of its victory, and on 20 November there was widespread panic in New Delhi.
301
 
The second offensive clearly went beyond the first attack and left a lasting impression on 
the Indian leadership. 
  
China’s concern about credibility again contributed to its decision to counter 
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challenges with a concentrated use of force. While China’s strategic interest in defending 
its territory and deterring challenges on its territorial claims argues decisively in favor of 
a limited war, leaders also found it necessary to establish credibility in the eyes of India, 
which would help consistently strengthen Chinese deterrence for years to come. India 
was not regarded as an enduring rival like the US. However, credibility vis-a-vis India 
was still important as the Chinese neighbor had unique influence over Tibet. Just as in the 
Korean War, China concluded that the best means to establish a reputation for resolve 
was actual military engagement in not just one but two battles, as the first one fell short 
of putting an end to Indian strategy. Again, leaders looked to past conflicts for lessons 
and projected the rewards of their decisions into the future.  
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1969 SINO-SOVIET BORDER CLASHES 
 
The string of deadly border clashes between China and the Soviet Union in spring 
and summer 1969 laid bare for the first time the deep schisms between the two biggest 
Communist powers in the world and led to threats of nuclear war among the two former 
allies. The emergence of more archival material has shed light on some key points in the 
decision-making timeline and led to more scholarly consensus on certain factual 
questions, but much remains unknown and locked up in archives. Moreover, studies of 
this conflict are often grounded in the large and contentious discussion on China’s 
revolutionary foreign policy, so that the historical interpretations are further complicated 
by a lack of clarity in the framework of analysis. In contrast, this dissertation hopes to 
focus primarily on the issue of whether and how the concern with credibility contributed 
to China’s decision to use force in March 1969. 
Unlike previous case studies, in which China used well-defined and decisive force 
to protect specific strategic interests, executed by a largely effective and centralized 
bureaucracy, the March 1969 border clashes occurred against a backdrop of radicalized 
values, the fervor of Mao Zedong’s personality cult and a tattered if not fully destroyed 
bureaucracy. This dramatically different context raises legitimate doubts about the 
applicability of previous lessons and frameworks. Moreover, unlike previous incidents of 
137 
 
 
deterrence, China’s decision to use force in March 1969 triggered an extended period of 
tension and Soviet reprisals that nonetheless did not erupt in war. In the absence of a 
clean-cut end to a deterrence episode, there may be questions that the case does not fit. 
This dissertation will also address these concerns and acknowledge the limits of the 
current endeavor. 
 
The clash in spring 1969 was more than ten years in the making, the culmination 
of increasingly public and deep-seated conflicts between the Soviet Union and China. 
When fractures first appeared, however, the two countries were engaged in 
unprecedented political and military cooperation. The death of Joseph Stalin in 1953 and 
the subsequent resolution of Korean War armistice talks brought the end to collaboration 
necessitated by war operations, but Sino-Soviet relations did not suffer at the hands of 
Nikita Khrushchev. In fact, the new Soviet leader authorized the largest-scale military 
technology transfer between the two allies, including the still new nuclear technology.  
On 3 October 1954, during Khrushchev’s first visit to Beijing, Mao asked for the 
first time that the Soviet Union assist China’s attempt to develop a nuclear weapons 
program.
302
 In case that the Soviets were not willing to “share” atomic weapons with 
China, Mao proposed that they provide “technology for the manufacturing of the atomic 
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bomb.” Khrushchev turned down the request tactfully, advising China against developing 
its own nuclear technology due to its lack of industrial and financial means. China could 
instead rely on Soviet nuclear protection.
303
 Far from giving up on the program, China 
decided to keep up the pressure on the Soviet Union and pressed for comprehensive 
assistance in missile technology in a Central Committee telegraph in August 1956. The 
Soviet response that it would train Chinese cadres in missile manufacturing fell far short 
of Chinese hopes, however.
304
 Soviet attitude turned considerably warmer in fall 1957, 
after repeated communication by the Chinese leadership that they would seek nuclear 
capabilities with or without Soviet involvement. Khrushchev also needed Chinese 
support during another episode of Politburo power struggle. During September 1957 talks, 
Soviet officials suggested that the Soviet Union could provide technological manuals and 
a model atomic bomb. The proposal was followed by a comprehensive technology 
transfer agreement signed in October, including surface-to-surface missiles, a nuclear 
reactor, SLBMs and rockets in the next twelve months.
305
 
Robust military ties masked a widening divergence in ideology and strategic 
priorities, however. The Soviet 20
th
 Party Plenum in February 1956 recalibrated the 
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country’s economic and foreign policy, for the first time asserting that the socialist camp 
and capitalist camp could engage in peaceful coexistence, peaceful competition and 
peaceful transition
306. More shocking was Khrushchev’s “secret speech” that revealed 
Stalin’s role in ruthless purges and struck down the personality cult around him, a speech 
that sent reverberations throughout the socialist camp. For Mao, who had long struggled 
to preserve some degree of autonomy and maximize interests for CCP as the Soviet 
Union’s junior partner, the criticisms struck a chord. The CCP leadership circulated the 
secret speech transcripts among party members without much effort at controlling its 
reach.
307
 Mao could have held the information closely, but he might have wanted to 
gauge the impact of de-Stalinization. In a private meeting with the Soviet Ambassador 
Pavel Yudin on 11 March, Mao detailed all the misguided orders by Stalin that caused 
damage to the CCP in the pre-independence years and accused the late Soviet leader of 
chauvinism.
308
 
However, as the first-generation leader of a newly consolidated republic, Mao 
inevitably identified more with Stalin than Khrushchev and was alarmed by the prospects 
of having his legacy tarnished by a seemingly loyal successor. In closed-door meetings on 
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19 March, Mao said that Stalin was 70% correct and 30% incorrect.
309
 The editorial in 
People’s Daily published on 5 April 1956 was distinctly more hedged on Stalin’s legacy, 
weighing his mistakes against his achievements and calling him an “extraordinary” 
statesman.
310
 Mao told an enlarged Politburo on 25 April that “the same people who once 
flattered and held Stalin to ten-thousand feet in the sky are now striking him down to 
nine-thousand feet under ground. Some people in our country are following suit.”311 The 
attack, sharp and bare, was a shot across the bow for any similar attempts to challenge his 
leadership. Unrest in Poland and Hungary that triggered Soviet crackdown months later 
further deepened his worries. In his eyes the Soviet leadership mishandled de-
Stalinization, but the Soviet Union was no more reluctant to display force against 
dissenters in the alliance. 
But the secret speech more than sowed the seeds of mistrust in Mao’s mind. Mao 
also started to openly challenge the authority of Soviet ideology and contending for 
leadership in the international Communist movement. In the follow-up editorial 
published in the People’s Daily on 29 December 1956, a much more grandiose effort was 
made to evaluate the entire Communist movement and establish a set of “universal” and 
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orthodox Communist beliefs that transcended time and space.
312
 On hooks such as 
dogmatism and revisionism hung China’s criticism of the current Soviet leadership, 
which was trying to maintain indisputable control of Eastern European allies while 
pursuing a more conciliatory foreign policy toward the West. This editorial would set the 
tone for repeated and bitter polemics in the future carried out in party papers. 
While Mao spent considerable time navigating what seemed like obscure and 
nuanced ideological minefields, his analysis of the uprisings in Poland and Hungary 
revealed more of what he was striving for at the time: a more prominent status in the 
international Communist hierarchy and greater freedom from Soviet influence. He told 
the Second Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee held from 10 to 15 October 1956 
that the main reason for unrest in Eastern Europe was that the class struggles there were 
not harsh and thorough enough and not enough enemies were killed.
313
 In other words, 
the unrest was instigated by enemies such as capitalists and western powers and must be 
suppressed. On the other hand, he criticized the Soviet Union for using force against its 
allies. Just days after the speech he told the Soviet ambassador Yudin that “if you 
dispatch troops we will support Poland and oppose you and openly condemn your armed 
intervention in Poland.”314 He was just as guarded against Communist dissenters as 
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resentful of Soviet intervention.  
Moreover, Mao actively voiced his disagreement with Soviet ideology at bilateral 
and international settings. Mao’s mission for Zhou Enlai, on the latter’s visit to Moscow 
in January 1957, was to criticize Khrushchev and the Soviet central party leadership “face 
to face” on their conduct in the Eastern European unrest and ask them to openly admit 
mistakes and wrongdoing.
315
 This daring mission would have been unthinkable during 
Stalin’s reign. Khrushchev’s efforts to de-Stalinize, while reminding Mao of the risk of 
betrayal, also encouraged him to challenge the Soviet leadership and question Stalin’s 
legacy. With Stalin’s death and Khrushchev’s courtship of Chinese support came the 
yearning for equality. In a telegram sent after completing the visit, Zhou acknowledged 
that finally “China and the Soviet Union can sit down together on an equal footing to 
discuss issues” and that “relations are certainly different from the days of Stalin.”316 
But more than anything else the Chinese leadership concluded that the shift in the 
relationship traced back to a shift in the balance of power between the two countries and 
compelling circumstances. In the same telegram, Zhou concluded that warming relations 
was primarily due to “the threat of major enemies” which compelled “solidarity and 
mutual assistance between China and the Soviet Union.”317 As a result he also called the 
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Soviet leadership opportunistic and questioned its sincerity. On 27 January 1957, Mao 
relayed to provincial party chiefs that “circumstances are more powerful than people, 
even some important officials. Pressed by circumstances, those stubborn Soviets who 
wanted to pursue big-power chauvinism found that they could not.” Mao called them 
“blinded by the lust for gain.” The gains, or rather the material grounds for the Soviet 
foreign policy, were summed up as “fifty million tons of steel, four hundred tons of coal 
and eighty million tons of oil,” the pillars of Soviet industrial production in Mao’s eyes. 
But this is “really nothing extraordinary!” Mao bitterly concluded that “[we can] seek 
similarities and tolerate differences for the time being… But if they insist on continuing 
with this, [disagreements] will be aired out eventually.”318  
In these ominous words one clearly sees the beginnings of the Great Leap 
Forward launched one year later, a disastrous, misguided attempt to leapfrog China’s 
industrial capacity ahead of rivals and peers in record time. If the key to reshaping Sino-
Soviet relations lay in a stronger China, the logical conclusion can only be one: that 
China must get stronger at all costs. And the converse is true: as Mao initially believed 
that the Great Leap Forward was delivering the desired results and propelling China into 
the club of great industrial powers, he felt that China could assert its views and interests 
more forcefully in front of its allies. The junior partner’s search for autonomy in an 
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alliance relationship is bound to be difficult, and even more so when ideology is used to 
lend legitimacy to competition. 
Yet on the surface relations were still warm and disputes nascent in 1957. Later in 
the year the two sides were to sign the treaty on national defense that started large-scale 
nuclear technology transfers. Mao, while contemptuous of Soviet “opportunism,” deemed 
the relationship advantageous to China and largely satisfactory. By 1958, however, 
relations suffered a number of serious blows that triggered mistrust and slowed the pace 
of cooperation. The two sides started perceiving threat from the other side. 
By May 1958, China set its course on overtaking Great Britain in seven years and 
doubling its steel production in one year. A month later, Mao thought that it would take 
“two to three years, possibly two” instead of seven years.319 The country also firmly 
believed that it would be able to produce nuclear weapons in several years, with or 
without Soviet assistance. The course it was charting was different from and superior to 
the Soviet path, exemplar of the entire Communist movement. This year Mao boasted 
that “Communism may arrive sooner for us than the Soviet Union,” clearly introducing 
an element of competition.
320
 In November 1958, Mao said that in the imminent future 
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China would be waiting for the Soviet Union at the doorstep of Communist society.
321
 A 
ministry-level meeting held at the same time to discuss the merit of the Soviet economic 
model concluded that the Soviet model was too balanced, too bound to plan, and not 
sufficiently invested in economic growth.
322
 
This confidence in China’s burgeoning great power status and singularity were 
expressed fully in alliance relations. No longer the junior partner – at least not for long – 
China would no longer tolerate compromises and challenges to its autonomy. The 
incident of the joint fleet, cited for decades by the official press as an example of Soviet 
haughtiness and imperialism,
323
 in reality did not differ much from common military 
arrangements between allies. In April 1957 PLA Navy Commander Xiao Jinguang visited 
the Soviet Union. Impressed with its missile submarines, he proposed to the Chinese 
leadership that China should try to get technology assistance from the Soviet Union. In 
June Zhou Enlai telegraphed Khrushchev, expressing an interest in nuclear submarine 
technology.
324
 But it was very difficult to justify sharing this advanced technology with 
China. The Soviet defense minister proposed that China set up a long-wave radio station 
in Hainan that the Soviet submarine fleet could access and a program under which Soviet 
vessels could dock and undergo repairs at Chinese ports. With this level of cooperation 
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technology transfers could be justified.
325
 Mao agreed to the setup of the radio facility but 
rejected Moscow’s offer to fund the bulk of it.326 Despite China’s obvious reluctance, 
Soviet ambassador Yudin again relayed the leadership’s offer to cooperate on the radio 
facility and fleet to Mao on 21 July 1958. Mao blasted Yudin and asked if the Soviets 
would withhold assistance unless China agreed to some form of a “cooperative.” He 
summoned Yudin the next day for a rambling tirade in front of the entire Politburo. Mao 
announced that he would stop asking for Soviet assistance, as the Soviets were clearly 
looking down upon China as “inferior people.” Grievances about Soviet espionage and 
interferences also came tumbling out.
327
 He was so outraged that Khrushchev arranged to 
visit China in late July to placate Mao. Yet China had tolerated much more serious 
compromises at the hands of the Soviets during the Civil War and the early 1950s. What 
was different this time was that China no longer saw such compromises as necessary for 
securing its interests.
328
 
China’s hope to acquire nuclear weapons, likely a reflection of its mistrust of the 
Soviet nuclear umbrella, also complicated Soviet efforts to reduce the risks of 
catastrophic war and reach an arms control agreement with the US. At the very time when 
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Mao was berating the Soviets for belittling China, Moscow and Washington were in talks 
over devising a system that could monitor secret nuclear tests, which would enable a 
future test ban. Any arms control agreement, however, would not allow proliferation, and 
the Soviets likely found their options increasingly constrained. Chinese officials, by the 
same token, could not but suspect that the test ban was aimed at denying China the right 
to own nuclear weapons.
329
 
But it was China’s decision to shell the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu 
without advance notice that sparked the fear of entanglement for Soviet leaders. After 
months of pondering the best course of action against the Nationalist regime in Taiwan 
during the summer of 1958, Mao decided on shelling the two offshore islands controlled 
by the KMT.
330
 Though Mao sought to carefully control the risk of US intervention, the 
move could not help but disrupt regional and global relations, especially as the intention 
of the shelling was not made clear. The thousands of shells that started raining on the 
islands on 23 August came as total surprise to Khrushchev, who had just visited China but 
did not hear a word from Mao, and was at about to accept Eisenhower’s invitation to 
meet and start negotiating a nuclear test ban and arms control regime.  
Moreover, Chinese leaders were effectively touting the risk of entangling the 
Soviet Union as the crisis widened. On 18 September, at the peak of the crisis, Zhou 
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Enlai told the Soviet attaché in Beijing that if war broke out and the US deployed atomic 
bombs against China, China would suffer damages but the Soviet Union would retaliate 
on China’s behalf. He also said that China planned to develop modern weapons with 
Soviet assistance.
331
 While Khrushchev publicly vowed to uphold alliance responsibility 
and said that the Soviet Union would side with its Chinese comrades,
332
 what he regarded 
as Chinese adventurism and total disregard for Soviet foreign policy interests greatly 
upset his confidence in the alliance. Afterwards Khrushchev decided not to provide an 
atomic bomb model to China and sought to slow down, scale back and eventually scrap 
advanced technology transfers to China in 1959.
333
 With Chinese interests seemingly 
diverging, the risk of arming China with nuclear weapons was too great to bear. 
Similarly, Soviet criticism of Chinese policies during the first significant clash on 
the Sino-Indian border also spawned mistrust and anger. Months after the Dalai Lama 
fled Tibet in March 1959, which eroded CCP’s control over the strategically important 
region, Indian border troops clashed with Chinese guards on 25 August in disputed areas. 
China’s western border, which had not been a strategic focus for the new republic, began 
to come under pressure. Khrushchev later recalled that he believed Mao was to blame for 
provoking the conflict, and he was angered by another failure of the Chinese to do what 
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was obligated in the Sino-Soviet treaty and consult its ally over an armed conflict.
334
 
Despite repeated pleas delivered by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to side with 
Chinese claims, TASS carried a statement on Soviet neutrality on the conflict on 9 
September,
335
 tantamount to a public rejection of Chinese grounds in the eyes of Chinese 
leaders. In a candid and unpleasant exchange between Khrushchev and top Chinese 
leaders on 2 October, the Soviet leader complained of Chinese adventurism while the 
Chinese protested that the Soviet Union gave in to India.
336
 Shocked that the Soviets 
would so publicly disclose policy differences with China, Mao concluded that the Soviet 
Union sacrificed China in order to please the US, the same reason the Soviets suspended 
technology transfers to China in June 1959.
337
 When Khrushchev visited the US in 
September 1959, the first by a Soviet leader, Mao must have grown increasingly wary of 
what he saw as Soviet capitulation or even collusion.
338
 
The most serious breach of trust, however, lay in the Soviet questioning of the 
Great Leap Forward that coincided with dissent within the CCP. The Soviet Union 
initially had very little information on the Great Leap Forward. In summer 1959, 
Khrushchev recounted to a congregation in Poland mistakes made in the 1920s when the 
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Soviet Union attempted to establish communes, an oblique criticism of rural communes 
that were the centerpiece of the Great Leap Forward.
339
 The speech was promptly noted 
in an internal news digest for top leaders and on 28 July was sent to Lushan, Jiangxi, 
where the fateful enlarged meeting of the Politburo was being held.
340
 By this time the 
meeting had been radicalized; Mao was incensed by the letter Defense Minister Peng 
Dehuai penned on 14 July criticizing the Great Leap Forward and his leadership. He 
circulated the Soviet speech among delegates the next day and commented that he was 
willing to “fight the world,” presumably including Khrushchev, as well as “a large 
number of opponents and skeptics in the party.”341 The Lushan meeting led to the radical 
Eighth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee, in which Peng Dehuai and other senior 
leaders were purged for anti-party crimes. Soviet criticism came at a time when Mao was 
extremely sensitive to domestic dissent and worried about the security of his rule. While 
the two allies would later attempt to paint over their differences, Mao was likely 
suspicious that nay-sayers within the leadership would lean on Soviet criticism to erode 
Mao’s supremacy. In the 1920s and 1930s, the young CCP had been rocked by violent 
internal upheavals; officials backed by the Soviet Union often clashed with and purged 
locally educated counterparts, and Mao was one of the latter. Soviet interference in intra-
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party rivalry was a particularly sensitive subject for Mao. 
Yet these burgeoning tensions, disagreements and mistrust have not yet morphed 
into serious security threats. The two allies have cooled from the honeymoon period after 
Stalin’s death, no doubt, but disillusioned allies did not make enemies. Relations waxed 
and waned in the early 1960s as Mao took the back stage temporarily in the wake of the 
famines, and both countries used the plethora of international conferences and meetings 
as battlegrounds for legitimacy as well as occasions for reconciliation. China’s boycott of 
an agreement on disarmament at the February 1960 Warsaw Pact conference enraged 
Khrushchev, who then censured China for adopting a reckless foreign policy in India. The 
CCP then published three lengthy articles on Leninism in April, a thinly disguised attack 
on Soviet policies. The two continued to spar at the June 1960 meeting of the Romanian 
Communist Party, and in July the Soviet Union notified China that it was withdrawing all 
Soviet experts in China. Yet even at this stage Mao still insisted that the differences were 
minor and could be overcome.
342
 In November 1960, China and the Soviet Union found 
enough common ground at the conference of 81 Communist and workers’ parties to 
produce a communiqué. 
But as China’s security environment took a turn for the worse in 1962, unresolved 
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territorial issues with the Soviet Union provided fertile ground for more material clashes. 
China claimed that imperial Russia had taken territory from China through unequal 
treaties and armed conquest in Xinjiang and the northeast, and the two also had 
conflicting historical claims on other pieces of land. The People’s Republic neither 
recognized nor denounced these treaties with Russia, but demonstrated in its negotiations 
with Burma that it was willing to recognize the line of actual control. But unresolved 
disputes also meant that clashes were inevitable. The first sign of tension appeared in 
August 1960, when Soviet border troops drove back herdsmen who crossed over in 
Xinjiang and triggered a statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the territory 
in question was Chinese. In 1962, China first faced the possibility of an armed KMT 
invasion of the eastern seaboard in the summer, then fought a short but decisive war with 
India in the west in October and November after months of escalating clashes.  
Compared with these familiar adversaries, however, the Soviets were a less 
expected provocateur. In April-May 1962, more than 60,000 Chinese in Xinjiang, either 
of Russian descent or Uyghurs and Kazakhs with close ties to Russia, crossed over into 
Soviet territory en masse. A significant number were local officials. 
343
 Chinese officials 
observed that they received encouragements and assistance from the Soviets, who offered 
them legal papers and instructions. The stunning show of defiance and the weakness of 
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Chinese control in this large and unstable region left much room for the Soviets to exert 
influence. But the assistance provided by Soviet officials suggested an even bigger 
nightmare: borders would become irrelevant if the population were more attached to the 
unfriendly neighbor. 
While Chinese officials tried to downplay the embarrassing episode of mass 
exodus, they could not help but appreciate the increasing security threat from the Soviets. 
The US-Soviet rapprochement was the most serious, structural threat to Chinese interests, 
raising the possibility of Soviet abandonment. As China slowly recovered from the Great 
Leap Forward, Mao reclaimed dominance in domestic politics and showed no appetite for 
a meaningful shift toward moderate policies. He purged the pro-reconciliation officials 
led by Wang Jiaxiang and pushed for a return to revolutionary foreign policy. But at the 
same time, the Kennedy administration, alarmed by the prospect of a nuclear-armed and 
volatile China, chose to take advantage of Sino-Soviet divisions and approach the Soviet 
Union for a Limited Test Ban Treaty. The Soviets also found Chinese adventurism 
threatening and welcomed the idea. The treaty was eventually signed in 1963, which 
proved to the Chinese leadership beyond all reasonable doubt that the Soviets have 
abandoned China and wanted to deny China nuclear weapons know-how. Although it is 
not clear if Chinese officials knew at the time, the US also probed the Soviets if it would 
agree to either a unilateral or joint US-Soviet attack on Chinese nuclear facilities. China 
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most likely knew of the plan from an October 1964 New York Times article referring to 
US-Soviet cooperation in preventing China from acquiring nuclear weapons.
344
 
By this time China ramped up the virility of attacks on Soviet ideology, 
publishing a series of abusive editorials in People’s Daily from December 1962 through 
July 1964 and publicizing cleavages with its ally. The attacks convinced the Soviet Union 
that China was becoming too volatile and difficult to control and alarmed China’s other 
neighbors, such as Mongolia. In 1963, the Soviet Union reached an agreement with 
Mongolia to station Soviet troops along the Sino-Mongolian border, putting the entire 
length of China’s northern border within reach of the Soviet military. Mongolia moved to 
join the Warsaw Pact in July and asked explicitly for Soviet defense aid in 1964-65.
345
 In 
September 1963, Shenyang Military Region officials said that China had to be on the 
lookout militarily, as “the revisionist could do every bad thing imaginable.”346 
At this point China began to raise the border issue as a prominent point of 
discussion with the Soviets. It should be noted that as a revolutionary party, the CCP must 
settle disputes with its neighbors anew after its founding in order to have secure borders. 
But how it chose to conduct these negotiations depended on its security interests, guiding 
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foreign policy principles and ideological needs. In March 1963, China for the first time 
raised the issue of “unequal treaties” in a People’s Daily editorial, hinting at a much 
tougher stance than previously stated.
347
 As unequal treaties are legally dubious, making 
such a claim upped the ante before the two sides held any talks. The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs used the same language in a formal notice in September. In February 1964, the 
two sides held negotiations to settle border disputes. Mao instructed that while China 
could accept an agreement based on the status quo, the Chinese delegation must secure 
Soviet concession that the current border was settled in a series of “unequal treaties” 
between imperial China and Russia.
348
 Such a premise, however, could not help but 
arouse suspicions in the Soviet Union that China would challenge the legality of an 
agreement in the future, and talks stalled.  
A brief window of reaching a deal, however, was closed by a brash comment. By 
early July it appeared that the two sides might be able to deliver an agreement on the 
eastern sector, and the delegates took a break.
349
 Therefore, it came as a shock to the 
Soviets when Mao seemed to reverse course and up the ante on the talks. He told 
Japanese visitors in July 1964 that China could have revisited the claim on vast areas in 
the Far East, all the way to Vladivostok, and that China would support Japan’s claim on 
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disputed territory with the Soviet Union.
350
 The Chinese delegation, inspired by the new, 
tough guidance from Beijing, raised more claims in August and warned that “if you 
stubbornly insist on the wrong stance… [we] cannot exclude the possibility that we 
would consider alternative solutions to the issue.”351 In early September, the Pravda 
commented that China was bent on expansionism.
352
 Later Mao would explain that he 
was not interested in reclaiming the more than 1.5 million square kilometers of territory 
ceded in imperial treaties, but simply wanted to “make empty claims” to make 
Khrushchev nervous so as to push the latter to sign an agreement.
353
 But it backfired. 
Talks broke down in August 1964 without reaching any consensus.  
China briefly reached out to the Soviet Union following a worsening of its 
security environment in the south and a changing of the guard in the Soviet leadership in 
the second half of 1964. The US started bombing North Vietnam after the 2 August 1964 
Tonkin Gulf incident, when the North Vietnamese navy allegedly engaged US destroyers. 
In China’s eyes, the escalation of military actions hinted at a Korean War redux, where 
US intervention in a neighbor’s civil war threatened to implicate China. Mao already 
made it clear that China would “do all it could” to support North Vietnam in a 27 July 
statement, pointing out that China must be prepared for war as well.
354
 A week later, the 
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General Staff Department of the PLA ordered military preparations across all forces.
355
 
While China’s diplomatic maneuverings and US willingness to accept military limits to 
its operations would eventually prevent war between the two, the escalation of US 
involvement in Southeast Asia could not help but force China to consider the possibility 
of war.  
It was in this context that Khrushchev was ousted in October 1964. China was 
encouraged enough by the potential impact on Sino-Soviet relations that Zhou Enlai 
reached out almost immediately, asking to establish channels of communications and 
send a delegation to attend celebrations of the October Revolution in Moscow.
356
 In a 
telegram to the Soviet leadership signed by the collective Chinese leadership, China 
vowed to “unite closely with the Soviet Communist Party and the Soviet Union to oppose 
our common enemy and promote our common mission.”357 The Soviet leadership, for its 
part, agreed to the visit and stopped anti-China propaganda briefly. The limited goodwill 
generated in these initial contacts, however, was completely dissipated when a very drunk 
Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky told Zhou Enlai in Moscow on 7 November that 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Historical Background of the Shift in China’s US Policy in the Late 1960s)” in Yang Fuchang, ed., 
Kuashijide Zhongguo Waijiao: “Zhongguo Waijiao Huihuang 50nian” Yantaohui Lunwenji (Chinese 
Diplomacy Over the Century: A Collection of Theses for the “Fifty Years of Glorious Chinese Diplomacy” 
Conference) (Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 2000), 131. 
355
 Ibid., 131. 
356
 Cao Guangjin, “Bolie Riniefu Zhizheng Chuqi Zhongsu Hejie de Changshi yu Shibai Tanxi (Trials and 
Errors of Sino-Soviet Rapprochement in Early Brezhnev Years),” Zhonggong Dangshi Yanjiu (Chinese 
Communist Party Studies), no. 1 (2012): 68. 
357
 Ibid., 68. 
158 
 
 
“you Chinese should get rid of Mao, [just like how] we Russians got rid of 
Khrushchev.”358 At an emergency CCP Politburo meeting held on the next day to discuss 
the event, it was decided that a serious protest was called for. Zhou told Brezhnev and 
others that far from a random act, this outburst “reflected the fact that some in the Soviet 
leadership continued to follow Khrushchev’s behavior, which is to subvert the Chinese 
regime.”359 Subsequent talks revealed that the new Soviet leadership had no intention to 
chart a new course on foreign policy or to denounce Khrushchev’s China policies, and 
Zhou concluded that “things were even worse than we thought.”360 The brief probe ended 
quickly, with China resuming attacks on the new leadership.  
By 1965, China’s official foreign policy principles had become as radicalized as 
its domestic policy. People’s Daily announced on 14 June 1965 that “anti-imperialism 
must be accompanied with anti-revisionism,”361 formally designating the Soviet Union 
the same enemy status as the US, China’s longest running enemy and ideological foe. Lin 
Biao, by then the most likely heir to Mao’s throne, elevated China to “the revolutionary 
base of the world” in a 3 September article in the party paper, in effect declaring China as 
the leader of world revolution. If China were to be the revolutionary base for the world, 
the implication was that China would spread the seed of Communist revolution to the rest 
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of the world, much like how the CCP first established revolutionary bases across China 
before engaging the ruling KMT in an all-out civil war.  
This radical turn of Chinese foreign policy both fed into and was exacerbated by 
the Sino-Soviet competition and clashes over their Vietnam policies. In February 1965, 
Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin told Zhou Enlai after visiting Vietnam that the Soviet 
Union was prepared to offer any assistance necessary to North Vietnam.
362
 Kosygin 
stepped up material assistance by the Soviet Union and asked for Chinese permission to 
help transport Soviet troops on Chinese rails to North Vietnam and grant access to Soviet 
planes through Chinese airspace.
363
 On the diplomatic front, he called for convening a 
new international conference on Indochina.
364
 These moves to take the lead in 
negotiations and military actions on the Vietnam issue irked China, which had a special 
interest in the negotiations in the 1950s and helped broker the first armistice in 1954. 
China first opposed Soviet intervention on the technical front, arguing that such obvious 
military maneuvers risked premature escalation. It accused the Soviet Union of both 
courting Vietnam and curbing Chinese influence.
365
 China also objected to holding talks 
with the US.
366
 As Thomas Christensen argues, the split between China and the Soviet 
Union led to a competition for greater influence in Vietnam and hurt their relations 
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further.
367
 The disputes also meant that it was more difficult to reach a compromise on the 
Vietnam issue. In other words, Vietnam served as additional fodder for China and the 
Soviet Union to clash over, and disagreements bled back into the ongoing ideological 
debate and heightened security concerns. 
When the Soviet Union and Mongolia formally signed the friendship treaty in 
January 1966, Mao was preparing for what he saw as his greatest accomplishment to date, 
the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution. Mao hoped that by encouraging a mass 
revolution to overthrow and cleanse the existing establishment, he could rid the party and 
government of dissenting voices, especially those who sought more practical policies. He 
could centralize all authority and channel it into the next handpicked, orthodox leader of 
China. This radical revolution turned out to be very difficult to tame, however. All 
spheres of political, economic and foreign policies became imbued with ideological 
fervor, and great energy was spent between factions vying for newly vacant party and 
government power. 
Relations with the Soviet Union turned steadily worse against this backdrop. In 
February 1966, the Soviet leadership invited Chinese leaders to attend the 23
rd
 Party 
Plenum. In its reply a week later, the Chinese leadership declined, declaring that “you are 
colluding with the US and conducting a series of dirty deals in the United Nations and 
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elsewhere. You are actively facilitating the counterrevolutionary ‘global strategy’ of the 
US imperialists and attempting to organize a siege of socialist China.”368 The venom of 
mutual attacks was such that fights broke out at massive demonstrations in both capitals 
after the onset of the Cultural Revolution. Pravda asserted in an October 1966 article that 
the Chinese movement targeted pro-Soviet cadres in China. By December 1966, the 
Soviet central leadership passed a resolution denouncing Mao and his followers.
369
 
Another serious fight broke out in January 1967 between Soviet police and Chinese 
students in Moscow defending Maoism. China issued a most outraged diplomatic protest 
and the students were received in China by tens of thousands. Afterward the Soviet 
embassy in Beijing saw heated protests, and Soviet diplomats were blockaded and 
harassed in February.
370
 Soviet newspapers pinned the blame squarely on Mao, 
suggesting that he was trying to divert the attention of the Chinese people by attacking 
the Soviets. In reality, the revolution has become self-reinforcing.
371
 
It was also during this time when the border issue began to flare up. Through the 
early and mid-1960s, China has been asserting its territorial claims gradually, by sending 
small numbers of troops to disputed territory, especially on the eastern front. In 1963, 
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China stationed personnel for weeks on end on islands on the Amur River claimed by the 
Soviets.
372
 But the moves were limited in scale, and the personnel were always instructed 
to avoid conflicts. This changed in late 1966. By then the policy has transformed into 
allowing soldiers and civilians to fight if necessary when Soviet border guards blocked 
“normal patrol routes.”373 Such a change in policy explains the many incidents of fights 
and tussles between Soviet border guards and Chinese troops and fishermen in 1966 and 
1967, triggering formal protests as well as popular outrage.  
Years of relentless propaganda campaign depicting the Soviet Union as the new 
revisionist imperialist power bent on hurting China have turned China’s former ally into a 
public enemy in the minds of the Chinese population. According to a May 1969 People’s 
Daily article, the Soviet Union provoked 4,189 clashes on the Sino-Soviet border from 
October 1964 to March 1969.
374
 While this figure was likely vastly inflated in a self-
serving attempt to justify the March clashes on the Zhenbao (Damanskii) island that is the 
subject of this chapter, there had been numerous clashes between the two sides after 
relations turned sour, evidenced by the large number of Soviet diplomatic protests. Soviet 
ground troops on the Chinese border doubled from 1966 to 1969 to “full strength,” and 
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Soviet firepower density on China’s northeast border was “comparable with that opposite 
NATO.”375 
The earliest record of a proactive military strategy on the border issue dated to 24 
January 1968. The CMC telegraphed the Shenyang and Beijing Military Regions to 
increase preparedness of the border troops and set out specific guidelines on “border 
struggles.” In short, Chinese border guards were authorized to shoot in self-defense if 
“two warnings by our side were ineffective and the other side has killed or injured our 
personnel.”376 Border troops were instructed that they “either did not fight or fight to 
win.”377 Yet while this strategy significantly upped the risk level on the border and made 
armed clashes a virtual given, the sites of patrols seemed to have been chosen with care. 
Guards were put on islands on the Chinese side of the main channel, a good distance 
away from Soviet cities and military bases.
378
 This choice likely resulted from practical 
reasoning on several levels: the distance from Soviet cities and troops meant that any 
clash was unlikely to put significant strategic interests of the Soviet Union under risk; 
moreover, it also meant that risks were more easily controlled on the Chinese front, as 
Soviet reinforcements would not be much of a concern. Such a controlled clash was also 
bent in China’s favor, as it was easier for the Chinese side to concentrate forces and 
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engage where Soviet defense was weak. In other words, while it appeared that China set 
the PLA on a collision course with Soviet guards, the government or military still hoped 
to control the scale of potential conflicts by selecting targets carefully. 
Chinese scholars credit the 5 January 1968 clash on the Qiliqin (Kirkinskii) island 
for directly triggering this change of policy. According to Chinese sources, Soviet guards 
used armored personnel vehicles to repel groups of Chinese fishermen on this small 
island to the north of Zhenbao (Damanskii), which led to bloodshed, and the incident was 
seen as squarely provoked by the Soviet side.
379
 The decision from the top military body 
was made several weeks later, in response to the conflict. A frontline command headed by 
the deputy commander of the Shenyang Military Region was set up
380
; it appeared that 
the local military commanders were treating the conflict seriously, with an expectation 
that additional conflicts might occur. However, this expectation did not yet turn into a 
decision to start a conflict. 
Another pivotal moment in this steadily building tension on the border would 
occur far away from China. In August 1968, thousands of tanks and troops from five 
Warsaw countries led by the Soviet Union rolled into Czechoslovakia to crack down on 
the reformist government of the Czech Communist party. The occupation was swift and 
thorough, and the government was left no choice but to accept Soviet occupation and 
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forced negotiations. The sheer speed and efficacy with which the Soviet Union brought 
its vast power to bear on an ally undoubtedly shook Mao. More significantly, the Soviet 
leadership justified the invasion by imposing limits on allies’ sovereignty in what was 
dubbed the Brezhnev Doctrine: “the sovereignty of individual socialist countries cannot 
be set against the interests of world socialism… The weakening of any of the links in the 
world system of socialism directly affects all the socialist countries, and they cannot look 
indifferently upon this.”381 The doctrine in effect reduced all socialist countries to Soviet 
satellites in one broad brushstroke and envisioned a collective defense system against its 
own allies. While Mao could not have endorsed the Czech government’s decision to 
political liberalization, he must have felt the threat of regime survival in the wake of the 
doctrine.  
Of course it would be much more difficult to occupy China’s vast territories, but 
the key is that the Soviet Union both had indisputable power to hurt China and the 
willingness to apply that power on its allies. The new Soviet grand strategy had removed 
all pretense of non-intervention and would legitimize an attack on China, a risk that 
Chinese leaders immediately realized. In a protest over alleged Soviet incursions into 
Chinese airspace, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted gravely that such incursions 
“were absolutely not coincidental” just weeks after Warsaw armies crushed the Prague 
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Spring.
382
 Zhou also linked Soviet military threat to China, such as border clashes and 
Soviet troops stationed on Chinese borders, to the Brezhnev doctrine.
383
 
Chinese leaders began to draw up battle plans shortly after. Another noteworthy 
confrontation between the two sides occurred on 23 January 1969 on the Zhenbao 
(Damanskii) island. Soviet border patrols beat and injured Chinese soldiers.
384
 Two days 
later, the Heilongjiang Provincial Military Region proposed a “blueprint of anti-
intervention struggle” on the island, which was in effect a plan of “retaliatory self-
defense” or proactive strike.385 The plan was approved first by the higher-level Shenyang 
Military Region. Another clash, in which shots were fired, occurred on 6 February. By 7 
February the General Staff Department and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs passed the 
plan and gave detailed instructions. The central leadership instructed that if Soviet troops 
“invaded” again and “provoked militarily,” Chinese troops can retaliate in self-defense 
after warnings went unheeded. However, troops should also take care to make sure that it 
was in the right and that actions were controlled.
386
 While this notice does not sound 
much different from the one issued in early 1968, the mention of “retaliation” was clearly 
significant. It authorized a careful act of retaliation in the name of self-defense. 
The military authority picked the site of the coming conflict judiciously. Zhenbao 
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(Damanskii) island was remote from Soviet reinforcements, and it promised tactical 
advantages to the Chinese due to its terrain.
387
 The island has already seen several small-
scale clashes in January and February 1969, resulting in some minor injuries among 
Soviet guards and Chinese patrol forces. China warned the Soviets against future 
incursions following each incident, which did not prevent future conflicts from 
occurring.
388
 In other words, this island both offered tactical advantage and legitimacy; 
the Chinese side could claim that it was simply responding to repeated challenges from 
the Soviet side. 
On 2 March 1969, the Chinese guards struck after days of careful preparation. 
More than 200 guards lay in ambush and annihilated the small group of Soviet guards, 
according to Soviet briefing to East German leaders.
389
 A total of 31 Soviet guards were 
killed. China issued a strongly worded diplomatic protest the day after, claiming that the 
Soviet guards intercepted Chinese guards and opened fire first, which forced the Chinese 
side to defend themselves. The Soviet Union was caught completely off guard. Moscow 
protested vehemently, calling it a premeditated attack, and ordered border units to counter 
attack.
390
 Massive demonstrations broke out in cities across China and the Soviet Union, 
and saber-rattling reached an intense pitch. On 13 March, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
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demanded that the Soviet Union “stop all acts of intrusion and provocation” and warned 
that “if you insist on this path, the Soviet government must bear all responsibility for all 
the grave consequences.”391 
On 14 March, the party journal Red Flag proclaimed that if the Soviet forces 
wanted war, China would “wipe them out completely.” The journal, insisting that the 
Soviet side provoked this conflict, attributed it to the principle of “limited sovereignty” 
that “helped the Soviet military advance into other countries,” a direct reference to the 
occupation of Czechoslovakia.
392
  
The second, more violent clash occurred on 15 March. This time the Soviet side 
used artillery, tanks and ground troops in the attack, and both sides significantly increased 
involvement, sending at least one regiment (up to 2,000 troops) on each side into 
battle.
393
 But the Soviets did not use air power, and Soviet guards also refrained from 
coming to the island following the incident.
394
 While the Chinese suffered more 
casualties this time, the Soviet troops were not able to retake their positions on the island. 
Efforts to contain the conflict showed distaste for large-scale war and a hope to limit the 
amount of damage to each side to the immediate confines. Mao seemed to share a similar 
unwillingness to escalate. While he was “overjoyed” by the clashes because they helped 
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to “motivate in the face of serious enemies,” he also pointed out that “there should not be 
additional fighting.”395 Chinese troops also moved off the island following the attack. 
The period between the March conflicts and the August large-scale retaliation in 
Xinjiang by Soviet forces saw China responding half-heartedly to Soviet diplomatic 
proposals while becoming increasingly alarmed at the prospect of war with the large 
Soviet military. On 21 March, Premier Kosygin called the Chinese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and asked for Zhou Enlai. The next day the Soviet attaché was called and read a 
memorandum, in which China simply asked the government to raise any matters through 
formal diplomatic channels. On the 29
th
, the Soviet Union issued a mildly worded 
statement asking for negotiations, while the Chinese side continued to warn the Soviets 
against “playing with fire.”396 While Mao and Zhou appeared pleased that the Soviet 
Union was reaching out diplomatically, they were not keen on resolving the issue this 
way in the immediate aftermath of the March fighting. On 24 May, China responded that 
it had always tried to resolve border issues diplomatically but also threatened that China 
can “fight to the end if we have no choice but to fight.”397 It was not until after the August 
clash that China agreed to negotiate. 
On 13 August, Soviet army struck forcefully in Tiebielieke of Yumin County, 
Xinjiang, the western segment of the long Sino-Soviet border, far out of China’s comfort 
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zone. The site was six miles east of a small settlement, Zhalanashkol, in Simipalantinsk 
Oblast, Kazakhstan.
398
 Dozens of Chinese guards were killed in the clash, in which the 
Soviet army deployed helicopters and armored vehicles.
399
 The attack, while not 
completely unexpected, caught the Chinese leadership by surprise, and the threat of a 
Soviet incursion into Chinese territory, especially in areas where Chinese reinforcements 
were weak, suddenly became real.  
More serious still was the threat of nuclear war. While the Brezhnev regime had 
repeatedly but quietly warned of nuclear attack, the communication of such warnings had 
only began to filter through third parties in August, catching China’s attention. During the 
summer, reports that Russian diplomats had inquired about the reaction of Eastern 
European countries in the case of a nuclear attack on China’s nuclear facilities surfaced. 
Mass rallies were held in China to condemn a Soviet nuclear war. More startlingly, on 18 
August, Second Secretary of the Soviet embassy in Washington D.C. Boris N. Davydov 
asked US Special Assistant for North Vietnam William L. Stearman “what the US would 
do if the Soviet Union attacked and destroyed China’s nuclear installations.” Such an 
attack could help to eliminate the nuclear threat from China and weaken the Mao 
leadership, possibly allowing dissenters to take control. He assured the US that it would 
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have no impact on the US.
400
 The Washington Post published an article on 28 August 
1969 on a potential attack by the Soviet Union on China. The source was likely the CIA 
director. Appearing with the article was a map of known Chinese atomic bomb sites.
401
 A 
report in the US media on Soviet signaling would undoubtedly carry enormous credibility 
in the minds of Chinese leaders, who had been wary of US-Soviet collusion to attack 
China for years. 
These threats explained the rapid escalation of tensions and military preparedness 
in China in the following month. On 27 August, hearing of Soviet hints of attack from the 
East Europeans, the Central Committee and the CMC issued emergency notices to set up 
a public air-defense group headed by Zhou Enlai. The mission of the group was to help 
organize evacuations of the urban population and relocate factories. On the next day, the 
Central Committed asked revolutionary committees and military forces in border areas to 
prepare for a “massive attack by the Soviet Union at any moment.” At the same time, 
forces in the northeast, north and northwest military regions went on alert.
402
 
Conditions relaxed momentarily following a last-minute meeting between 
Kosygin and Zhou Enlai on 11 September. Kosygin promised not to initiate a nuclear 
attack on China, and the two parties agreed to de-escalate first by resisting from military 
                                                        
400
 US State Department Memo of Conversation, “US Reaction to Soviet Destruction of CPR Nuclear 
Capability,” 18 August 1969. Accessed at 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB49/sino.sov.10.pdf on 30 June 2012. 
401
 Arthur A. Cohen, 287. 
402
 Qing Shi, “Yijiu Liujiunian Juece Zhimi?”: 15. 
172 
 
 
clashes.
403
 But Kosygin failed to exchange documentation of the informal talk after he 
returned to Moscow, prompting speculation that either he deceived China or that there 
were disagreements within the Soviet regime. The Chinese leadership did not take 
chances as the stakes of a misreading were prohibitive. On 16 September, there was 
another leak that an air raid on Chinese nuclear sites was imminent.
404
 In the period 
between 16 and 22 September, the Politburo held at least three meetings to discuss war 
prospects. A number of leaders believed that Kosygin’s visit might be a decoy meant to 
disarm China before a decisive attack, much like the visit by a Japan envoy to the US 
ahead of the Pearl Harbor attacks.
405
 Leaders decided that the Soviets could time the 
attack during the upcoming National Day celebrations. Zhou spoke at a military 
preparedness meeting on 22 September that “we have to be prepared for war… as a new 
strategic plan.”406 Three days later, the CMC called together military region commanders 
to discuss tactical planning. On 23 September and 29 September China held an 
unannounced underground nuclear test and a hydrogen bomb test respectively, 
presumably as a deterrence signal to the Soviet Union.
407
 The day after the hydrogen 
bomb test Beijing airports were evacuated in anticipation of a surprise attack by the 
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Soviets. 
This highly charged atmosphere lasted until border negotiations began on 20 
October. While the talks did not yield material results in the years to follow, the fact that 
the Soviet Union did not attack China and was willing to negotiate toned down palpable 
tension. During this period, Mao also began to initiate a rapprochement with the US, a 
significant policy reversal that served to improve China’s security environment in the 
years to come. The episode of armed conflicts between China and the Soviet Union, both 
nuclear powers, passed without breaking into an all-out war.  
 
Why is this a relevant case for credibility? 
The Sino-Soviet clash differs from the previous two cases in several notable ways 
on the surface. First, the conflict never escalated into a full-scale war as in the previous 
cases. The scope and duration of the clashes were very limited in comparison, with 
casualties in the hundreds and combat over in a day. Neither side waged a joint military 
campaign or targeted military or civilian facilities beyond the specific point of encounter. 
Second, the period of tension consisted of a series of defined clashes of similar scale, 
with China initiating the first and the Soviet side initiating the latter two. While the 
number of personnel committed varied, the clashes did not trigger a more powerful 
response that morphed into a lengthier military campaign. While the reason for this 
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restraint is outside the scope of this paper, those in the school of nuclear deterrence would 
argue that nuclear powers inevitably avoided all-out wars with one another. Moreover, the 
fact that there were a number of episodes made it more difficult to define the beginning 
and end of tensions.  
These superficial differences also bring up more material questions about the 
validity of this case. One objection may be that the state-centric model of deterrence 
interactions does not apply to this interaction, which was tinged heavily with factionalism. 
Students of Chinese foreign policy have long been split over the importance of ideology 
and personality versus realist calculations in policy-making in Mao’s China, but no 
matter which school one is in, it would be impossible, if not completely misguided, to 
ignore the overwhelming presence of ideological fervor fueled by Mao’s personality cult 
in this period. If one recalls the argument by Robert Jervis et al, it would seem that the 
rational-actor premise of a unified China with a coherent foreign policy could not be 
further from the truth. It could be argued that a group of ideologically driven leaders 
looking to seize power in the near-anarchy of the late 1960s orchestrated the conflict. 
Very little is known of the late 1960s, a critical juncture in Chinese foreign policy. 
Publicly available material paints the broad contours of the conflict, and declassified 
Soviet archives help fill in the gaps in diplomatic exchanges and top-level meetings. But 
almost nothing is known on the elite politics level: how big a role did radical military 
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leaders such as Lin Biao play? How much did Mao want to use Soviet policies to criticize 
and destroy dissenters in the party? How much of the Soviet nuclear threat was perceived 
in China, and was it played up by certain leaders? On the Soviet side, how committed 
were leaders to the idea of preemptive strike on Chinese nuclear facilities? These 
questions may not be known for a long time. 
Some evidence already hints at the role of factional politics. According to one 
important account, the Xinjiang Military Region commander Long Shujin met with Lin 
Biao at the Ninth Party Plenum in April 1969, during which Lin was publicly designated 
as the heir apparent to Mao. Lin regarded the risk of a large war as “very small” between 
China and the Soviet Union, since the main contention was over the leadership role in the 
international Communist movement and did not justify a major war. However, “a bit of 
border conflicts” would add to the clout of the military and allow the several military 
region commanders pull more weight in the central leadership.
408
 Long therefore 
downplayed border skirmishes in the months to follow, gearing for a more significant 
clash that could add to the military’s clout. In April, the CMC sent a telegram to Long 
with Mao’s warnings to watch for incidents in the northwest. Long did not pass it down 
the ranks and instead told subordinates that they did not need to report small diplomatic 
incidents.
409
 On 10 and 11 August, shortly before the Xinjiang clash, Long did not react 
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to reports of Soviet army maneuvers, allowing Soviet guards to use the element of 
surprise to kill all Chinese guards on patrol on 13 August.
410
 It is difficult to determine 
whether these allegations were made to denigrate Lin following his fall from grace in 
September 1971, but they at least suggest the possibility of factionalism playing an 
important role in what is usually highly centralized military policy. 
Those subscribing to factionalist explanations may argue that unlike a classic 
instance of deterrence, in which the defender calculates what is at stake and takes a series 
of measured steps to warn the adversary, the Sino-Soviet border clash was born from 
domestic forces that sought to exploit tensions and conflicts. There was no deterrence 
because no one was looking to deter. If the account of Lin Biao’s instructions is credible, 
it may seem that instead of deterring, the military was almost hoping for conflicts. 
The turn to radicalism did powerfully influence China’s foreign policy and 
domestic politics, but to argue that infighting and radical thinking invalidate this case 
misses the point. The state-centric assumptions of deterrence do not require a single, 
rational decision-maker. As long as a process exists to produce a decision that in turn 
drives the interactions between states, what goes into that process can vary a great deal 
depending on idiosyncratic factors such as political institutions, the ideology of the ruling 
party and the personality of the state leader. Certain combination of factors, such as a 
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conservative ideology and risk-averse leader, may be more conducive deterrence 
management. Others, such as radical thinking and contentious domestic politics, may 
contribute to aggressive posturing and conflicting signals. But none of these conditions 
would invalidate a deterrence process, which is an exchange between the defender and 
the challenger on the best course of action. The simplification does not seek to reduce 
states to one voice or one policy. In the case of the Sino-Soviet clash, while it was clearly 
inevitable that radical ideology entered all realms of Chinese politics, the interaction 
between China and the Soviet Union, though marred by some fits and starts, fit the 
theoretical model like other episodes of deterrence. China – though in this case a more 
fragmented entity – was still capable of perceiving threat and implementing deterrence. 
Lin may have wanted conflicts to enhance his power, but the threats posed by the Soviet 
Union and the interactions between the two states were likely independent of his wishes.  
 
What was at stake? 
Compared to previous cases in this study, whereby territorial security was 
unmistakably under threat and dominated China’s calculations, the provocations that led 
to China’s attack at Zhenbao (Damanskii) seem less severe at first glance. In the Korean 
War case, the UN Command was rapidly advancing across the 38
th
 parallel and racing 
toward the Chinese border, upsetting the status quo ante and threatening to permanently 
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destabilize the northeast region of China. Twelve years later, India embarked on a 
military strategy of active encroachment that would push into hitherto unoccupied or 
Chinese-controlled territory. In both cases the challenger has upset the immediate status 
quo, with an unclear end goal that posed an uncertain threat to China’s security. Yet the 
Soviet Union has not aggressively pushed into Chinese-controlled territory. The two sides 
shared a lengthy border with disputed areas largely controlled by the Soviet Union. So 
why did China feel the need to deter? 
Despite the lack of an immediate provocation, however, the threat to Chinese 
security was both specific and structural. The chapter has presented a chronology of 
tensions and mistrust that turned the former allies into enemies. Unlike the traditional 
enemy of the United States, which was powerful but distant and had already tasted the 
results of a drawn-out war with China, the equally powerful Soviet Union physically 
enveloped vast portions of China, had long-standing interests in the northeast and 
northwest and was capable of striking China’s capital with the bulk of its forces in days, 
even if it chose not to deploy its large nuclear arsenal. As the leader of the Warsaw Pact 
and international Communist movement, it could also isolate China and undermine 
China’s legitimacy, at least among its own allies. It was truly an enemy with awesome 
power that could put China’s physical and political survival at risk. 
And while the threat posed by the Soviet Union was more generalized than 
179 
 
 
immediate, it was extended over vast and strategically important territories in the 
northwest and northeast. China was long displeased about Soviet attitude in the Sino-
Indian border disputes. When Soviet press carried a neutral statement on 9 September 
1959 despite China’s pleas to support the Chinese claim or stay quiet on the subject, 
Chinese leaders felt betrayed. Chen Yi accused Khrushchev during the latter’s visit to 
China in October 1959 of siding with India. Khrushchev’s answer did not help. He asked, 
“Do you not understand that India considers it critical to have an independent 
neighbor? … A Tibet as part of China is certain to pose a threat to India.”411 This candid 
assessment that an independent Tibet would be more conducive to border settlement and 
perhaps even better relations with China was unsettling to say the least, so soon after 
Dalai Lama fled Lhasa and set up an exile government in India. This sense that the Soviet 
Union did not support Chinese territorial claims, which called into question the 
credibility of extended deterrence, was further deepened when the Soviet Union extended 
loans of 1.5 billion rubles in 1959 and sold fighter jets to India in 1962.
412
 A People’s 
Daily article in November 1963 called the Soviets more ardent supporters of Indian 
counterrevolutionaries than even the Americans.
413
 
Unlike the southwest region of Tibet, where Soviet risks were indirect, the 
northwest region of Xinjiang felt Soviet presence much more keenly. The Chinese 
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Communist Party was able to reclaim Xinjiang after it won the civil war precisely with 
Soviet help. It was Soviet transportation that allowed China to take over the region 
sooner than expected. After decades of Soviet influence in Xinjiang, about 200,000 
residents in the Yili-Tacheng area held Soviet passports, and the Soviet consulate actively 
encouraged even those with tangential ties to the Soviet Union to acquire Soviet 
papers.
414
 In the shocking Yita incident in April-May 1962, more than 60,000 Uyghurs 
and Kazakhs, including local party cadres, fled to Soviet territory with Moscow’s 
encouragement. Soviet forces were well established in the area surrounding China, with 
army stations just six miles away from the point of contact in the 13 August conflict and a 
railroad crossing within a mile. China was in no position to fight a “people’s war” in 
Xinjiang, the tried-and-true strategy proudly upheld by Mao and his followers. The 
loyalty of the people was in question. 
An attack by the Soviet Union was also seen as increasingly likely in the 1960s, 
peaking when Moscow adopted the Brezhnev Doctrine against its own allies and the 
Soviet Union sent out feelers for preemptive attacks. Mao became openly concerned 
about the possibility of a Soviet attack on China starting in 1963-64, repeatedly asking 
foreign guests including Kim Il-Sung if Khrushchev could attack. He even pondered the 
route of an invasion; “[they could] send armies to occupy Xinjiang, Heilongjiang and 
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then advance inland. Inner Mongolia could be under threat, too.” He mused, “we must be 
prepared.”415 This threat to China’s rule was further extended to the Sino-Mongolian 
border after the Soviet Union signed the friendship pact with Mongolia in 1966 and 
stationed more than a dozen divisions on the border. At this point all of China’s vast 
northern flank was completely in the shadow of Soviet forces. Chinese leaders felt this 
military pressure. In a 16 March 1966 meeting, Zhou told northern China officials that “if 
anything happens, north China may be the main front of attack by the enemy.”416 Japan 
struck this political and industrial heartland of China in 1937 when World War II 
escalated. The historical lesson of northern China falling into the hands of a powerful 
enemy was still fresh in the minds of these revolutionary leaders.  
 And the thousands of skirmishes in disputed areas put pressure on the leadership 
to respond. Possible exaggeration aside, the fact that it was the Heilongjiang provincial 
military region that first proposed retaliation in 1968 corroborates that there had been 
significant grievances among the rank and file. Although the clashes in this case did not 
follow the previous examples of invasion or continuous encroachment, they were also 
frequent and difficult to stop. Chinese forces faced the choice of either avoiding conflicts 
altogether by staying out of the way of Soviet border guards or incurring costs and 
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damages if they tried to enforce Chinese claims. 
Increasing radicalism certainly helped aggravate these threat perceptions. As 
China’s domestic and international policies were dominated by talks to oppose 
“revisionists” who dared venture away from Mao’s thinking, leaders who had more 
moderate views of China’s security environment have long been cleansed from the top 
ranks. The dovish Wang Jiaxiang, who advocated pragmatic foreign policies that upheld 
China’s basic security interests, was purged in 1962. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 
under serious attack from radical leaders from 1966 to 1967, which was only rectified 
when Mao became worried enough to reinstate Zhou Enlai and let him handle day-to-day 
affairs at the ministry. Mao’s Soviet policy was so central to his turn to the left that no 
one was allowed to question it in any way. In this frenzied atmosphere, threats were 
amplified, and it was very likely that both the rank and file and senior officials yearned 
for retaliation. 
In Mao’s eyes, what made the Soviet Union particularly menacing was the threat 
it posed to regime survival. The threat came both in the form of breeding dissent within 
China and the possibility of a forced takeover in the example of Czechoslovakia. From 
the days of Khrushchev’s secret speech Mao has regarded the problem of regime 
succession with grave concern. And he had reasons to be wary: after the Soviet attack on 
the personality cult around Stalin, people naturally compared that to the personality cult 
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around Mao. According to classified internal reports submitted to the central leadership 
after the secret speech, cadres around the country questioned slogans such as “long live 
Chairman Mao” and “Mao saved the people.” Cadres in Chongqing observed that every 
time a Communist leader died, attacks were leveled on them, and that the succession in 
Communist countries was just like dynastic succession.
417
 This cannot but raise the most 
alarming prospects for Mao, barely a decade into his rule over the country. 
To have his legacy thrown out and his name tarnished was unthinkable. This is 
why Mao stridently defended Stalin despite his long-standing grievances. Were there 
people just like Khrushchev lurking in the ranks of Communist officials? Worse, could 
his heir apparent turn out to be Khrushchev? Such thinking played a big role in his 
decision to wage successive attacks on “rightists” and revisionists in the party, both a 
need to purge dissent but also paranoia that no amount of loyalty was enough. By the 
mid-1960s Mao was convinced that there were already Khrushchev-like elements, if not 
his lackeys, within the party. They were simply waiting for the right time to bring back 
the ancien régime. Revisionists were in the highest echelons of the party.
418
 The 
unfortunate suggestion by a drunk Rodion Malinovsky that China should rid itself of Mao 
in November 1964 served as evidence that the Soviet Union was bent on overthrowing 
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the regime. 
In short, at stake in this conflict were extensive security interests along China’s 
north border as well as regime survival, in the eyes of China. The Soviet Union was both 
one of the most powerful countries in the world and one that could bring the most forces 
to bear on China. It could at once threaten large sections of Chinese territory. Moreover, it 
had a special influence on China and Chinese leaders as the first Communist country and 
held the most convincing claim to legitimacy. In Mao’s eyes, the Soviet regime was also 
actively courting his adversaries in the party and waiting to denigrate his legacy. If the 
Soviet Union were allowed to conduct its policies undeterred, it would become an all-out 
threat, a time bomb for the regime. 
 
How did China think that this case could affect its credibility? 
As argued above, this conflict is distinctly more drawn out than previous cases of 
deterrence. The lack of a clear crisis and a dearth of historical records in the politically 
sensitive era of the Cultural Revolution mean that it is more difficult to verify China’s 
thinking with archival materials. However, what has been made available points to the 
same preoccupation with being taken advantage of by an adversary with long-term 
intentions to hurt China. We have seen in previous case that such a line of thinking 
necessarily entails sensitivity toward China’s credibility and reputation for resolve.  
185 
 
 
It took more than ten years for China to shift from regarding the Soviet Union as 
its closest ally and “big brother” to an archenemy, more evil and feared than the US. 
Similar to the US, the Soviet Union also cast a long shadow in most of Mao’s reign over 
the new republic. China’s understanding of the security threat posed by the Soviet Union 
transitioned from small and isolated to serious and omnipresent. As late as 1960, 
following a minor border incident in Xinjiang in which Soviet guards chased away 
Chinese herdsmen, Zhou Enlai told officials that “border provocations are possible, but [I] 
cannot imagine a military clash.”419 But with escalating tensions China turned wary. Zhou 
said in 1962 that China had to be prepared militarily as there was no evil that revisionists 
would not do.
420
 
By the mid-1960s Mao was convinced that a large-scale war with the Soviets was 
inevitable. Mao became obsessed with the Soviet nuclear threat in 1963-1964, calling the 
Soviets a bigger nuclear menace than the US. After the initial Zhenbao (Damanskii) clash, 
Mao exclaimed that China must be prepared for war “no matter which year it is” and 
“whether [the Soviet Union] comes or not.”421 On 28 April 1969, Mao said at the First 
Plenum of the Ninth Party Congress that while he would not be provoked and would not 
“go out and fight… even if you invite me,” he would “deal with it if you want to attack 
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me.”422 The huge undertaking to build the Third Front accelerated in 1969, speaking to 
Mao’s conviction of an almost certain Soviet attack. The crippling costs of relocating 
manufacturing capacity and technological know-how to remote, mountainous areas were 
only justified if Soviet attack was considered imminent. 
423
 
With this powerful enemy looming on the horizon and so much at stake, Mao 
repeatedly expressed concerns that the Soviet Union might bully China, either by itself or 
in collusion with the US, a concern that grew with US-Soviet rapprochement during 
Khrushchev’s years. On several occasions in 1964, Mao told foreign visitors that “while 
we do not have nuclear weapons yet, it is unacceptable for others to try to scare us. We 
have never ever accepted threats by great powers, and it has always been the case no 
matter how weak we once were.”424 Elsewhere he has warned of a Soviet-US collusion to 
divide up the world and undermine China in the process. Reports of Soviet probes in 
1968 to wage a preemptive attack on Chinese nuclear facilities seemed to confirm this 
worst fear. 
Mao also viewed territorial disputes as one long string of offences by different 
perpetrators that must be put to a decisive stop. Following the bitter spat over the joint 
fleet in 1958, Mao told Khrushchev that “for many years the British and other foreigners 
                                                        
422
 Chen Shaoming, “Yijiu Liujiunian ‘Guojixingshi Zuotanhui’ jiqi Lishi Gongxian (The 1969 
‘International Situation Seminars’ and Its Historical Contribution),” Zhonggong Dangshi Yanjiu (Chinese 
Communist Party Studies), no. 1 (2008): 76-77. 
423
 See Barry Naughton, “The Third Front: Defence Industrialization in the Chinese Interior,” The China 
Quarterly, no. 115 (Sepember 1988): 351-386. 
424
 Xiao Donglian et al., Wushinian Guoshi Jiyao: Waijiaojuan, 281. 
187 
 
 
have taken our land. We must not allow anyone to use our territory to achieve their 
end.”425 In other words, no territorial dispute exists in a vacuum. Any undermining of 
Chinese sovereignty would call to mind previous offences, even if by other countries. As 
a flip side to uninterrupted historical outlook, if China were to sit back and allow others 
to take advantage of its weakness or fears, it would only lead to similar affronts in the 
future. 
In the case of the Zhenbao (Damanskii) conflict, when the CMC agreed to a plan 
to retaliate and set an example, it also evoked the traditional military principle oft 
mentioned in previous cases of deterrence, that “if others do not violate us, we do not 
violate them; if they do violate us, we must violate them.” This tit-for-tat principle was at 
first glance a shrewd and measured foreign policy. Yet the emphasis on the absolute must 
of a countermeasure, a retaliation, reveals a preoccupation with its own credibility. If 
China did not respond to offences with like force, this theory suggested, it would be an 
open invitation for attacks in the future. 
In all, while there is not as much available archival material detailing China’s 
thinking on how the case affected its credibility, the similarity in other basic lines of 
reasoning, especially the establishment of the Soviet Union as a possible enduring rival, 
suggests that China was also concerned about how it would be perceived by the 
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challenger, a country with a history of domineering Chinese politics and the means to 
threaten its survival. China’s multi-pronged efforts to uphold its credibility also suggest 
that this concern had remained in the forefront of its thinking. 
 
How did China maintain its credibility? 
As China was concerned about its credibility in the eyes of a possible enduring 
rival with the singular ability to destabilize the Chinese regime and threaten its physical 
survival, it resorted to similar means to maintain its credibility as seen in previous 
incidents of deterrence, displaying both the ability to learn from previous interactions but 
also the consistency of thinking within the same leadership. On the other hand, rapidly 
deteriorating relations with the Soviet Union posed challenges to crisis management, and 
the takeover of radical thinking among top leadership also made some tools seen in 
previous conflicts unfeasible. The pattern emerging from China’s management of its 
credibility in the eyes of the Soviet Union broadly follows the one from previous cases of 
deterrence; China decided when threats failed that the best course of action to strengthen 
its credibility was to initiate a decisive conflict that it was certain to win. 
Since the more generalized state of tension between China and the Soviet Union 
started years before border conflicts became the flash point, China had the time to 
identify the long-term solution to the issue of credibility – the need to build real political, 
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economic and military power as well as nuclear deterrence. Mao was obsessed with the 
fact that Soviet leaders never took China as an equal, despite China’s size and strategic 
importance and the CCP’s track record of successfully overthrowing the KMT regime 
and fighting the US army to a standstill in North Korea. As Mao argued in January 1957, 
it was the fifty million tons of steel, four hundred tons of coal and eighty million tons of 
oil that allowed Soviet leaders to look down upon and take advantage of China, and some 
people in China were also blinded by Soviet prowess.
426
 As a logical conclusion, he 
decided to set China upon an accelerated path to becoming a great power. China must 
first acquire the ultimate weapon, the atomic bomb, since the reason imperialist powers 
“looked down upon us was because we do not have atomic bombs, only hand 
grenades.”427 China must also acquire the hallmarks of economic power strength. Aside 
from grain production, which ensures the self-sufficiency of a country, Mao settled on 
steel production because it was the essential building block of both civil and defense 
manufacturing. The Great Leap Forward in his mind would deliver China to the doorstep 
of great wealth and power; all it took was enough mobilization to unleash the limitless 
potential among the people. Great changes can happen suddenly, just like the victory of 
the CCP and the jump in grain and steel production.
428
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 While China did acquire nuclear weapon capabilities within the expected time 
frame, the disaster of the Great Leap Forward and political turmoil prevented China from 
establishing itself as an industrial heavyweight during Mao’s time. With this ultimate 
solution to maintain credibility beyond reach, China made use of verbal and non-verbal 
threats when it was challenged to establish and defend credibility, as in previous cases. 
Following a period of vehement public attacks on each other in winter 1966, China 
asserted on 11 December 1966 that the Soviet Union was planning to join forces with the 
US and attack China, but China was “not afraid of a Soviet-US attack” because “we have 
the atomic bomb and rockets.”429 This reference to nuclear retaliation was meant to deter 
a more generalized threat posed by the Soviet Union. Regarding the specific border issue, 
after the initial Zhenbao (Damanskii) clash, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs warned 
the Soviet Union to “stop all acts of invasion and provocation… If you insist on this 
course of action, the Soviet government must bear all responsibility for all the grave 
consequences as a result.”430 On 7 October, after weeks of intense calculation that the 
Soviet Union might attack China’s nuclear facilities, China declared that “China is not 
going to be scared by the threat of war, including nuclear war. If a small number of 
warmongers dare to go against the trend and attack China’s strategic strongholds, then 
that means war and invasion. Seven hundred millions of Chinese people will rise up and 
                                                        
429
 Wang Qi, ed., Erzhanhou Zhongsu (ZhongE) Guanxi de Yanbian yu Fazhan, 120. 
430
 Li Lianqing, Lengnuan Suiyue, 353. 
191 
 
 
resist, taking out an invasive war with revolutionary war.”431 These threats were a 
necessary way to communicate China’s resolve in the face of threats and establish 
credibility, especially difficult when threatened with nuclear war.  
The verbal communication was supplemented by non-verbal signals including a 
perceptible change of engagement principles and finally a threat of nuclear attack. As was 
the case in the Sino-Indian border conflict, after repeated warnings on the frontlines did 
not work, the central authorities instructed local troops to engage enemy forces in “self-
defense” if the other side did not back down in future encounters. The principle, first 
authorized in January 1968, again put Chinese guards in the line of fire and increased the 
risk of casualties, as it did in the border war with India. The willingness to incur 
additional political and military costs was a non-verbal signal that China would defend its 
interests. However, the view in the Soviet Union that Chinese policies have disintegrated 
into a state of disarray and radicalism probably affected the effectiveness of signaling.  
When the threat of a Soviet attack peaked in late September and invasion was 
believed to be imminent, China selected the most unequivocal signal: it detonated an 
atomic bomb and a hydrogen bomb in two separate tests late in the month. Soviet 
intelligence most likely was aware of the detonations, despite a lack of archival 
confirmation. Beijing was seeking to use the ultimate threat available to itself and 
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significantly upped the ante in the standoff. If the Soviets dared attack China’s nuclear 
facilities, any surviving capacity would be deployed on the Soviet Union. It appears that 
the threat of nuclear retaliation finally brought the Soviet Union back to the negotiating 
table. 
Unlike previous cases, however, China’s signaling did not follow a distinct 
sequence, and exchanges were few and far between in comparison. Part of the reason has 
to be found in the lengthy and generalized nature of Sino-Soviet tensions. The border 
disputes were in themselves significant but far from the entirety of Chinese grievances. 
The perceived encirclement and subversion of China were more serious challenges. In 
this light, the lack of a sudden crisis made it less likely that China would issue a series of 
signals in a clear sequence. The only exception was the September period, when China 
entered a period of intense preparation for war and signaling intensified. On the other 
hand, the almost complete breakdown on all levels of communication probably 
contributed to the difficulty of signaling. Li Lianqing, who worked at the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs at the time, recalled that the operator at the ministry hung up on Kosygin 
when he called the Sino-Soviet hotline because it was inconceivable to speak to the arch-
revisionist. It was only after Zhou criticized the operator that Kosygin was able to call 
again and set up a meeting for the Soviet attaché.
432
 With the propaganda of Soviet 
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revisionism so ingrained on all levels of the government and military and the 
repercussions so dire for those seen as Soviet sympathizers, the proper workings of 
diplomacy had all but broken down.  
In the end, China decided to employ the most effective and decisive method to 
establish credibility in the eyes of the Soviet Union, combining a decisive conflict with a 
threat of nuclear retaliation. Just as in the past, a carefully planned battle was the best 
way to demonstrate China’s resolve and power. The threat of nuclear annihilation, 
however, prevented either side from escalating the clash to a sizeable war, and China 
found that deterrence was difficult when the conflict had to be localized. China isolated 
its conventional attack to one small island on the lengthy Sino-Soviet border, and the 
Soviet Union responded with an attack in Xinjiang. Unlike the Korean War, the Soviet 
Union and China did not fight in a proxy state that naturally served as the boundary of 
conflict. Unlike the Sino-Indian conflict, China had to face the risk of complete 
destruction at the hands of the Soviet Union. Given these constraints, China decided on a 
limited clash where Chinese forces could wipe out a small group of Soviet guards. As the 
CMC instructed, “either do not fight or fight to win.”433 But when the limited clash failed 
to deter the Soviet Union from continued challenges, including threats of a nuclear war, 
China used the nuclear tests to bring the Soviet Union back to negotiations. 
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The Sino-Soviet border clash was the culmination of more than a decade of 
growing tensions, real and perceived strategic conflicts and radical politics in China. As a 
result it was a more complex and less typical case of deterrence failure. However, just as 
in earlier cases, China displayed a concern with its own reputation and credulity in the 
eyes of this powerful adversary and came to the same conclusion that the best solution 
was to fight resolutely and win. Even in the face of potential nuclear disaster, it decided 
that credibility was worth fighting for. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
China has chosen to initiate military conflicts with perceived challengers in some 
deterrence situations. This dissertation makes the argument that aside from the real and 
perceived security interests at stake, China’s concern with its reputation for resolve 
contributed to the decision to fight. In the case studies covered in this dissertation, 
Chinese leaders were worried that they were not resolute enough in the eyes of 
adversaries. The reputation for resolve became a security interest in and of itself, serving 
to dispel future infringements and well worth fighting for. In the end, deterrence breaks 
down not only because the defender fails to convince the challenger to back down, but 
also because the defender believes that fighting enhances credibility the most. 
 
Case studies: deterrence failures 
The case studies are three episodes in recent Chinese history in which China used 
force actively to respond to repeated challenges from another country in a deterrence 
situation. The similarity in these cases lies in the fact that it was China that used decisive 
force first after an escalation of tensions that was started by the challenger. Otherwise the 
cases are different in the counterparties and the specific types of security challenges 
China faced. Another similarity is the broader time period and context, both within China 
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and internationally. All three cases occurred during the first twenty years of the People’s 
Republic, with Mao Zedong at the helm. They also took place in the first half of the Cold 
War, prior to the China-US rapprochement.  
On the other hand, while they occurred during this largely uninterrupted 
continuum, the domestic and international contexts for each conflict were different. In 
1950, the People’s Republic was barely born and its survival seemed perilous. In 1962, 
Mao was certainly more established in his rule but faced growing fissures with China’s 
biggest ally, the Soviet Union; moreover, there was the need to rebuild the country in the 
aftermath of the disastrous Great Leap Forward. In 1969, Mao had demonstrated his 
personal hold on power but the bureaucracy was tattered. China also began to see the 
Soviet Union as arguably a bigger threat than the United States. These vacillating 
circumstances may have faded into the same Cold War backdrop in hindsight, but leaders 
were faced with what seemed to be vastly different situations and perceptions. 
All three fit into deterrence situations even though it is not always easy to define 
challenger and defender in clinically precise terms. China’s intervention into the Korean 
War was the most clear-cut of the three, as China was involved in extended deterrence 
and was not in a position to change the status quo ante at the beginning of the 
intervention. Even in this case, however, the rapidly changing military developments 
blurred the distinction between deterrence and compellence. When China finally sent 
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troops across the border into North Korea, Mao’s telegrams showed that China’s task had 
changed from deterring the rapidly advancing UN forces to fighting a decisive war that 
defeated the US once and for all.
434
 It was only when that goal became unattainable in 
combat that China began negotiating for an armistice that cemented the division of the 
peninsula. In the border conflict with India, China was deterring further advances into 
territory previously controlled by the Chinese. But diverging territorial claims meant that 
China could be seen as the fait accompli offender if one takes the other side of the claim, 
especially as China adopted more aggressive patrolling tactics in response to the forward 
policy. Similar territorial disputes also existed between China and the Soviet Union, 
making it difficult to classify and distinguish actions and sometimes players. Chinese 
radicalism in the 1960s also made Beijing the more discontented party in the international 
system. This difficulty in applying theoretical definitions of deterrence and compellence 
to real-life situations highlights the complexity and rapid evolution of events. Concepts 
such as security and the integrity of borders are not merely descriptions of reality or the 
status quo at any given point in time; they are also shaped by history and perceptions and 
can be fluid. 
However, while sterile definitions may not do justice to the complexity of real 
events, the concept of deterrence is still a useful construct to describe the broad contours 
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of players and their interactions in a given time frame. In all three case studies, regardless 
of the legitimacy of claims by each side, China did not actively seek to change the status 
quo when it attempted to deter, but rather had to deal with an opponent interested in 
changing the status quo. In the case of the Korean War, the rapidly advancing UN forces 
changed the balance of power on the Korean Peninsula and threatened to bring 
adversarial forces to the border of China, a clear change of the status quo. In the case of 
the war against India, the forward strategy of India moved forward the actual line of 
control by Indian forces in both the west and east sectors of the border. Lastly, aggressive 
tactics by the Soviet Union along disputed borders led to concerns of Soviet advances 
across the border. This case was the most mired in ideological posturing, and the efficacy 
of the Chinese leadership was the most in doubt. Yet in the most basic sense of border 
conflicts, China was dealing with a string of border-related offenses, including the 1962 
mass exodus of border populations in Xinjiang and repeated skirmishes in the northeast. 
Therefore in a broad sense, China was put in the position of defender and its strategic 
calculations showed this self-classification as well. 
The decision to only evaluate deterrence failures rather than successes is 
deliberate. First of all, the hypothesis of this dissertation is squarely focused on the 
defender’s concern with resolve. When the concern is strong, it can help push the 
defender to initiate military conflicts to end the provocation. In the case of deterrence 
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failures, both the outcome (military conflict) and concerns about resolve are observable, 
and policymakers often clearly couch the decision to use force in the terms of 
establishing or defending its reputation for resolve. In certain deterrence successes, such 
as the tacit agreement between the US and China not to directly engage each other in the 
former’s deepening involvement in Vietnam, one may argue that one reason for the 
success was China’s confidence in its reputation for resolve. As the US chose to 
acknowledge Chinese concerns actively and frequently and observed self-inflicted limits 
on its military campaigns, China was reassured that it did not have to use force to 
demonstrate its resolve. In this sense there are certain deterrence successes that could 
help strengthen the hypothesis. 
However, deterrence successes are over-determined. In reassuring China, the US 
also by necessity reduced its threat to Chinese security. China did not have to fight 
because the US already took away the reason to fight. The analysis of such episodes 
would not add much more to the discussion because the lack of security concerns would 
be considered compelling enough. In addition, the less complicated interaction between 
the two parties, as well as a shorter time frame, also meant that there was less discussion 
in official discourse on the reason for peace. 
In contrast, while deterrence failures can also be over-determined and explained 
by infringements on Chinese security interests, the much richer leadership discourse for 
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analysis as well as the possibility to compare cases would better showcase the role played 
by the concern with resolve. The fact that security interests were present in all deterrence 
cases does not make them equal. There was often as good a reason to fight as there is to 
seek a compromise. In the first case, US-led campaigns to unify the Korean Peninsula, 
seen by most scholars as the most compelling case for China to go to war, did not 
necessarily compel a war. Some have argued that China overestimated US threats to 
China and could have avoided a costly conflict.
435
 In the context of Cold War politics, it 
was not necessarily the most egregious offense. Dozens of countries were going through 
the process of becoming independent and shifting allegiance, which changed the security 
context of countries around them. Violent crackdowns in Czechoslovakia by the Soviet 
Union did not prompt neighboring countries to go to war with the Soviets. The fact that 
the US was so powerful and could easily hurt the new People’s Republic, if not destroy it, 
meant that intervention also carried enormous security risks. In the last case, when China 
chose to actively engage Soviet forces on the border, security interests were clearly 
present and arguably transcended just the border issue, but they did not point 
automatically to military conflict. Instead, China could have chosen to accept a 
compromise or lived with the reality of minor incursions. Deterrence does not break 
down in just one fashion, nor does it have to break down. Comparing the varied inputs 
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into deterrence failures allows us to evaluate the constant factor, that of the defender’s 
concern with resolve. 
 
Summary of findings 
The case studies were organized in a similar structure. In each case the historical 
context for the conflict was laid out to help set the stage. The stream of events and 
discourse were analyzed through the same three questions: first, what was at stake? 
Second, how did China think that this case could affect its credibility? And third, how did 
China maintain its credibility? These questions are designed to lend structure to the 
textural analysis. Any instance of China using force could be approached from a myriad 
of angles, relevant to security studies, nuclear deterrence, military strategy, bureaucratic 
politics, personalities and domestic politics. Given the constant challenge of finding 
material on China’s policymaking during the Cold War, it is easy to dwell on the 
attraction of historical details. By addressing these questions after setting up the historical 
context, this dissertation hopes to frame the discussion through the lens of the hypothesis, 
that while China considered itself the defender in deterrence situations, it nonetheless 
decided to use force in part to establish and defend its reputation for resolve. It also 
makes it possible to treat the cases not merely as distinct instances of deterrence, but as a 
continuation of China’s attempts to strengthen its reputation over time, which it believed 
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would improve its security. 
 
What was at stake? 
The threats in each case were certainly grave, though they differed in severity and 
type. When the UN forces advanced past the 38
th
 parallel toward China’s border with 
North Korea, China was suddenly faced with the specter of having enemy forces directly 
on its border, something that China thought it had avoided by winning the civil war. The 
sudden change in the balance of power on the Korean Peninsula was unprecedented even 
at this stage in the Cold War; while the extension of Soviet interest after the end of the 
Second World War meant regime changes in many countries, the shift was rarely the 
result of a spectacular military defeat in a short period of time. In the case of the Korean 
War, the change in the status quo was a sudden and deeply uncertain development. There 
was no guarantee that the UN forces would stop at the border with China, and even if 
they did, it was not obvious if they would leave. The implications of a unified Korea 
under the auspices of the US were difficult to predict but likely disastrous, as the North 
Korean government-in-exile would set up in China and attract hostile forces for the 
foreseeable future. The threat of constantly preparing for war with US, or US-allied 
forces across from the border would cost thousands of troops and millions of dollars, a 
luxury that China could not afford. Though China’s own territorial integrity was not yet 
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compromised, the likelihood that it would be had gone up significantly. 
India’s forward strategy, on the other hand, threatened China’s territorial security 
in the most conventional sense. By pushing forward the effective line of control, India 
reduced the strategic depth of the Chinese southwest and threatened to cut off China’s 
logistics supply lines in the west. The area is considered of higher importance due to 
ethnic tensions in the region and the leadership’s more tenuous hold on loyalty. Directly 
affected were territorial interests as well as a loss of military advantage in potential 
conflicts in the future. India’s influence in Tibet following the 1959 Lhasa revolt was also 
a worrisome backdrop to the conflict. 
The Soviet Union was an unlikely foe. China’s biggest ally and ideological flag 
bearer just a short few years ago quickly become a threat to China after a shift in the 
balance of power between the two bred tensions and competition. Territorial disputes and 
small-scale conflicts in this case were simply pieces in a bigger fight for control. By 
themselves, the territory in dispute and type of military strategy did not pose as direct and 
significant a threat to China as the case of India. It was the strategic significance of losing 
out to the Soviets that mattered in this scenario. In another sense, however, the difficult 
coexistence with a power adversary in the north was the most familiar and traditional 
security problem for the Chinese. For hundreds of years the biggest threats had come 
from nomads in the north, and on two occasions they succeeded in conquering the Han 
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Chinese entirely and setting up the Yuan and Qing dynasties. The Communist takeover of 
power was part of the grand search for a modern nation-state after the collapse of the 
Qing dynasty, and the Communists were steeped in the anti-imperial, anti-Qing causes. 
The difficulty of living with an enemy in the north, where borders lacked natural defenses 
and loyalty was suspect, was well understood by any leader, even if the most Communist. 
Beyond the most direct security threats that were often different, all three cases 
presented big stakes to the leadership. The conflicts took on much greater importance in 
the shadow of the future and in front of domestic audiences. In the case of the Korean 
War, China was keenly aware of the possibility of engaging the US again in future 
conflicts and the likelihood of being taken lightly by the powerful opponent. It was only 
shortly before the outbreak of the Korean War when the leadership specified its wholesale 
alliance with the Soviet Union in the “leaning to one side” announcement. While China 
had not abandoned hopes to adopt a realist, working relationship with the west, it was 
certainly understood that China was joining the Soviet Union in an active standoff 
between the two camps. When the territorial dispute between China and India escalated 
in 1962, the context of a much weakened China due to the Great Leap Forward likely 
clouded the security calculations as well. The fear that a weaker China would be taken 
advantage of, much as it was during previous dynasties, made a decisive response and 
advantageous outcome all the more valuable to the leadership. Finally, in the deterrence 
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case against the Soviet Union, China already regarded the Soviets as a more serious 
threat to Chinese security than the US at that point, and the leadership expressed concerns 
that the powerful Soviet military with massive nuclear capabilities right on China’s 
border could strike China much more easily and directly than enemies across the sea. In 
all of these cases a larger security concern was at play. 
All three episodes also took place when the Mao-led Communist leadership had 
reason to worry about its survival, and over time Mao also became fixated on the survival 
of his legacy. By the time the Korean War broke out, less than a year after the official 
founding of the People’s Republic, Chinese Communists largely had control over vast 
land masses but their rival, the KMT, had survived in Taiwan and remained the most 
viable threat to the regime. Battles over maritime control were still being fought, as were 
final campaigns to settle western territories. Without the benefit of hindsight, it was far 
from clear that the Communist takeover was final. Internally, few would doubt the 
supremacy of Mao’s reign at this time, but the sheer challenges of governing over a vast 
population were likely perilous. 
More than a decade later, when China had to decide what to do with India, the 
Chinese government had become much more institutionalized and experienced, but the 
regime was also badly tattered by its own doing. The Great Leap Forward, instead of 
propelling China into the league of great nations, had led to a large-scale famine and the 
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destruction of nascent industrial capabilities. While Mao had more than enough authority 
to purge the party of skeptics such as Peng Dehuai, he was forced to take a conciliatory 
position in 1962 when it became plainly obvious that the policy had failed and a 
loosening of his grip was necessary. Even though he enjoyed so much concentration of 
power that no legitimate challenge from within the party could exist, he was aware of the 
doubt that must have arisen as he single-handedly steered the country down the wrong 
path. At the same time, security challenges were also surfacing from the ousted KMT in 
Taiwan. Though no alternative existed, the legitimacy of Mao’s rule was under threat. By 
this time the search for a successor was also well under way. Mao was concerned about 
safeguarding his own legacy as well as upholding the ideological stature of the party as 
he had defined it, and he had shown a distaste for moderates such as Wang Jiaxiang. 
While the fallout with Liu Shaoqi would not come until later, the suspicions that his 
colleagues have betrayed the revolution were always present. 
The search for a successor was all the more urgent by the late 1960s with Mao 
well into his twilight years. His last cause, the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution, 
unleashed and harnessed tremendous violence and proved his effective grip on the party 
and society, but also ruined the functioning bureaucracy in all political structures. Mao’s 
fear that a Chinese Khrushchev would emerge after his death never disappeared, and the 
political institutions, or what remained of them, were extremely radicalized. Although 
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Mao managed to restore a minimum level of efficacy by letting the military take over the 
political apparatus, normal political processes were still disrupted beyond recognition. 
Even though Mao likely had faith in the new world order that were to emerge from the 
ruins, his deep insecurity never died. With the competition for legacy and status in the 
international Communist movement reaching a feverish pitch, the need to prove himself 
was probably never greater. 
 
How did China think that this case could affect its credibility? 
While the three cases differed in their specific security contexts, they all prompted 
concerns by the leadership about the damage that submission would do to China’s 
credibility. In all three cases, immediate security challenges became increasingly 
intertwined with future security challenges, and it became difficult to clearly define the 
boundaries of the damage. As the leadership became more convinced that giving ground 
now would lead to questions about China’s credibility in the future, it also became 
increasingly interested in responding to challenges once and for all through a decisive 
military victory. 
In the case of China’s intervention following the Korean War, Mao quickly began 
to see parallels between the past and present and made projections from the present to the 
future. Mao, and other senior leaders, decided that just like past episodes when China’s 
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security was encroached upon gradually as it fell into disarray in the late 1800s, the US 
and its allies were daring enough to threaten Chinese security at the moment for exactly 
the same reasons. The century of humiliation saw China forced to face up to foreign 
challenges repeatedly, only to demonstrate its weakness in the most humiliating way 
possible and give up fragments of sovereignty in an endless string of unequal treaties. 
These challenges finally culminated in an outright invasion of China by Japan, its much 
smaller but more powerful neighbor. As Mao often said that the Japanese invasion was 
the reason why the Chinese Communists could seize power from the inept and distracted 
Kuomintang, he was more apt than anyone else to connect security threats with 
demonstrated weakness. After repeated warnings failed to stop the advancing UN forces, 
the leadership came to the conclusion that the UN forces must be ignoring China’s 
warnings because it was believed to be too weak. If China were to stand down, the 
perception would prove true and loom in all future conflicts. And by this time China was 
certain that the US would feature in future conflicts with China. By blocking the Taiwan 
Straits with its mighty aircraft carrier groups, the US has effectively denied China the 
chance to destroy its enemies, who would survive to challenge China in the foreseeable 
future. 
Likewise, when China faced repeated challenges from India, the leadership 
largely reached for very similar explanations for these threats. For them the security 
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challenges from a traditionally friendly, or at least neutral, Nehru regime was puzzling. 
To be sure, by this time Sino-Indian relations had cooled considerably, as India’s attitude 
toward the exiled Dalai Lama was considered an act of hostility, harboring grander 
territorial ambitions. And the party had convenient ideological labels for India to explain 
its divergent interests from those of China’s. In the end, however, the leadership was hard 
pressed to understand why a mid-sized power, shortly after independence, would ignore 
the many warnings from China. The most obvious conclusion, again, was that India 
thought China was too weak and did not believe that China had the capability to 
withstand another military conflict. Given China’s weakened state after the Great Leap 
Forward, it was perhaps not completely unfounded. But the weakness also heightened 
leadership fears. If a mid-sized power like India could advance into China-controlled 
territory and not heed Chinese warnings, all of a sudden the ranks of potential Chinese 
adversaries would swell. If China did not defend its credibility, the implications for other 
countries were clear, in the eyes of the leadership. Any country with unfriendly relations 
could have the nerve to challenge China in the future. 
Almost a decade later, the threats from the Soviet Union were interpreted in much 
the same way, but with even deeper fears. First, China’s troubled alliance history with the 
Soviet Union, formal and informal, dated to the genesis of the Communist party. Over 
close to half a century, China saw Soviet support wax and wane, often based on how 
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China fit into the larger security picture for the Soviets. When the KMT seemed on the 
verge of rooting out Communist forces, or when good relations with the US were 
considered more important, the Soviets were often seen as reevaluating their options and 
withholding support for the CCP. The long history of close interactions bred suspicion 
and resentment, and provided many reasons for observing that the alliance was constantly 
threatened by shifting self-interests. Second, Mao in particular believed that the Soviets 
were only able to flaunt their might because China was weak. China could not drive 
alliance dynamics and decisions because it did not produce fifty million tons of steel. If 
China did, no amount of Stalin’s personality cult or Soviet ideological pedigree could 
stop China from assuming a bigger role in the alliance. As such China was particularly 
sensitive to the status of inferiority vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Finally, by the time 
China’s conflicts with the Soviet Union reached their peak, the two countries were openly 
confrontational and the Chinese leadership was completely convinced that the Soviets 
would remain China’s adversary for the foreseeable future. Just like the US, the Soviet 
Union’s superpower status would remain unchallenged for the time being, and its ability 
to completely destroy China was even more assured. Losing credibility in the eyes of 
such a menacing and certain opponent would almost become an open invite for 
aggression. 
In all three cases, in other words, the conflict and the way it was evolving were 
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seen to affect not only Chinese security at the present, as demonstrated by answering the 
first question “what was at stake,” but also China’s credibility. The key was that China 
had warned against further challenges, often repeatedly, with very little effect. The 
immediate issue at question then took on additional risk angle: if China was already not 
taken seriously at the present, what would acquiescence do to China’s security in the 
future? The concept of credibility acted as the link, contextualizing the immediate 
conflict in a larger arena, where conflicts will take place in the future. If China can 
demonstrate its credibility, the current, minor conflict would not necessarily translate into 
repeated aggressions or challenges by the same opponent, or others, in the future. If 
China cannot demonstrate its credibility, the ground China yields today will open the 
door to much graver, often unquantifiable damage in the future. 
 
How did China maintain its credibility? 
In all three cases China tried a variety of tools to communicate its threats and 
maintain its credibility, but in the end decided upon the only option so costly that its 
intention could not be mistaken – military conflict. As Allen Whiting points out in his 
seminal works, the Chinese way of communication during deterrence episodes tends to 
employ particular lingo and follow a familiar pace of communication. While the degree 
of duplication may have been more pronounced in the 1950s and early 1960s, before 
212 
 
 
effective bureaucracy broke down during the Cultural Revolution, the deliberate choice 
of words to convey varying levels of threat was likely a direct aftermath of learning 
through deterrence episodes. The biggest lesson learned from past episodes, however, is 
the utility of force and the need to defend one’s credibility in order to prevent future 
conflicts. 
In the case of the Korean War, China picked an array of press and informal 
diplomatic channels to warn the UN forces not to threaten Chinese interests, especially 
territorial interest. Public warnings first appeared in late August, in the form of a 
statement linking North Korea’s interest to Chinese interest. Due to the dramatic reversal 
of fortunes between the North Korean military and UN forces, however, the window for 
China to make warnings was narrow. China issued increasingly alarmed threats to UN 
forces as the latter charged toward China’s border with North Korea between 20 
September and 10 October.  
Moreover, the limited channels of communication made it difficult to discuss or 
negotiate directly with the stakeholders. China had to pass warnings through the Indian 
ambassador and wait to either hear back from him or to observe the events on the ground. 
When a government spokesperson delivered the clearest and most urgent warning on 10 
October, China was seeing its security position become rapidly jeopardized. Thus China 
also made use of troop movements and public acknowledgements of military support to 
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the North Korean regime to demonstrate its huge stakes in the conflict. Compared with 
verbal threats, these were clearly more serious modes of communication, one that carried 
higher costs to China and implied greater risks to the challenger. However, the US-led 
UN forces decided that the risks were under control and discounted the possibility of a 
full-scale war with China. China had largely exhausted its conventional arsenal of threats. 
While the sequence of warnings proved futile in warding off US challenges in the 
Korean War, China re-deployed them when tension was building with India on its 
western border. The much slower burn of this conflict, compared to a more favorable 
balance of power against the adversary, likely explained the multitude of warnings and 
more varied diplomatic efforts. The careful choice of words may be a result of either 
explicit or implicit learning from within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; China may have 
observed the impact these words have on the audience as well as expert commentators. 
Also, given the very tightly controlled diplomatic process and the politicized nature of 
discourse, the repertoire of sanctioned diplomatic phrases was probably very limited to 
begin with. When warnings failed to stop India from ordering troops to advance, China 
again moved troops openly, tapping another Korean War-era tactic. The case against India 
provides a marked contrast to the Korean War case in how much more room and time 
China had to maneuver, but China largely attempted to demonstrate its credibility in the 
same way as during the Korean War. Yet it failed again. 
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The final case against the Soviet Union was an even slower grind, featuring 
escalating tensions, heightened distrust and hostility broken by periods of attempted 
reconciliation. In the first years the two allies had more than adequate venues to 
communicate their grievances, such as private exchange, summit meetings and 
international conferences, but more channels did not make for a consensus. As interests 
began to diverge, China’s government also began to lose effectiveness in the process of 
radicalization. In the months before the outbreak of conflict, private communication 
between the two parties had been all but shut down, leaving China to use the same public 
warning system it has used in previous conflicts. Only the previous pattern of warnings 
was used in a less precise and elaborate fashion in this episode. The frequent expression 
of vitriol against the Soviets by the early years of the Cultural Revolution, combined with 
a breakdown of diplomatic channels, likely made communication much less effective. 
Tactically, China might have also hoped that a more aggressive engagement principle for 
frontline border guards could signal an escalation of Chinese response. But again, it was 
lost in the noise of repeated clashes, and did not lead to a change in Soviet behavior. 
When all else failed, China decided to demonstrate credibility through initiating a 
fight, the only way to put an end to the perception that it was bluffing. And in each case, 
the military response was not a token warning, a brief engagement followed by retreat, 
but a decisive, prepared blow with the intention to win the conflict at hand. In the Korean 
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War, the Chinese moved hundreds of thousands of troops and decimated thousands of the 
UN forces in the first battles. In the border war with India, China also committed large 
troops to meaningfully push back the Indian line of control. China’s military response 
was more measured against the Soviets, likely a result of nuclear deterrence between the 
two, but still the border engagement was aimed at wiping out the Soviet border guards to 
send a message that could not be mistaken. When threats escalated in August 1969, and 
warnings of nuclear attack began to emerge from the Soviets, China combined nuclear 
tests with a big evacuation, sending the strongest signal short of an actual nuclear attack 
that China was prepared for one. In all cases, China finally decided on the most costly 
warning that could not be faked. 
 
Defender’s concern with credibility and deterrence theory 
Deterrence theory, both in its classic version and later modifications, focuses 
more on the challenger than defendant. The challenger has the unique power of deciding 
whether a particular episode of deterrence ends in success or failure, simply by deciding 
to continue and step up the challenge or to step down. The defender plays an important 
role, no doubt, by trying to influence the decision-making process of the challenger. It 
usually chooses between a show of force to deter or diplomatic channels to reassure. In 
the case of extended deterrence, which is more difficult than homeland deterrence, the 
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defender can also employ a variety of tools to strengthen its commitment to the protégé in 
the eyes of the challenger. When all is said and done, however, it is the challenger that 
sits at the forefront of deterrence theory. If it is convinced of the defender’s ability and 
resolve to counter a provocation, it may not proceed. If not, it will. 
This deterrence study seeks to put the defender in the limelight, as it faces an 
uncertain challenge from an opponent. How may it determine the outcome of deterrence? 
Is it possible for a defender to preemptively strike out against an adversary, before its 
territory or other indisputably vital interests have been violated? In the case of China 
during Mao’s rule, at least three conflicts saw China strike out before a material invasion 
by the opponent. Though it was on the receiving end of provocations, it decided to wage 
a decisive military attack on the challenger even before the latter had had the chance to 
carry out its ultimate objective. The defender, in other words, can determine the outcome 
of a deterrence episode simply by terminating the encroachments forcefully. The 
traditional arguments for deterrence underestimate the importance of the defender, by 
implicitly assuming that defending the status quo makes one risk-averse. 
In the three cases in this study, China started with wanting to defend the status 
quo and avoid conflicts, much as classical theory implies. It tried to use diplomatic 
channels to communicate with the other side, though the channels were not always 
adequate and direct. Against bigger adversaries that did not have effective 
217 
 
 
communication with China, it also used verbal and tactical warnings such as troop 
maneuvering, painting a picture of dire consequences were challenges to continue. 
Yet deterrence is by definition a series of provocations until they stop. Unless a 
warning is so intense or the challenger so weak that it retreats after just one warning, a 
deterrence episode is dotted with failures by the defender to convince the challenger to 
stop. As provocations continue, two consequences are likely: first, the status quo shifts in 
favor of the challenger; second, the defender becomes concerned about its credibility 
since the challenger has ignored one warning after another. Scholars have considered the 
shift in status quo that can happen during a deterrence episode: when the status quo is 
changed materially, the interaction becomes one of compellence rather than deterrence, as 
the defender tries to restore the status quo ante. However, even classic cases of deterrence, 
such as China’s border war against India in 1962, followed a gradual moving forward of 
the actual control line in favor of Indian border patrol. From China’s perspective, the 
status quo was certainly being eroded and transformed. As we indicated before, the line 
between compellence and deterrence can be rather blurred. As the status quo changes in 
the favor of the challenger, the defender will both feel more threatened and find it more 
difficult to convince the challenger to give up its gains. 
The second consequence, defender’s concern about its credibility, is the focus of 
this study. In search for why its warnings are unheeded, defenders may identify reasons 
218 
 
 
such as an unfavorable balance of power or miscommunication, as many have argued. 
These are all valid reasons, but the defender may also arrive at another lesson: that the 
challenger does not retreat simply because it does not believe the defender. No amount of 
communication or size of arsenal can convince the other side if one is not considered 
credible. 
The stakes are particularly high if the defender finds itself in an entrenched 
strategic position and cannot easily change the adversarial relationship with the opponent. 
Conflicts are bound to happen among neighbors who disagree and enemies who will 
remain enemies in the foreseeable future. Challenges in such a context take on an 
understandable significance: they are feared to be the opening salvo to a long war, with 
uncertain end goals. Does the enemy want total annihilation of the Chinese territory? 
Unlikely. But does the enemy want to weaken Chinese defense by reducing China’s 
strategic buffer or the reach of Chinese military on porous borders? Possibly. When it is 
not clear what the enemy wants in the end, strategic and tactical calculations become 
trickier. How many resources should be expended on the current conflict, when one 
compromise may invite future conflicts where stakes are higher? Credibility concerns are 
therefore more pronounced if the defender has reasons to believe that it may find itself 
fighting the same conflict in the future. 
The three case studies find that China decided to use decisive force to end the 
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provocations once and for all. Reasoning among the leadership suggests that while 
strategic interests were at stake and needed to be redressed, the need to establish 
credibility in the most unequivocal fashion was also a contributing factor. Deterrence 
ended because the defender wanted it to end, so that it could both remedy the grievances 
at hand and prevent future challenges. Certainly, concerns about credibility would not 
have existed if strategic interests were not at stake, but this does not diminish the 
importance of the concern. It was the logic that was needed to justify the commitment of 
force and the ensuing reputational risk. 
The fact that China responded with decisive force in all three cases despite varied 
strategic interests and relative balance of power suggests that the concern with credibility 
is difficult to address. Although in each case significant strategic interests were under 
threat, they were not always the same and did not threaten China to the same extent. The 
threat posed by the US-led UN forces was certainly ominous, but unlikely to result in a 
compromise of Chinese territory. Indian troops advanced into Chinese-controlled land, 
but India was a much less of an adversary than either the US or Soviet Union. Lastly, the 
Soviet Union at its peak was perhaps the most thoroughly threatening, but China’s 
nuclear deterrence capabilities should have provided some security. Yet in all cases China 
expressed concerns about credibility: it was concerned that adversaries big and small 
could take its might and willpower for granted; it was concerned about real and potential 
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threats to its territory and buffer states. The presence of this concern in different cases 
suggests that a drawn-out deterrence process, where the defender has the time to make 
repeated warnings or reassurances only to be ignored multiple times, could exacerbate the 
concern about resolve. 
The concern about credibility plays a unique role in deterrence calculations. 
Whereas in classic international relations theories, balance of power is considered an 
international-level game and separate from domestic-level games such as bureaucratic 
politics, the concern about credibility reflects complex reasoning that ties in concerns 
based on both levels. Insecurity, whether stemming from a relatively weak economy and 
military, or from worries about domestic strife and succession uncertainty, fed the 
concern about credibility. In the mind of the defender, the adversary does not believe we 
could fight back because it thinks we are too weak to fight; or the adversary does not 
believe we could fight back because it thinks we are too divided to fight. Either way, once 
this concern is present and encouraged by deterrence challenges, the insecurities that lie 
behind the cause can easily reinforce each other. 
This study suggests that given the impact of deterrence interactions on the 
concern about credibility, the longer the interaction period, the more likely the defender 
would be concerned about credibility. Once the pattern of being thwarted or ignored is 
established, the defender is likely to look for reasons for its concern, and would find it 
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either in international weakness or domestic weakness. Both of these insecurities are 
difficult to remedy in a short order: the relative balance of power is usually fixed for a 
considerable period of time, and domestic rivals will likely remain a concern for some 
time as well. In the absence of a sure way to redress the underlying weaknesses, the 
defender could consider the use of force to settle the dispute at hand. 
 
The concern about credibility and China’s security policy 
This dissertation also addresses themes from another area of international 
relations, that of Chinese security policy. The choice of the three case studies is deliberate: 
by focusing on China’s deterrence episodes, this dissertation hopes to add to the 
discussion on Chinese foreign policy in addition to that on deterrence theory. The 
findings can also enrich the understanding about how and why China uses force. 
As Alastair Iain Johnston argues, China has been involved in frequent militarized 
conflicts since ancient times. This turbulent history may reflect an often adverse strategic 
environment, as past regimes could not always defend its vast and unstable periphery. But 
it may also show a long history of learning and socializing violent lessons from foreign 
policy, as Johnston argues. The central role played by the military in political thinking, as 
well as a realist, amoral approach to victory and defeat, may have led China to believe in 
resolving conflicts violently. 
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The fact is that most deterrence cases China faced occurred during Mao Zedong’s 
rule, in the first thirty years of the new republic, were understandable from a purely 
realist perspective. The new regime came to rule China after a drawn-out, brutal civil war, 
following a harrowing and divisive war against Japanese invasion. Such upheavals would 
take time to settle, especially since the rival KMT regime managed to survive just a 
hundred miles off the mainland coast and enjoyed US protection. Not only that, but the 
Mao regime was also established under the context of the burgeoning Cold War, siding 
with the Soviet Union against the western bloc as the two sides were actively vying for 
greater control and pushing the boundaries of each other’s policies. As a new 
revolutionary power that refused to acknowledge old treaties, China naturally had to 
reconfigure its ties with neighbors, redefine friends and foes and learn the rules of 
engagement. In other words, it is reasonable to project that the early history of a 
revolutionary power would be similarly turbulent. As countries came to accept the new 
strategic setup and the Cold War also transitioned from active confrontation to 
management of co-existence, violence would logically give way to more predictable 
policymaking. 
On the other hand, the field of Chinese foreign and military policy has often 
found this broad analysis unsatisfactory and pointed out that the strategic environment 
did not necessarily predetermine China’s foreign policy. China had a violent first thirty 
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years because China, or its paramount leader, sought conflicts. It may have sought 
conflicts to secure Mao’s rule; to propagate a violent and revolutionary ideology or 
culture; or to sell grand strategies to the Chinese population that was reluctant for war. 
Whatever the cause, China and Mao wanted conflicts to serve a bureaucratic or personal 
purpose, and its broadly hostile relations with the outside world simply provided a stage 
for such conflicts. 
The divide between the two schools has become increasingly smaller, thanks to a 
rich body of new archival evidence and scholarly research. A more nuanced 
understanding of Cold War history and Chinese politics points to a middle ground, that 
China’s complex bureaucratic politics and Mao’s personality provided the spontaneity 
within the confines of international politics. The number of policy choices for any given 
leader is not fixed, but depends on the forgiveness of the international environment and 
the room for maneuver offered by domestic politics. Leaders could miscalculate and 
overshoot, just like politicians in hope for electoral victory. Like politicians, they also 
enjoy some freedom of choice until grave mistakes are punished, in the case of state 
leaders, by threats to regime survival. 
China’s deterrence cases demonstrate that domestic political concerns filter into 
security policymaking during crises via the concern about credibility. When leaders are 
less secure domestically, they are more likely to be concerned about credibility, as the 
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need to demonstrate resolve is meaningful as a deterrent toward enemies both foreign and 
domestic. They are also worried that foes would read into domestic weakness and 
conclude that leaders would not risk a war when its power was contested. This variable, 
the concern about credibility, was the way in which insecurities were expressed, and the 
source of insecurity could lie in both the international and domestic level. 
In all three episodes Mao experienced serious political crises even prior to the 
outbreak of the conflicts. In the case of Korea, Mao was pressed for time to pacify the 
remainder of KMT forces as well as settle the restless western borders. When the border 
war with India broke out, China’s territory was more secure, but Mao had to re-establish 
his tarnished reputation in the aftermath of the Great Leap Forward disaster and rebuild 
China’s industry and economy. Seven years later, when China chose to face off the Soviet 
Union, Mao’s last and boldest social experiment, the Cultural Revolution, had all but 
annihilated the existing political landscape and left Mao with great uncertainty as his 
health declined rapidly. While it would be overly simplistic to equate Mao’s personal 
struggles with the extent of Chinese domestic politics, they were often the most important 
element given his status as the indisputable leader who concentrated power in his own 
hands and failed to establish a credible alternative or succession mechanism. 
China also learned to value credibility through its conflict-prone history, and 
especially during Mao’s rule. Mao was keenly aware of the likelihood of repeated wars 
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with China’s enemies. In spite of a considerable amount of grandstanding, Mao was 
likely sincere in his conviction that international politics, just like domestic politics, 
would feature an unending string of struggles. He constantly prepared for war, no doubt 
the side effect of fighting almost constantly for thirty years before coming to power. 
While Mao and his cohorts were also capable statesmen who sought to strengthen their 
hold on power through diplomatic means, they had traced all the major achievements in 
nation-building to hard-won military victories. Without scoring decisive, indisputable and 
total victories, the CCP regime may have had to settle at best for a divided rule. The 
Soviet Union would have also wanted China to remain divided, Mao believed, and it was 
only when the CCP leadership demonstrated its power that the Soviets reaffirmed their 
support. The quintessential Maoist expression, that power comes from the barrel of the 
gun, sums up Mao’s belief about politics and violence. 
Chinese leaders both learned from each deterrence case and institutionalized the 
lessons through repetition, indoctrination and scholarly affirmation. One of the most 
explicit lessons learned from deterrence interactions is that credibility is established 
through a decisive military engagement. The Korean War was touted as an example of 
employing carefully prepared forces in substantial numbers to overpower the better-
equipped UN forces. Though China eventually had to settle for a divided peninsula, the 
fact that the UN Command was rolled back and the status quo ante restored and 
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maintained over three years of on-and-off combat established China as a force to be 
reckoned with. Even strong powers such as the US dared not mess with China following 
this victory, the lesson goes.  
The second lesson was that military preparation and diplomatic efforts should be 
concurrent. While scholars have often regarded the advance preparation for war as 
evidence that China had wanted to fight from the start of the conflict, it was regarded 
only as prudent policymaking for the Chinese generals-cum-leaders. War efforts cannot 
be rushed, especially when the aim is to overwhelm enemy forces in a final blow if 
diplomacy fails. Diplomacy and war are not mutually exclusive. These lessons are written 
into official military accounts and political chronology; dozens of books by orthodox 
authors tout the importance of a decisive military victory and that of credibility in 
avoiding future conflicts. In the case of successful deterrence, such as China’s deterrence 
against the US during the Vietnam War, the lesson is seen as proved from the other side: 
because China has established its credibility in the eyes of the US through the Korean 
War and used many of the same communication tools, it avoided a second conflict with 
the superpower. The penchant for meeting challenges with force, at least once, is 
confirmed and reinforced by each incident. 
 
The concern with credibility and modern foreign policy 
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These findings reveal the difficulty of achieving successful deterrence. With the 
challenger bent on testing the tolerance of the defender through a series of probes, it is 
almost inevitable that the defender would begin to question its own credibility in the eyes 
of the challenger. Once these doubts are established, the defender is more likely to 
consider the use of the force not only to reset its security environment but also to affirm 
its reputation for resolve. The two become mutually reinforcing, especially if the 
deterrence process is drawn out and the defender has multiple occasions to be rebuffed. 
Deterrence therefore could more easily fail, both because the challenger may feel that the 
relative balance of power has tilted more to its favor, and because the defender may feel 
the need to put an end to the challenges once and for all. Deterrence success in this 
instance becomes very difficult. 
The concern about credibility is also exceedingly difficult to assuage. These 
worries surfaced in all three cases, despite differences in the degrees of threat to Chinese 
security and the variation in relative strength. When challenged, countries are apt to fear 
that credibility was not strong enough (or otherwise there would not have been 
challenges), setting itself up for a tautology. China did not take its credibility for granted 
after a successful campaign in Korea, the next time it faced threats from India; in fact, 
being confronted by a more equal adversary probably confounded Chinese leaders and 
led to an even stronger desire to establish credibility. 
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In the case of Chinese security policy, China’s better security environment, as a 
result of its abandonment of revolutionary ideology and the end of the Cold War, has 
reduced the threat level to China, which is the premise of deterrence. Yet another source 
of insecurity that used to translate into a heightened concern about credibility, that of 
political vulnerability, has also been reduced through the gradual establishment of certain 
rules about succession and collective leadership. Political leaders do not enjoy 
concentrated power to the extent Mao did during his reign, but likewise also do not face 
the worst-case scenario of total anarchy and unpredictability in the case of death of the 
supreme leader. In the post-Mao era, the greatest source of domestic insecurity would 
likely stem from popular unrest and economic troubles, rather than over-concentrated 
power. As long as the leadership finds its hold on the population more or less secure, it is 
unlikely to experience severe insecurity that convinces them to opt for a forceful response 
to external challenges. 
Yet the historical precedents still have value in post-Mao Chinese foreign policy. 
The challenges China faces today, or conceives of, stem from unresolved disputes that 
have been revived. As recently as 2008, the possibility that Taiwan could elect a pro-
independence president was considered threatening enough to warrant a stern military 
warning, or even an attack. Territorial disputes with Japan over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) 
Islands flared up into angry protests and military maneuvering as recently as 2012 and 
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2013. And frequent skirmishes with Southeast Asian neighbors over the Spratly Islands, 
especially Vietnam and the Philippines, often threatened to escalate into controlled 
conflicts. As China’s land borders became more settled, helped by the normalization of 
Chinese foreign policy and the precedent of fighting decisive wars, the remaining 
disputes are overwhelmingly naval. Despite several naval engagements with Vietnam in 
the 1970s and 1980s and skirmishes in the 2000s between China and the Philippines, no 
significant, premeditated conflicts have been fought. There are fewer precedents on the 
handling of naval deterrence, especially since China has more catching up to do in its 
naval forces. In the case of Taiwan, the explicit warning from the East China Sea military 
exercises of 1995-96 demonstrated China’s resolve but left ambiguities. Unilateral 
military exercises, after all, are vastly different from direct military conflicts, and China 
could not firmly establish its credibility in the absence of an engagement, something that 
is difficult to envision given US involvement in cross-Strait affairs. 
The unresolved conflicts therefore could still create the premise of proper 
deterrence episodes, in which case China’s concern with its own credibility would be an 
important factor to watch. Though balance of power is decidedly in China’s favor now, 
the new battleground on the sea means that Chinese prowess is not as tested, leaving 
room for probing and insecurity. The regime’s use of diplomatic disputes to fan up 
popular support could also backfire and create pressure to respond forcefully. In such 
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deterrence cases, the government’s public statements that emphasize the importance of 
credibility must be closely watched, a sign that preemptive engagement is more likely. 
 
The defender’s concern about credibility, a factor overlooked by classic 
deterrence theory, plays an important role in the decision of the defender to initiate 
conflicts. This dissertation examines the role of credibility in three cases of deterrence 
failures in recent Chinese history and concludes that it contributed to the decision for 
China to go to war. While some of the causes for China’s heightened concern have eased 
in the post-Mao era, this factor remains alive and important in potential challenges in the 
future in unresolved disputes. These findings aim to make both a theoretical and practical 
contribution to the body of literature on security policies.
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